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iAbstrat
This dissertation onsists an introdutory hapter and four empirial essays on the
taxation of rms and individuals. The rst essay onentrates on how the Finnish tax
reform of 2005 aeted voluntary pension plan savings in Finland. The main objetive
is to examine whether or not the overage and/or the amount of savings in voluntary
pension plans hanged as their tax treatment hanged from progressive labor inome
taxation to being subjet to a at-rate apital inome taxation regime. The results
imply that high-inome individuals who faed a derease in their tax inentive to save
in these plans redued their voluntary savings. Savings overage also dereased in this
group but inreased among low-inome individuals whose inentives to save inreased.
It also seems that all of the responses were due solely to a hange in men's behavior.
The seond essay studies tax planning ativity among business owners. The study
uses a orporate and dividend tax reform in Finland in 2005 as an exogenous soure
of tax rate variation. The reform inreased the marginal tax rate on dividends, thus
inreasing the inentives for business owners to pay personal ompensation in the form
of wages rather than dividends. The results support the view that business owners are
ative in inome-shifting. The welfare loss alulations show that the responses have
notable onsequenes for welfare. Also, the size of the hange in the tax inentive and
the monetary gains from tax optimization seem to aet the behavioral inome-shifting
response.
The third essay examines the abolition of equalization tax in Finland in 2005. The
aim of the equalization tax was to protet domesti tax revenues by ensuring that no
dividends ould be distributed from prots that were not subjet to domesti orpo-
rate tax. Equalization tax served this goal by levying an extra orporate-level tax if
dividends were naned from tax-exempt (or leniently taxed) prots and MNEs were
ii
partiularly aeted by this tax. We nd that MNEs inreased their dividend pay-
ments after the repeal of the equalization tax. Also, the repatriation of foreign prots
in the form of intra-ompany dividends inreased among MNEs. Furthermore, the re-
sults imply an inrease in the reported prots of foreign subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs,
suggesting a derease in prot-shifting. However, there are no hanges in the level of
real or nanial investments due to the abolishment of EQT.
In the fourth essay we analyze the eets of a redution in the value-added tax
rate for restaurants in Finland on onsumer pries, demand for meals and employment.
The value-added tax rate was ut from 23% to 13% in July 2010. The results show
that the VAT ut redued restaurant meal pries only a little, by 2% on average.
The redution we found was only a fourth of the full pass-through. The onsumer-
weighted prie response is higher, over half of the full pass-through, implying that
larger restaurants redued their pries more than smaller establishments. There is also
substantial heterogeneity in prie responses by restaurant type as restaurants that are
part of a hain lowered their pries more often than those that do not belong to a
hain. The results suggest that the VAT redution led to no inrease in the quantity of
restaurant meals supplied and no inrease in employment. Also, we do not nd that the
reform led to any hanges in the number of exits from the industry or new businesses
being set up.
Keywords: Taxation, Tax reforms, Firms, Individuals
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Tiivistelmä
Tämä väitöskirja sisältää johdantoluvun ja neljä itsenäistä artikkelia verotuksen
vaikutuksista yritysten ja yksilöiden käyttäytymiseen. Ensimmäisessä artikkelissa tut-
kitaan, miten vuonna 2005 Suomessa toteutettu verouudistus vaikutti vapaaehtoiseen
eläkevakuutussäästämiskäyttäytymiseen. Päätavoitteena on selvittää, muuttuiko sääs-
tämisaktiivisuus ja keskimääräiset talletukset eri ryhmissä säästöjen verokohtelun muu-
tuttua progressiivisesta ansiotuloverojärjestelmästä suhteelliseen pääomatuloverojärjes-
telmään. Tulokset osoittavat, että suurituloiset vähensivät säästöjään vapaaehtoisiin
eläkevakuutustileihin uudistuksen jälkeen. Lisäksi suurituloisten säästämisaktiivisuu-
tensa laski, kun taas pienituloisten säästämisaktiivisuus nousi hiukan. Tulosten perus-
teella muutokset koskivat yksinomaan miesten säästämiskäyttäytymistä.
Toisessa artikkelissa tarkastellaan listaamattomien osakeyhtiöomistajien tulonmuun-
non aktiivisuutta. Tutkimuksessa keskitytään tarkastelemaan Suomessa vuonna 2005
toteutetun yritys- ja osinkoverouudistuksen vaikutuksia omistajien tulolajin valintaan
osinkojen ja palkkojen välillä. Uudistus kasvatti selvästi omistajien kannustimia maksaa
palkkaa osinkojen sijaan. Tulosten perusteella verouudistus vaikutti selvästi tulolajin
valintaan. Tämänkaltaisella käyttäytymisellä arvioidaan olevan merkittäviä vaikutuk-
sia hyvinvointiin. Tulosten perusteella myös verokannustimen muutoksen suuruudella
ja siitä saatavalla rahallisella säästöllä on vaikutus verosuunnittelun laajuuteen.
Kolmannessa tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan ns. täydennysveron poistamisen vaikutuk-
sia monikansallisten yhtiöiden toimintaan. Täydennysveron tavoitteena oli varmistaa,
että osinkoa ei voi jakaa voitoista, jotka eivät kuulu kotimaan yhtiöveron piiriin. Yri-
tys joutui maksamaan täydennysveroa, jos osinkoja rahoitettiin verovapailla voitoil-
la. Täydennysvero poistui käytöstä vuonna 2005, kun yhtiöveronhyvitysjärjestelmäs-
tä luovuttiin. Tulosten mukaan monikansalliset yritykset kasvattivat osingonmaksuaan
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täydennysveron poistuminen jälkeen. Myös kotiutettujen ulkomaisten voittojen mää-
rä kasvoi sisäisten osinkojen muodossa. Lisäksi tulokset osoittavat, että suomalaisten
monikansallisten yritysten ulkomaisten tytäryhtiöiden voitot kasvoivat täydennysveron
poistamisen jälkeen, mikä viittaa siirtohinnoittelun pienenemiseen. Mitään muutoksia
investoinneissa ei kuitenkaan havaittu.
Neljännessä artikkelissa tutkitaan ravintoloiden arvonlisäverokannan alennuksen vai-
kutuksia kuluttajahintoihin, aterioiden kysyntään ja työllisyyteen. Ravintoloiden ar-
vonlisävero alennettiin 23 prosentista 13 prosenttiin heinäkuusta 2010 alkaen. Tulokset
osoittavat, että arvonlisäveron alentaminen laski ravintola-aterian hintaa vain vähän,
keskimäärin noin 2 prosenttia. Liikevaihdolla painotettu hintavaikutus oli suurempi,
mikä tarkoittaa, että suuremmat ravintolat alensivat hintojaan enemmän kuin pienem-
mät. Ravintolan tyyppi vaikutti myös vahvasti hintamuutokseen, sillä ravintolat, jotka
kuuluivat ketjuun alensivat hintojaan huomattavasti useammin kuin ketjuun kuulu-
mattomat ravintolat. Tulokset osoittavat, että aterioiden kysyntä ei lisääntynyt eikä
työllisyys kasvanut veronalennuksen seurauksena. Myöskään poistuvien ravintoloiden
tai uusien ravintoloiden määrissä ei havaittu muutoksia.
Asiasanat: Verotus, verouudistukset, yritykset, yksityishenkilöt
vAknowledgements
When I started studying eonomis at the University of Turku over 10 years ago, I
had no idea that I would now be here defending my PhD thesis. Now the path to this
point seems very logial and lear, but I am sure that many would not have foreast
this outome, any more than I did. Very many people believed in me along the way
and invested a lot of eort in helping me to get here. I want to express my gratitude
to those people. The following thanks ould and perhaps should be muh longer, and
espeially the thanks to friends outside aademia are far too short.
First I want to thank Professor Matti Virén, who oially guided my thesis from
the University of Turku. I am grateful to Seppo Kari, who ended up being my o-author
and being at least partly a supervisor for my thesis. Seppo was also the person who
really supported me in starting my PhD studies and believing that I ould manage to
omplete this book. It has also been a privilege to work with Tuomas Kosonen and
Tuomas Matikka, who have been not only o-authors of my PhD essays but very muh
aeted the researh interests I have in eonomis. We also have many follow-up papers
to ome and I hope we an ontinue to work together in the future. I am also grateful
to Professor Rihard Blundell, who was my supervisor when I visited University College
London.
Thanks go to my two pre-examiners, Professor Eva Mörk of the University of Upp-
sala and Professor Diderik Lund of the University of Oslo. Their insightful omments
and suggestions greatly improved the manusript.
I have been privileged to work at the Government Institute for Eonomi Researh
(VATT) for the entire period of my PhD studies. VATT has oered me all the possible
support, databases and equipment to do my thesis. Thus I want to thank the former
Diretor Generals of VATT, Seija Ilmakunnas and Aki Kangasharju, and the urrent
Diretor General, Juhana Vartiainen, for the opportunity to work at VATT. I am also
vi
grateful to many olleagues at VATT for their omments and guidane at seminars and
otherwise. A speial thank goes to Essi Eerola, who has always been willing to read
my researh papers and give very insightful omments. Outside VATT I am espeially
grateful to Jukka Pirttilä and Kaisa Kotakorpi for their valuable guidane in the proess.
I am very grateful for the nanial support I have reeived from the Alfred Ko-
rdelin Foundation, the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, the Nordi Tax Researh Counil,
the Federation of Finnish Finanial Servies and the Finnish Cultural Foundation.
I am also grateful to my mother Kaija and father Tatu. Both of you have always been
there for me and have always supported my hosen path. I also want to thank my sister
Terhi and brother Petri. Without lose friends and snowboarding life would be boring,
so many thanks go to Jenni and Juho for the great experienes on the slopes and in
the wilds. Also, thank you Vesku for the great disussions and your insightful thinking
outside the box. Finally, I ould have not done this thesis without you, Johanna. You
have supported me unonditionally during my studies. Many thanks for that.
Helsinki, Deember 2013
Jarkko Harju.
Contents
Abstrat i
Tiivistelmä iii
Aknowledgements v
Chapter 1. Introdution 1
1.1. Taxation: general remarks 1
1.2. Designing a tax system 2
1.3. Methods: seeking redible evidene 4
1.4. Behavioral responses - what matters? 8
1.5. Summary of essays 11
Bibliography 17
Chapter 2. Voluntary Pension Savings and Tax Inentives: Evidene from Finland 21
2.1. Introdution 21
2.2. Voluntary pension plans in Finland 25
2.3. Empirial analysis 32
2.4. Eonometri results 41
2.5. Conlusion 47
Bibliography 49
Appendix 52
viii
Chapter 3. Business Owners and Tax Avoidane: Empirial Evidene from a
Finnish Tax Reform 57
3.1. Introdution 57
3.2. Finnish inome tax system and the tax reform of 2005 61
3.3. Theoretial framework 69
3.4. Empirial analysis 74
3.5. Results 84
3.6. Extensions 92
3.7. Conlusions 99
Bibliography 101
Appendix 103
Chapter 4. Dividend Taxes and Deisions of MNEs: Evidene from a Finnish Tax
Reform 111
4.1. Introdution 111
4.2. The taxation of dividends in Finland 115
4.3. Theoretial preditions 118
4.4. Empirial analysis 125
4.5. Conlusions 147
Bibliography 149
Appendix 153
Chapter 5. Restaurant VAT ut: Cheaper meal and more servie? 157
5.1. Introdution 157
5.2. Institutions and preditions 161
5.3. Methods 165
5.4. Data 170
ix
5.5. Results 176
5.6. Conlusions 200
Bibliography 203
Appendix 205

CHAPTER 1
Introdution
This dissertation omprises four empirial essays on the taxation of rms and indi-
viduals. In partiular, this study analyzes the eets of various tax reforms. The rst
essay studies the eets of taxes on the deisions of individuals onerning voluntary
pension savings. The seond essay evaluates the eets of tax inentives on inome-
shifting between tax bases among business owners. The third essay onentrates on
the responsiveness of multinational enterprises to taxes. The fourth essay examines
the eetiveness of onsumption taxes levied on restaurants. Thus the essays in this
dissertation are highly poliy-relevant and ontribute to the eld of empirial publi
eonomis.
This hapter is organized as follows. First I make some general remarks about
taxation in setion 1.1. Setion 1.2 briey disusses eieny and equity aspets in tax
design and setion 1.3 oers a view of how we should analyze the eets of taxation
empirially. In setion 1.4 I disuss the interpretation of the empirial observations.
Finally, in setion 1.5 I present a summary of eah artile.
1.1. Taxation: general remarks
Publi spending needs to be funded by taxes. At the very minimum, publi spending
guarantees national defense and the maintenane of law and order in a state. However,
in many ountries publi spending inludes various other expenses, e.g. health are,
shooling and retirement benets, whih are, at least, partly funded by government,
therefore inreasing the need for more tax revenue. Although publi spending sets
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a level for tax revenue, these two are not ompletely independent from eah other.
For example, government's high emphasis on redistributing inome in spending side
ertainly also aets the struture of tax system. In this dissertation I do not fous on
the ombined struture of publi spending and taxation, as I take the level of spending
given.
1
In general, tax revenue is mainly olleted by taxing onsumption and apital, or-
porate and personal inome, whih are all relevant from the point of view of this disser-
tation. Taxes an be divided into two ategories: indiret and diret taxes. The former
are taxes that are olleted in the prodution proess, and not levied diretly on inome.
The latter, on the other hand, are levied diretly on inome. Consumption taxes oer
an example of indiret taxes, whereas apital, orporation and personal inome taxes
are examples of diret taxes.
1.2. Designing a tax system
The question of how to ollet tax revenue to fund publi spending is at the ore
of publi eonomis and leads to onsiderations of how to design a tax system. The
design of a tax system essentially raises issues onerning the eieny and equity of
the system.
2
As regards eieny, traditional eonomis textbooks will say that the market oers
eient outomes (Myles (1995)). However, there are many dierent markets operating
in the real world. Thus it is hard to nd an eient outome for eah and every market.
In some ases markets may even generate market failures. In suh ases, government
intervention may atually inrease eieny. However, the standard approah to ex-
amining the eieny of taxes is to oer insights into how taxes ould ause as little
ineieny as possible.
1
Tanzi and Shukneht (2000) oer a nie review of historial trends in taxation and publi spending.
2
Administrative osts and the transpareny of a tax system, for instane, are also important when
designing a tax system.
1.2. Designing a tax system 3
Taxes alter relative pries in a market and reate a wedge between the prie paid by
the buyer and the prie reeived by the seller. In this dissertation the learest example
of this is given in hapter 5, where the VAT on restaurant meals represents the wedge.
Consequently, this learly reates osts for both onsumers and rms ompared to a
ase without VAT. This leads to onsiderations of how and to what extent eonomi
agents respond to these prie hanges and how large the osts of these prie hanges
are for agents.
3
In general, to be able to design a tax system we should have information on how
taxes aet the behavior of individuals and rms. Theory provides mehanisms and
preditions whih are then tested empirially. In a good and redible empirial study
the aim should be to estimate the behavioral parameters produed by the theory. In
this way we an gain an understanding of the real auses and the extent of the eets.
Empirial results with an adequate theory provide information about the eets, whih
then oers us a framework in whih to design tax systems. In this dissertation I estimate
the eets of various tax reforms on the behavior of individuals and rms whih are
then appliable in designing a tax system.
Nevertheless, equity reasons are also important. Although private markets may oer
eient outomes, they may not always be distributionally optimal or soially desir-
able. A government may want to adjust the distribution of inome through taxes and
subsidies, although this ould ause ineienies in the eonomy. This leads eonomists
to study the equity aspets of tax reforms.
The design of a tax system is ompliated as there is ommonly a trade-o between
the two perspetives of equity and eieny: the objetive of reating a more equal
tax system auses more ineieny, and vie versa. Consider, for example, that the
objetive is to obtain a more equal inome distribution through inome taxation or
3
A reent and very omprehensive book on tax design is the Mirrlees review (2010 and 2011).
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subsidies to the poor. Suh an objetive requires an inrease in the progressivity
4
of the
tax ode. This reates detrimental inentives in the eonomy whih ould then lead to
an inrease in ineieny due to hanges in the behavior of eonomi agents.
The fous in this dissertation is solely to investigate the eieny, and not the
equity, aspets of various taxes.
1.3. Methods: seeking redible evidene
There is a lear tension in the eld of empirial reseah in eonomis between so-
alled 'strutural' and 'redued-form' approahes (see Chetty (2009a)). The strutural
approah tries to model the omplete eonomy from eonomi behavior and then es-
timate the eets of the poliy on behavior and welfare. The redued-form approah
instead tries to estimate the eets of a ertain exogenous shok on behavior. Propo-
nents of the strutural approah laim that there is only little we an learn from the
results of redued-form studies in terms of welfare analysis. Then again, proponents
of the redued-form approah say that the identiation in strutural studies is often
too suspiious, for example beause of the strong assumptions, omitted or unobservable
variables and seletion problems.
There is also a middle ground between these two approahes alled the 'suient
statisti' view (Chetty (2009a)). This view derives welfare formulas in whih estimates
from program evaluation an be used. My study builds on the redued-form way of
thinking but I also disuss the welfare onsequenes of the results in eah hapter.
In reent years, an inreasing number of empirial eonomis studies in various sub-
elds have onentrated on estimating the eets aused by government interventions
on eonomi outomes using miro data. Angrist and Pishke (2010) present a de-
sription of developments in empirial researh in eonomis. Over the last ouple of
4
Progressivity means that the tax rate on a marginal inrease in inome is higher than the average tax
rate. Thus, the average tax rate inreases as inome rises.
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deades the miro-based empirial methods have been vastly expanded. Experimental
researh designs have mostly replaed previous methods mainly based on orrelations.
Although the aim in eonomis has always been to estimate ausal eets, nowadays
identiation is usually taken more seriously than before. Eonomists are keen to use
methods onentrating on how we an identify the eets of ertain hanges, e.g. in
government poliy. In a way this is also what separates empirial eonomis from other
soial sienes, as identiation is muh more the fous in eonomis than in other so-
ial sienes. Muh of this development in the eld of empirial researh in eonomis
is due to the inrease in aademi interest in poliy-relevant questions, espeially in the
eld of publi eonomis. This has led to a onentration on the design of empirial
work.
The most promising way for eonomists to be able to solve the eet of one variable
on another is to organize random trials. In this ase, a randomly hosen group faes
a treatment, while another group does not (i.e. the latter is used as a ontrol group).
It is then possible to ompare the outomes of these two groups. In suh randomized
trials, the 'internal validity' of the results is ommonly good, meaning that the empirial
design determines ause-and-eet relationships. However, there are also some problems
in randomized trials. One, perhaps the greatest, of the hallenges in randomized trials
is the 'external validity' of the results: how well the results are appliable to other
groups. Some studies of this type use small and very spei populations of people
whih give lear eets for those individuals, but the results may not neessarily oer
insights for wider interpretation. Thus, one an see a trade-o between internal and
external validity. The ritis have laimed that the fous is too muh on details, and
not enough on generally important topis. Surely this may be true in various ases, but
nevertheless a small and narrowly dened population ould oer new insights whih
ould then be extended, with ertain assumptions, to broader populations.
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Empirial publi eonomis literature has also progressed in reent years. However,
lean-ut random trials are rare in the publi eonomis literature. This is natural as,
for example, it is hard to get poliy makers to randomize tax rates for people.
5
Thus a
muh more ommon researh design in the eld of empirial publi eonomis is natu-
ral experimental methods, utlizing government interventions as an exogenous variation.
These methods are losely related to randomized experimental designs. However, in
natural experimental designs the onditions of the exogenous experiment are deter-
mined naturally, whereas in randomized experiments the experimentalist determines
the onditions. In natural experimental designs the external validity is usually good,
but often it an be hard to demonstrate the internal validity onviningly. In this
dissertation I use natural experimental methods as I analyze the eets of tax reforms.
The methods that eonomists use in natural experimental studies are ommonly
instrumental variables, regression disontinuity methods and dierene-in-dierenes.
6
The last, dierenes-in-dierenes, is the one that is used the most in this thesis with
panel data. The intuition of the method is to have two groups of rms or individuals, one
onfronting a spei treatment (treatment group) and one being left untreated (ontrol
group). The outomes of these groups are ompared over time, before and after the
treatment. The main identifying assumption is that, in the absene of the treatment,
the average outomes of the treatment and ontrol groups would have developed along
parallel trends over time. Also, the omposition of the agents in the two groups should
remain the same over time. If onviningly demonstrated, the dierene-in-dierenes
method shows the ausal eet of a treatment.
5
However, this does not mean that there is no room for random trials in publi eonomis. In the US,
the government randomized negative tax rates for individuals already in the late 1960s (Mott (2004)).
Also, many subelds in publi eonomis have gained their strongest evidene based on randomized
experiments, e.g. tax evasion literature (Slemrod et al. (2001), Kleven et al. (2011)).
6
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) oer an extensive review of reent developments in empirial eono-
metris.
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In hapters 2, 4 and 5 the method I apply is the dierene-in-dierenes approah.
In hapter 2 I onstrut the treatment group based on the information from the pre-
reform harateristis of individuals that had an inentive to hange their voluntary
pension plan saving behavior as a result of the tax reform. The ontrol group ontains
individuals who did not fae hanges in the taxation of their savings. Similarly in
hapter 4, the treatment group ontains multinational rms that faed an inentive
hange due to the tax reform. Those rms are ompared to similar rms that did
not have a hange in their tax inentives. In hapter 5 the omparisons are between
industries and ountries that resemble eah other. In this essay, restaurants in Finland
are ompared over time in partiular to Estonian restaurants, and also to Finnish hotels.
In hapter 3 the method applied is the rst-dierene model, whih is losely related to
the dierene-in-dierenes method. In this hapter we see that tax inentives following
the reform hanged dierently for similar business owners, whih enables us to apply
the rst-dierene model. In this hapter we also apply another natural experimental
method, the instrumental variable approah.
In addition to developments in experimental researh design, the literature on sta-
tistial signiane has progressed onsiderably over the last deade. Many papers have
found that the way the standard errors are alulated when using experimental designs
is denitely not trivial (Bertrand et al. (2004), and Cameron et al. (2008)). This is
important in order to redibly onlude the statistial signiane of the results.
Also, the sensitivity of the results is taken into aount more seriously in urrent
researh than it was a deade or two ago. Robustness heks and plaebo treatments
are more thorough nowadays and artiles without these are not likely to fulll aademi
standards. I also disuss these issues in every hapter separately. Also, many aademi
journals have reently started to require the data on whih the analysis is made, in order
to allow anyone to repliate the results. This further guarantees the trustworthiness of
the analysis.
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In addition to developments in the methods of miroeonometris, the amount and
quality of data available have also inreased a lot in reent years. In partiular, register-
based miro-level data sets have beome available to researhers. This oers exat
preision, whih, with new innovative ways to examine the responses to agents' behavior,
inreases the overall quality of the empirial researh.
In this dissertation the data sets are always based on registers. In the rst essay I
apply individual-level data produed by Statistis Finland, inluding basially all rele-
vant tax variables from the register and also many important ategorial variables. The
data are a representative sample of the Finnish population. In all the other hapters
the main data ome from the Finnish Tax Administration. The unique harateristi
of the data is that they basially inlude all Finnish rms and they ontain all relevant
information on the nanial statements and taxation of rms. In addition, the se-
ond essay makes use of owner-level data for business owners, inluding personal level
information, whih are used together with the rm level information. In addition, all
the data sets used in this dissertation are in panel form, ontaining observations for
the same individuals or rms over time. These data sets oer very preise information
whih will produe results that are representative for the whole population.
1.4. Behavioral responses - what matters?
Generally the osts of taxes are greater than the inrease in revenue from the taxes.
The dierene between these is often alled the deadweight loss or the exess burden
of the tax, whih measures the eieny of the tax. The deadweight loss of a tax
is ommonly analyzed by omparing distortionary tax to non-distortionary lump-sum
tax, whih does not by denition oer any inentives for behavioral hanges. The
magnitude of the deadweight loss depends on the extent to whih agents hange their
behavior due to the tax. Subsequently, for eieny analysis, it is very important to
know the elastiity of the response to the tax hange.
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In general, there are two hannels of responses: the substitution eet and the in-
ome eet. The substitution eet means that, in the ase of inome taxes for example,
the inome earned per working hour is smaller, and thus makes it less attrative for
onsumers to work as muh as without taxes. On the other hand, the inome eet
goes in the opposite diretion, the loss in inome from taxes enouraging onsumers to
work more to guarantee a ertain inome level. The inome eet is also present with
lump-sum taxes, but the substitution eet is not. Empirial studies have found the
substitution eet to be the dominant hannel of the two.
The history of eonomis shows that eonomists have laimed taxes to have dierent
eets at dierent times. Previously it was ommon for eonomists to be ertain that,
for example, inome taxation reates greatly harmful behavioral responses. Inome
taxation was found to be very detrimental espeially for work inentives (Feldstein
(1995)). Reently, this onlusion has been hallenged by the view that inome taxation
has a muh smaller eet on real eonomi variables for most individuals (Saez et al.
(2012)). This is mostly related to the development of empirial methods and data
availability.
However, even though the hange in thinking in many elds and the developments
in empirial methods have happened very reently, already two deades ago Slemrod
(1992) oered an interesting view of how we should onstrut our thinking on the eets
of taxes. He analyzes the evidene from the 1980s tax reforms in the US and onstruts
a view of what we an learn from these responses.
Taxes may have omplex eets. Aording to Slemrod, the relative prie hanges
due to tax hanges an aet various outomes. In addition to real responses, there
are also other relevant margins of response whih should be separated. Examples of
these are misreporting of inome, the struture of nanial laims, the legal form of
organizations, transations over time, et. Based on these, Slemrod reates a hierarhy
struture of behavioral responses to taxation. The rst tier is the timing of transations.
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This onerns the question of whether there are opportunities over time to realize tax
savings that outweigh the osts. This ould be seen as a reation to the hange in tax
law with only a temporary hange in behavior.
The seond tier is nanial and aounting responses. Evidene that supports the
rearrangement of eonomi laims falls under this ategory. This ould be possible e.g.
where there are two tax bases only one of whih is hanged. In hapters 3 and 4 we
nd evidene supporting this type of behavior.
The third hannel is the real eonomi deisions of eonomi agents. These are,
for instane, deisions regarding hours of work by individuals, investment deisions by
rms et. This is also the most fundamental hannel of response. These responses are
analyzed espeially in hapters 4 and 5.
However, it is also essential to onsider the osts aused by taxes together with
the hannel of response. Costs resulting from time transations or the restruturing of
nanial laims are dierent e.g. to those related to real eonomi deisions regarding
hours of work. If, for example, the elastiity with respet to the inome tax on work
partiipation or hours of work is large, the deadweight loss ould also be large. But if
the response to taxes is only in transations over time or the restruturing of nanial
laims, the deadweight loss an be very dierent and muh lower even if the response in
these margins is large. Therefore it is not only relevant to know the dierent margins
of response, as Slemrod noted, but it is also important to know the extent of the osts
aused by taxes in order to be able to analyze the welfare eets of the taxation (Chetty
(2009a and 2009b)). This ould lead to very dierent onlusions about the eieny
of the tax system. I oer interpretations of my ndings from the eieny perspetive
at the end of eah subsetion in setion 1.5 after I present the main observations of eah
paper.
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1.5. Summary of essays
1.5.1. Voluntary pension plan savings. Many western ountries fae inreasing
diulties in naning their urrent soial seurity programs due to the dereasing
proportion of the working-age population. In response they have been utting the
future sope of their publi pay-as-you-go pension systems. In order to guarantee
an adequate level of old-age inome, they have tried to enourage individual pension
savings by granting tax allowanes.
The most ommon reason for enouraging tax-deferred voluntary pension plans
(VPP) is to inrease the aggregate savings rate and seure the inome of retired persons.
The paternalisti argument in favor of preferential tax treatment is that savers are
myopi and they start to provide for pension savings too late and save too little. Also,
the huge heterogeneity in people's saving behavior, with some saving too muh and
some not enough, ould be a reason for governments to allow tax preferred pension
shemes (Banks and Diamond (2010)).
However, there are ounter-arguments too. Only a small part of the inreased pen-
sion funds are new savings. Most are atually transfers from other savings instruments
to tax-preferred instruments (see e.g. Attanasio et al. (2005), Chung et al. (2008) and
Disney et al. (2010)). In addition, many front-loaded VPP instruments are problemati
in ountries where ertain subpopulations an get larger tax advantages than others.
This is espeially true if the taxation is progressive.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirially how the Finnish tax reform of
2005 aeted the behavior of VPP savers in Finland. The main objetive is to examine
whether or not the overage and/or the amount of savings in VPPs hanged. The
reform altered the savings tax inentives as the tax treatment of VPPs hanged from
progressive labor inome taxation to a at-rate apital inome taxation regime. In the
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previous tax shedule it was problemati as individuals faed dierent savings inentives
depending on their taxable inome.
Aording to the results, it seems obvious that the reform of 2005 aeted the VPP
savings behavior of individuals. High-inome individuals who faed a derease in their
tax inentive to save in VPPs redued their savings. Also the savings overage among
suh persons dereased but inreased among low-inome individuals whose inentive to
save in VPPs inreased. It seems that all of the responses were solely due to a hange
in men's behavior. Thus women did not hange their behavior at all as a result of the
reform.
However, muh of the responses ould ome from individuals' realloation of sav-
ings and not from hanges in total savings, as many previous studies have indiated.
Unfortunately, due to the lak of miro data on total savings, this study annot answer
how aggregate savings were aeted by the reform. For this reason it is hard to oer
a onlusive analysis of the eetiveness of the taxes on savings based on the results of
this paper.
1.5.2. Inome-shifting between tax bases. Behavioral responses to inome
taxation derease the eieny of a tax system. One soure of this kind of ine-
ieny is tax avoidane ativity. Inome-shifting between dierently taxed tax bases
is a ommon example of a tax avoidane hannel. Inome-shifting is generally reog-
nized in the eonomi literature, but only a few studies have oered redible empirial
estimates of the extent of it (Gordon and Slemrod (2000), Fjaerli and Lund (2001),
Sivadasan and Slemrod (2008), Pirttilä and Selin (2011)).
Inome-shifting is espeially relevant for entrepreneurs and the owners of privately
held businesses. Compared to wage earners, entrepreneurs and business owners have
greater legal possibilities to engage in inome-shifting, as they an more easily apply
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dierent types of inome as a soure of personal ompensation. Inome-shifting possibil-
ities reated by the tax ode are espeially pronouned within a so-alled dual inome
tax system, in whih the eetive marginal tax rate shedules for labor inome and
apital inome dier signiantly from one another.
Finland applies the priniple of dual inome taxation for individuals, under whih
a business owner's wages and dividends from the rm are taxed dierently. The artile
uses the extensive orporate and dividend tax reform of 2005 as an exogenous soure
of tax rate variation. The reform inreased the marginal tax rate on dividends, thus
inreasing the inentives for business owners to pay wages instead of dividends as a
form of personal ompensation.
The results support the view that business owners are ative in inome-shifting.
Inreased dividend taxation following the 2005 tax reform led owners to adjust the
omposition of their inome by signiantly inreasing wage ompensation at the ex-
pense of dividends. From the welfare loss point of view, the inome-shifting response
was notable. In addition, there was not muh heterogeneity in the inome-shifting re-
sponse between dierent entrepreneurs or rms. However, the size of the tax inentive
hange and the monetary gains from tax optimization seemed to aet the behavioral
inome-shifting response.
The results imply a welfare loss due to the inome-shifting responses. Nevertheless,
the welfare eet of inome-shifting depends strongly on the marginal resoure ost.
If it is very small, the welfare loss is also small (see Chetty (2009b)). The osts are
very diult to approximate as we do not have any diret data for them. Although
these osts are not neessarily great, the results suggest that osts have an eet on
the estimate of inome-shifting. Thus the osts are ertainly not negligible. From that
perspetive inome-shifting still reates ineienies in the eonomy. The ineieny
aused by inome-shifting might be mitigated by simply re-designing and adjusting the
tax ode and regulations.
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1.5.3. Equalization tax. The role of multinational enterprises (MNEs) has in-
reased in the world eonomy in the last ouple of deades. MNEs operate in various
ountries whih oer them possibilities to exploit ross-ountry dierenes in tax sys-
tems. This development has inreased interest in international tax design issues among
both poliymakers and aademis. Therefore it is no surprise that several OECD oun-
tries have reformed their orporate tax systems very atively in reent years. A ommon
trend in Europe has been to redue tax rates on orporate prots. The European trend
an be explained at least partly by a worry that rms might inreasingly move their op-
erations to other ountries. MNEs also exploit variations in tax rates aross ountries,
thus lowering the tax bases in high tax rate ountries.
Given the importane of MNEs and the diulties in designing the taxation apply-
ing to them, there has been surprisingly little empirial researh establishing natural
experimental evidene between taxes and the behavior of MNEs (Bond et al. (1996),
Bond et al. (2007), Hines and Rie (1994), Clausing (2003), Bartelsman and Beetsma
(2003) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008)).
This artile studies the abolition of equalization tax (EQT) in Finland in 2005. It
is used as a natural experiment to examine the behavioral responses of MNEs to taxes.
The aim of EQT was to protet domesti tax revenues by ensuring that no dividends
an be distributed from prots that are not subjet to domesti orporate tax. EQT
served this goal by levying an extra orporate-level tax if dividends were naned from
tax-exempted (or leniently taxed) prots, and MNEs were partiularly aeted by this
tax. The main interest lies in the eets of the abolishment of EQT on dividends,
investments and the use of alternative hannels to repatriate foreign prots.
The empirial results suggest that aeted rms inreased their dividend payments.
Also, the repatriation of foreign prots in the form of intra-ompany dividends inreased
after the repeal of EQT. Furthermore, the results imply an inrease in the reported
prots of foreign subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs, suggesting a derease in prot-shifting.
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However, there are no hanges in the level of real or nanial investments. The results
emphasize the sensitivity of dividend deisions to taxes both outside and inside an
MNE.
Nevertheless, it seems that taxes do not aet the real deisions of MNEs as their
investments do not hange. The only hannels of response seem to be between the
nanial aounts of rms aross ountries, the seond tier in the Slemrod (1992) artile
mentioned before. Thus, even though there are lear responses to taxes in the behavior
of MNEs, eieny is not neessarily aeted muh as real eonomi responses, in terms
of hanges in investments, are not deteted.
1.5.4. Consumption tax. In many ountries the share of onsumption taxes of
total tax revenues has inreased signiantly in reent years. In addition, many gov-
ernments have tried to stimulate ertain industries by allowing them to have redued
onsumption tax rates. These poliy hanges have been targeted at labor-intensive in-
dustries. The main objetive was to stimulate employment, but also to redue the inen-
tive for these businesses to operate in the blak eonomy (CD Diretive 1999/85/EC).
Despite the vast theoretial literature (e.g. Ramsey (1927), Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976), Myles (1989)), urrently there is surprisingly little empirial literature onern-
ing the eets of onsumption taxes on pries, demand and employment (Carbonnier
(2007), Doyle and Samphantharak (2008), Kosonen (2010), Marion and Muehlegger
(2011)). Also, many previous studies fous solely on prie responses. However, prie
responses are not suient statistis for eieny analysis. It is more important to
know the demand elastiity.
Aording to theory, goods with less elasti demand should be taxed more than
goods with high elastiity (Ramsey (1927)). Therefore it is important to study to what
extent onsumption tax aets onsumer pries and demand. This paper tests these
impats with an analysis of the eet of a ut in the value added tax (VAT) rate on
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restaurants in Finland when the VAT rate was ut from 23% to 13% from July 2010.
Also, the paper analyzes the eets of the reform on employment as the main objetive
was to stimulate job reation.
The results show that the VAT ut redued restaurant meal pries by approximately
2% for a representative restaurant in Finland. The implied full pass-through would have
been a 7.4% derease in onsumer pries. Thus the redution we found was a fourth
of the full pass-through. The onsumer-weighted prie response is higher, over half
of the full pass-through, implying that larger restaurants redued their pries more
than smaller establishments. There is substantial heterogeneity in the prie responses
by rm-level harateristis. Restaurants that are part of a hain lowered their pries
more often than those not belonging to a hain. The results suggest that there was
no quantitative inrease in demand for restaurant meals and that employment did not
inrease as a result of the VAT redution. Also, there was no hange in the number of
exits from the industry or new businesses established in the industry due to the reform.
The results imply that the VAT redution for restaurants did not manage to aom-
plish its main objetive, whih was to inrease employment in the industry. Also, the
reform redued pries only a little and the demand for restaurant meals did not hange.
This leads to the onlusion that demand for restaurant meals is inelasti and that the
VAT redution for restaurants was not very eient.
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CHAPTER 2
Voluntary Pension Savings and Tax Inentives: Evidene from
Finland
1
Abstrat. This paper studies empirially savers' behavioral responses to the Finnish
tax reform of 2005 by using a omprehensive panel data. The tax shedule of volun-
tary pension savings hanged from progressive to proportional, hanging the saving
inentives in dierent subgroups. The results indiate that the reform altered saving
behavior by reduing voluntary pension saving overage among high inome-earners
by 4 perentage points and inreasing it among low inome-earners by 2 perentage
points. The reform also redued annual saving ontributions among high inome-
earners by over 20 perent. The estimated eets result entirely from the hanged
saving behavior of men.
Keywords: Voluntary pension savings, Tax reform, Tax inentives
JEL lassiation odes: H24, H31
2.1. Introdution
Many western ountries fae inreasing diulties in naning their urrent soial
seurity programs due to the dereasing proportion of the working-age population. In
response they have been utting the future sope of their publi pay-as-you-go pension
systems. In order to guarantee an adequate level of old-age inome, they have tried to
enourage individual pension savings by granting tax-allowanes. Well known examples
of tax-favored individual pension savings plans are the IRAs
2
and 401(k) plans in the
USA, Personal and Stakeholder pensions, and ISAs and TESSAs in the UK and Riester
1
This paper has been published in FinanzArhiv Publi Finane Analysis, Vol 69, Marh 2013, 3-29.
2
List of abbreviations in the order of appearane in the paper: IRA, Individual Retirement Arrange-
ment; ISA, Individual Savings Aount; TESSA, Tax-Exempt Speial Savings Aount; EET, Exempt
Exempt Taxable; TEE, Taxable Exempt Exempt; TR2005, Finnish Tax Reform on voluntary pension
savings in 2005; VPP, Voluntary Pension Plan; TyEL, earnings-related pension; GDP, Gross Domesti
Produt; DIT, Dual Inome Tax; METR, Marginal Eetive Tax Rate; MTR, Marginal Tax Rate;
OLS, Ordinary Least Squares.
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pensions in Germany. Most OECD ountries provide speial tax treatment for some sort
of individual saving plans (OECD 2005). A ommon system is EET (exempt-exempt-
tax) whih allows the saving to be dedutible from the inome tax base, the earnings
of pension aumulations are tax-free, and the pensions, when withdrawn, are taxable
inome. Another widely used system is TEE (tax-exempt-exempt) where ontributions
are taxed but arued interest and benets are untaxed.
The most ommon motivation for tax-deferred voluntary pension plans is to inrease
the aggregate saving rate and seure the inome of retired persons.
3
The paternalisti
argument in favor of preferential tax treatment is that savers are myopi and they
start to provide for pension savings too late. Some eonomists also argue that the
illiquidity of pension savings makes their elastiity dier from that of preautionary
savings. This would justify preferential tax treatment for pension savings (Fehr et al.
2008, p. 193). In the reent Mirrlees review, Banks and Diamond (2010) disuss why
tax-favored pension savings are important. Their most fundamental argument for tax-
favored treatment is the huge heterogeneity in people's saving behavior: some save too
muh and some do not save enough. They also argue that other methods should be
thought of than just exemptions from tax bases. For example, it would be possible
to inrease the role of employers or nanial institutions in the private pension saving
markets.
However, there are some ounter-arguments too. Only a small part of the inreased
pension ontributions are new savings. Most is atually transfers from other savings
instruments to tax-preferred instruments.
4
In addition, many front-loaded voluntary
pension plan instruments are problemati in ountries where ertain subpopulations
3
Bernheim (2002) presents a omprehensive analysis onerning taxation and savings.
4
General equilibrium models are used to estimate the eets of voluntary pension plan savings on
the apital stok and inremental savings. Imrohoroglu et al. (1998) have onluded that there are
inreases in national net savings, apital stok and additional savings but the eets are not extensive.
Fehr et al. (2008) estimated the additional savings to be 22% higher than in the Imrohoroglu et al.
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an get larger tax advantages than others. This is espeially true if the dedutions are
made based on progressive taxation.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirially how the Finnish tax reform of
2005 (TR2005) aeted the behavior of voluntary pension plan (VPP) savers in Finland.
The main objetive is to examine whether or not the overage and/or the amount of
savings in VPPs hanged. Before the reform, savings were deduted from labor inome
and the benets were taxed as labor inome, subjet to a steeply progressive tax rate
shedule
5
. TR2005 hanged the tax treatment to a at-rate apital inome taxation
regime. The previous tax shedule was seen as being problemati as the individuals
faed dierent saving inentives depending on their taxable inome.
6
The most drasti
inentive hange was among high inome earners who were lose to retirement age.
Among young and middle inome individuals the hange in the inentives was very
moderate, if any. Due to this variation, the reform seems to open up an interesting
opportunity to estimate the eets of the tax hange on dierent inome groups.
This paper applies the TR2005 as a natural experiment using a dierene-in-dierene
method. In the analysis, the ontrol group is formulated for middle inome individuals,
who are ompared to high and low inome individuals who faed the largest hanges in
their saving inentives.
The questions examined by Attanasio et al. (2005), Chung et al. (2008) and Disney
et al. (2010) are losest to that of this paper. Attanasio et al. (2005) studied the
eet of tax dedutions on saving behavior in the UK. They examined the tax reform
of 1999 and found that the amount of tax-exempted savings inreased in all age groups
due to the reform. Partiularly young people saved more. However, at the same time,
5
Finnish inome taxation follows the Nordi dual inome tax system in whih labor inome is subjet
to a progressive tax shedule whereas apital inome is taxed using a at tax rate. (See Sørensen
(1994), (2005)).
6
Kari and Lyytikäinen (2004) and Määttänen (2005) have drawn attention to this inentive aspet of
TR2005.
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the amount of aggregate savings dereased in all age groups and the largest dereases
were among the young and low-inome groups. Chung et al. (2008) and Disney et al.
(2010) studied the UK tax reform of 2001. Chung et al. did not nd any signiant
growth in new private savings after the reform. However, in the ase of low labor
inomes the amount of savings inreased. Another fous in their study was the hanges
in the overage of having a retirement plan before and after the reform. There was
no evidene indiating any inrease in the overage. Disney et al. argued that the
assoiated hange in the ontribution eiling beneted low and zero-earners; this group
added the overage of savings in voluntary pension aounts. The results also provided
evidene that women added overage. In ontrast to the rest of the sample, the level
of ontributions among those who beneting from the higher ontribution limit did not
fall.
7
Aording to my results, it seems obvious that TR2005 aeted the VPP saving
behavior of individuals. The overage of high inome earners dereased after the reform
by 4 perentage points and ontributions went down by 20 perent ompared to middle
inome earners. Low inome earners inreased their partiipation rate by 2 perentage
points but their level of savings did not hange. These results seem to be onsistent
with the theoretial results. In addition, it seems that all of the responses were due to a
hange in men's behavior. Thus, women did not hange their behavior at all. However,
muh of the responses ould ome from individuals' realloation of savings and not from
the hanges in total savings, as many previous studies have indiated. Unfortunately,
due to the lak of miro data on total savings, this study annot answer how aggregate
savings were aeted by the reform.
7
There is also a omprehensive previous literature about the eets of tax-dedutible savings on ag-
gregate savings in the US (see e.g. Engen et al. (1994), Venti and Wise (1992, 1995), Attanasio and
DeLeire (2002), Benjamin (2003), Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004).
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The paper proeeds as follows. In the seond setion, I present a short introdution
to the Finnish VPP savings sheme and the tax system related to it, and I will also
desribe the model for assessing the eetive tax rate for savers before and after TR2005.
The third setion ontains empirial analysis where I introdue the hypotheses and
explain the eonometri method used, in addition to whih I present the data set and
oer the estimates of the responses to TR2005. Finally, in the fourth setion I present
my onlusions.
2.2. Voluntary pension plans in Finland
In the international literature it is ommon to desribe pension systems in terms of
three `pillars'. In Finland the pension system
8
is based on a publi rst pillar whih is
divided into two parts. First, the national pension is the basi tier whih is a at-rate
benet, naned through taxes and ontributions. The seond part is the earnings-
related pension (TyEL), whih is naned from ompulsory ontributions paid by em-
ployees and employers
9
. The seond pillar omplements the rst pillar and inludes
voluntary olletive industry-spei or employer-spei shemes. The third pillar
omprises voluntary pension plans (VPPs).
The publi pension provision is omprehensive in Finland, representing over 10 per
ent of GDP. This share is expeted to grow in the future. Total pension expenditure
onsists approximately of 95 perent statutory pensions and 5 perent VPPs. How-
ever, VPP savings have gradually grown in popularity in reent deades, but these
instruments still have only a minor role ompared to the other saving options.
8
The Finnish Centre for Pensions (Handbook 2007:6) oers a omprehensive desription of the Finnish
pension system.
9
In 2005 there were reforms in earnings-related pensions. The main hanges in the reform were that
earnings over persons' entire working areer were taken into aount, a exible retirement age between
63 and 68 was introdued, higher aumulation rates for older workers were applied, and inreased
life expetany started to matter for pensions with being lowered as life expetany inreases. At the
same time there was a wide debate about the sustainability of the publi pension system.
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Figure 1 depits the inrease in the overage and in the amount of VPP savings from
1995 to 2007. The data set is from Statistis Finland. It is a representative sample of
Finnish people, inluding approximately 28,000 individuals per year. By weighting the
data to represent the whole population of Finland, we an alulate the sum of VPPs
and the number of savers per year. The sum of savings is in millions of euro and at
1995 pries. The grey pillars are the sum of dedutions per year (left vertial axis) and
the thik line shows the number of savers (right vertial axis).
Figure 1. The sum of VPPs and the number of savers from 1995 to
2007 (Soure: Inome Distribution data 19952007 (Statistis Finland))
The number of savers has inreased onsiderably. Growth was stable until 2001 but
thereafter the number of savers exeeded the average trend growth. In 2004 and 2006
there was just a small inrease, whih might be explained by the overall unertainty
regarding the new tax system. However, the number of pension savers rose by almost
50,000 savers from 2004 to 2005 and from 2006 to 2007.
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The sum of savings has inreased over the last deade. The annual growth in sav-
ings has been fairly linear, exept for 2001 and after the reform, in 2005 onwards. The
poor eonomi yle ould also have aeted the subnormal growth in savings in 2001.
However, savings growth piked up from 2001 to 2005. In 2006 the aggregate amount
of savings dropped approximately to the 2003 level and seemed to stay there in 2007
too. One explanation is that the deline in the sum of savings is simply realloation
of savings from VPPs to other types of saving options, leaving aggregate savings un-
aeted. Unfortunately, due to the data limitations it is not possible to evaluate the
hanges in aggregate savings aused by TR2005.
2.2.1. Tax sheme for VPPs. A notable feature of the Finnish inome tax sys-
tem is the Nordi-type dual inome tax (DIT), whih ombines a steeply progressive
taxation of labor inome and a at-rate taxation of apital inome. Interestingly, al-
though this has reeived little attention in tax literature, the DIT system oers two
alternative ways to tax private pension savings in EET system. The rst way is to ap-
ply a progressive labor inome tax shedule and the other is to impose at-rate apital
inome taxation on both ontributions and withdrawals. The dierenes in tax rates
will have dierent impliations for saving inentives.
Tax literature has paid some attention to progressive taxation applying an EET
model (OECD (1994), (2005)), whih is the model applied to VPPs in Finland. A-
ording to the literature, a progressive tax sheme an lead to a wide variation of
inentives between dierent ontributors and may end up favoring savers in high in-
ome lasses. A solution to these heterogeneous inentives under DIT ould be to tax
VPPs with at rates of tax on apital inome.
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Tax reform of 2005
The Finnish law on VPPs was based on labor inome taxation until 2004. De-
dutions were made from labor inome and tax on withdrawals was paid as on labor
inome. After the reform dedutions are made from apital inome and withdrawals
from these savings are taxed aording to the at tax rate on apital inome (Ministry
of Finane (2005)). VPP ontributions are deduted from apital inome after natural
dedutions
10
, interests and losses. If the total amount of ontributions is higher than
the total amount of apital inome, the taxpayer is entitled to dedut the deit from
the labor inome taxes.
Before the reform, dedutions were appliable if the saver had undertaken to keep
his/her savings in the plan until the age of 60. This ontratual limit was also inreased
to 62 years after 2005. In addition, the maximum dedutable amount dereased on-
siderably from 8,500 to 5,000 euro under to the reform.
11
Transitional rules
The new law ame into fore at the beginning of 2005. However, it inluded the
following transitional regulations. Firstly, in 2005 it was still possible to apply the
old rules to ontrats onluded before the government's rst proposal (6 May 2004).
Seondly, the tax rules on pension plans inluded transitional provisions for savers
entering into a ontrat between the government's rst reform proposal and the end of
2004. Savers making their rst ontributions in that period deduted their ontributions
from labor inome and their future withdrawals will be taxed on the basis of apital
taxation. This means that persons with high marginal labor inome tax rates had a
10
Aording to Finnish tax law, natural dedution refers to a taxpayer's right to dedut from investment
inome all expenses inurred in aquiring and maintaining suh inome (Ministry of Finane (2005).
11
The Finnish government reformed the VPP system again from the beginning of 2010 by introduing
a new pension saving instrument. It was aimed to inrease ompetition and lower the saving expenses
of savers. Only insurane ompanies were allowed to provide pension savings plans until the end of
2009, but after 2010, for instane, all banks were allowed to oer VPPs.
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major inentive to save in pension plans in 2004. Thirdly, the ontratual age remained
at 60 years (or lower, depending on whih age limit was valid when the ontrat was
made) until 2009 if the ontrat with the insurane ompany was made before the rst
government proposal. Sine 2006, all dedutions have been made from apital inome
and withdrawals are taxed at the apital tax rate.
2.2.2. Measuring tax inentives of VPP savings. A ommon way to ompare
tax inentives to save in a partiular instrument is to alulate the marginal eetive
tax rate (METR), as was done in the OECD (1994) report. The METR represents
the tax burden of an investment option better than the nominal tax rate beause it
allows one to take into aount many other fators whih interat with taxes (OECD
(1994), p. 62). For example, ination, tax base regulations and overlapping taxes an
be inluded in the formula of the METR.
Kari and Lyytikäinen (2004) introdued a simple way to measure the tax burden
of dierent private investments in Finland and applied also the METR approah to
VPPs in the EET system. The method of Kari and Lyytikäinen is simpler than the
OECD (1994) version, and under their approah the METR an be presented in just
one formula.
12
The pattern of the METR is based on
13
(2.2.1) METR =
1
rT
ln
(
1− τt
1− τt+1
)
where r is the real interest rate, T is the saving period, τt is the marginal tax rate
(MTR) for inome from whih dedutions are made and τt+1 is the MTR for pensions.
The model relies on the following assumptions. The ontribution is one euro out of
the saver's disposal inome in a private pension plan at time t = 0. The holding period
12
Wakeeld (2009) also used a similar method to alulate eetive tax rates for dierent assets under
the UK tax system.
13
The notation is slightly dierent from Kari and Lyytikäinen (2004).
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is T years and the withdrawal is made in the form of a lump sum. The real interest
rate r is xed and positive. The model assumes perfet ompetition in the insurane
market and that there are no management or other expenses.
The lower theMETR, the better it is for the saver. The expression 2.2.1 is negative
if (1− τt)/(1− τt+1) is between zero and one, and positive if (1− τt)/(1− τt+1) is larger
than one. The saving inentive is aeted by two dierent fators when the interest
rate is xed: rst, the dierene between MTRs on ontribution and withdrawal periods
and, seond, the holding period of the savings. If the MTR is higher for the ontribution
period (τt) than for the withdrawal period (τt+1), the tax authorities do not ollet all
the tax dedutions bak as tax inome. In a progressive tax sheme it is likely that
some savers ould benet from this. Therefore, some savers, espeially those in the
highest tax brakets, ould have a substantial tax inentive by saving in VPPs.
Hene
(2.2.2) METR


>
=
<
0⇐⇒ τt


<
=
>
τt+1
Seondly, the length of the holding period of savings (T ) aets the extent of the
inentives. The METR on retirement savings approahes zero in the holding horizon,
as Kari and Lyytikäinen point out. Before the reform the eetive tax rate ould have
been very low for short holding periods (T ), for example the METR an be as low
as -150% if the holding period is only 3 years but it inreases to -15% if the holding
period is 20 years and further inreases to over -10% when the holding period is over
30 years. Therefore, it is lear that holding period aets the METR but still does not
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eliminate the inentives totally. In the new system, where the at tax rate is applied,
the eetive tax rate is zero and the inentives are equal between dierent savers.
Kari and Lyytikäinen (2004) illustrate in more detail the eet of the reform by
simulating METRs at dierent xed labor inome levels (Figure 2)14. The Figure il-
lustrates that persons with low annual labor inome (20,000 ¿) and low annual pension
inome (below 15,000 ¿) had very high positive METRs. Therefore, it was not very
protable for them to invest in the pension plans. Persons with higher annual labor
inome (40,000 ¿ and 60,000 ¿) ould benet from below-zero METRs. For example,
if the annual pension level is half of annual wages, the METRs for wages of 20,000 ¿,
40,000 ¿ and 60,000 ¿ are 28%, -20% and -54%. After the reform, in the apital taxa-
tion model, the METR equals zero and thus the inentives are the same independent
of their inome levels.
As TR2005 onsiderably hanged saving inentives for VPPs depending on individu-
als' wage levels, how individuals reated to these hanges is an empirial question. The
natural way to study the eets of the reform is to evaluate the hanges in ontributions
and the rate of partiipation of dierent subgroups. To summarize, due to the hanges
in tax inentives, the empirial analysis is based on the following preditions that we
observe
• a derease in VPP savings and partiipation among high labor inome individ-
uals and espeially those lose to the retirement age, and;
• an inrease in VPP savings and partiipation among low labor inome and
young individuals.
14
In their analysis they applied the TUJA miro simulation model whih is in use at VATT (Govern-
ment Institute for Eonomi Researh). The alulations are made assuming a 4% interest rate and a
10-year investment horizon.
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Figure 2. The marginal eetive tax rates on pension savings for dif-
ferent labor and pension inome (the interest rate is assumed to be 4%
and the saving period is 10 years)
2.3. Empirial analysis
2.3.1. Methods. The following empirial strategy is based on the assumption that
the reform of 2005 was exogenous for individuals and that inentives hanged dierently
in dierent subgroups. Thus, it provides an opportunity to estimate the eets of the
reform on the saving overage and the amount of savings by using a dierene-in-
dierene strategy. This method requires individuals to be divided to those who were
aeted by the reform (treatment) and to those who were not aeted (ontrol).
The dierene-in-dierene model an be written as follows
(2.3.1) Pi,t = α + δTreati + γTreatiD + βXi,t + ηi + εi,t,
where Pi,t is an outome variable that is the annual (t) amount of VPP savings as
a logarithm per individual i or a dummy variable with a value of one if the individual
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saves in a VPP and zero otherwise. Treat is a treatment status equaling zero for the
ontrol group and one for the treatment group, D represents an indiator of the post-
reform period and X is a vetor of ontrol variables. In most ases the estimation
strategy is a xed-eet method in whih the parameter ηi an be separated from the
error term. The vetor of ontrol variables inludes individuals' age, apital inome,
debt, labor inome and tax payments when the xed-eet model is used. In the ase of
the random eet or probit model, the ontrol vetor also inludes other harateristis
like marital status, plae of residene, type of residene and soioeonomi status. In
addition, all the speiations inlude year dummies for ontrolling the time trend and
a exible linear time trend for the treatment group.
Ideally, a dierene-in-dierene method would be used if the treatment and ontrol
groups ould be seleted randomly. However, the 2005 reform in Finland does not
oer a random division into treatment and ontrol groups. Thus, it is neessary to
use a natural experimental approah and formulate the ontrol and treatment groups
arefully. The natural starting point is to onsider the MTRs on pension and wages,
as showed in the theoretial setion. Individuals are aware of the MTR on their wages
but not the MTR on pensions. To be able to use equation (2.2.1) in formulating the
hypotheses, we need to assume that individuals expet the MTR on pensions to follow
the urrent tax ode for pensions. This is a sensible assumption sine there is no lear
reason why individuals would have any better information about the future tax sheme
than the urrent tax shedule. Espeially individuals with ontinuous work biographies
generally fulll this assumption; however, for workers with a fragmented work history
this would not neessarily hold very well. Thus, after the main eonometri results in
Setion 2.4, I perform a battery of robustness heks to show that the main results are
not aeted by the formulation of the ontrol and treatment groups.
As stated in the Setion 2.2.2, the inentives to invest in VPPs depend on the
MTRs on wages and pensions. Figure 3 presents the MTRs both on annual pensions
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and wages in 2003 to point out the inentive dierenes depend on inome levels.
15
There are at least four important aspets in Figure 3. First, the MTRs are muh
higher for pensions between 7,500 and 16,000 euros than for wages, whih is a result
of dierenes in dedutions between wages and pensions. Seond, for the highest wage
braket the MTR is always higher than the MTRs on pensions if the pension inome is
lower than 55,000 euros (pensions higher than 55,000 euros are very rare in Finland).
Therefore, individuals in this tax braket had lear inentive to save in VPPs before the
reform. Third, individuals in the seond-highest wage braket (wages between 33,000
and 58,000 euros) did not have suh a lear inentive to save in VPPs, assuming that
their pension inome will not be below 7,500 euros (whih is a very low annual pension
level in Finland). Fourth, individuals in the wage band from 7,500 to 22,000 euros faed
higher a MTR on pensions than on wages and therefore had a positive METR, implying
no lear inentive to save in VPPs (again, assuming that their pension inome will not
be below 7,500 euros).
Both the ontrol and treatment groups are formulated based on the tax shedule
for wages and pensions presented in Figure 3. Using the marginal tax rate shedule
for 2003, the highest braket in the tax shedule onstitutes a rst treatment group
(taxable labor inome higher than 58,000 euros in 2003)
16
. The subgroup that saw an
inrease in inentives to save due to the reform is low inome earners. Following the
reform their positive METR went to zero.
17
Therefore, a seond treatment group is for
low earners whih had taxable labor inome between 7,500 and 22,000 euros in 2003.
The seond highest tax braket ats as a ontrol group (taxable labor inome from
33,000 to 58,000 euros) and is not assumed to experiene any hange in inentives.
15
To be lear, wages refer here to the total sum of annual taxable labor inome and pensions are the
total sum of annual pensions taxed as labor inome.
16
The information for 2002 is used similarly in the robustness heks.
17
If we assume that after the reform the apital tax rate is the same in the ontribution and withdrawal
period. However, this is not a huge assumption, at least in the sense of savers' expetations.
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Figure 3. Marginal tax rates on pensions and wages in Finland in 2003
The main assumption of the dierene-in-dierene method is the parallel time
trends between the ontrol and treatment groups before the poliy hange. Thus, the
time eets must be ommon for the ontrol and treatment groups. In addition, the
omposition of the treatment and ontrol groups must remain stable over time. If these
assumptions hold, the model identies the oeient γ in equation (2.3.1), whih is the
average treatment eet on treated individuals.
Until now, I have ignored the eet of the investment horizon whih was disussed
in the previous setion. For a short investment horizon, the benets for high inome
earners might have been onsiderable before the reform. This is taken into aount
in the regressions by introduing a new dummy (G), whih is one if the individual
is over 50 years old in 2003 and zero otherwise. By using this dummy it is possible
to investigate if the eets of the reform are dierent among older treated individuals
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than younger. This an be done by using a triple-dierene strategy and the estimated
equation is now
Pi,t = α + δTreati + φGi + ιT reatiGi + γTreatiD +(2.3.2)
λGiD + θGiTreatiD + βXi,t + ηi + εi,t,
where G is one if the individual is over 50 years old in 2003 and zero otherwise. The
other variables in equation (2.3.2) are the same as in equation (2.3.1). Naturally, the
parallel trend and the omposition of the group assumptions must hold both in this
ase and in the standard dierene-in-dierene model. The parameter θ reveals the
triple dierene estimate, and therefore tells us whether older high earning savers saved
dierently from others after the reform.
One additional point to be taken into aount is that the provision allowed existing
savers to use the former system until the end of 2005. People ould hoose to make
ontributions up to the upper limit and gain the tax benets. It was also possible to
dedut ontributions from labor inome in 2004 and pay apital tax if the ontrat
between the saver and the insurane ompany was signed between 6 May 2004 and the
end of 2004; in other words, it was possible to reeive an extra tax benet in those
years. These speial provisions reated a lear inentive to antiipate the reform. Thus,
to make sure that this does not bias the estimates, the estimations are also performed
without the years 2004 and 2005. Then years 2000-2003 represent the before period
and 2006 and 2007 the after period. Otherwise the years from 2000 to 2004 are used as
the before period and the years from 2005 to 2007 as the after period.
2.3.2. Data. The data set is from Statistis Finland. It is a panel-stratied sample
of approximately 53,000 annual observations. The data set is a representative sample
of the Finnish population and overs the period from 2000 to 2007. The analysis is
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made by examining two outome variables: the overage of savers (partiipation) and
the amount of VPP ontributions deduted from the inome tax bases as a logarithm
(labor and apital). The data set ontains many other relevant ontinuous variables
inluding labor inome, apital inome and age, whih are used as ontrol variables.
There are also many important dummy variables like gender, plae of residene, marital
and soioeonomi status. Unfortunately, the data has no variable representing the
private wealth of a person, thus it is impossible to analyze the hanges in total wealth
of individuals beause of the reform.
The desriptive statistis of the main variables used in the estimations are given
in Table 1 below. These desriptive statistis are alulated for the subsample whih
inludes only the ontrol and the two treatment groups desribed above.
18
All the
euro values are given in urrent pries for eah year. VPP savings represents annual
savings in the aounts. In the ontrol group the mean VPP savings are over 300 euros
but in the high treatment group the mean is over 900 euros. VPP savings overage is
also muh higher in the high treatment groups. In the low treatment group the mean
savings amount in VPPs is below 80 euros and 8 per ent of population save.
18
The desriptive statistis for the whole data set are presented in the Appendix, Table A1.
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Variables Control Treatment - high Treatment - low
VPP savings overage 0.1726 0.2589 0.0784
0.3779 0.4381 0.2687
VPP savings 326.4 921.5 79.5
1052.5 2102.2 463.4
Labor inome 39284.3 72519.8 15233.7
11641.6 45360.6 6953.3
Debts 25893.1 35268.0 11053.3
40196.3 64909.6 22768.0
Capital inome 2860.9 10460.8 928.1
35222.8 58348.3 7686.4
Home ownership 0.7307 0.8293 0.4057
0.4436 0.3763 0.4910
Taxes paid 14274.9 33955.9 3594.1
11587.4 31058.5 3397.4
Male 0.7483 0.8532 0.4194
0.4340 0.3539 0.4935
Age 47.9 49.8 50.5
11.5 9.9 17.5
Number of observations 28727 6608 175917
Note: Table ontains mean (uneven rows) and standard deviation (even rows) values of variables
ategorized by ontrol and treatment status.
Table 1. Desriptive statistis by groups, data from 2000 to 2007
2.3.3. Desriptive analysis of the treatment and ontrol groups. Figure 4
shows the overage of VPP savers in two separate treatment groups and in the ontrol
group. The low-inome treatment group inreased its overage over the whole exam-
ination period. The inrease is almost linear, starting from under 5 per ent in 2000
and ulminating at approximately 13 per ent in 2007. The high-inome treatment
group inreased its overage from 2000 to 2004, but after that the share dereased. The
overage in the ontrol group inreased from 2000 until 2003 but thereafter the share
is relatively onstant. The overage of pension savers in the high-inome treatment
group seems to be similar to the ontrol group before the reform, whih is essential to
the analysis, sine the dierene-in-dierene model assumes ommon trends between
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groups. The pre-reform trends also seem to be relatively similar in both the low-inome
treatment group and the ontrol group, although overage inreased a bit faster in the
ontrol group. Figure 4 provides desriptive support for our hypotheses: individuals
in the high labor inome treatment group lowered their partiipation rate and those in
the low labor inome treatment group inreased their partiipation rate.
Figure 4. Partiipation rate and 95% ondene intervals in the treat-
ment and ontrol groups from 2000 to 2007
Figure 5 represents the mean of annual VPP savings in the treatment and ontrol
groups for those who saved in VPP aounts. Thus all those who did not save are
exluded from this desriptive analysis. There seems to be a downward trend in mean
payments after the reform. In all groups the mean amount of VPP savings dereased
learly from 2005 onwards. The mean savings amount in the high labor inome treat-
ment group delined muh more than in the ontrol group after the reform. The mean in
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the high labor inome treatment group is 2,500 euros after the reform, whereas before
it was approximately 4,000 euros. On the other hand, it seems that the mean sav-
ings amount in the low inome treatment group did not hange muh after the reform
ompared to the pre-reform years.
Figure 5. Mean savings amount and 95% ondene intervals in the
treatment and ontrol groups from 2000 to 2007
All in all, the desriptive analysis indiates that the trends in the mean savings
amount are similar between groups before the reform, and the main assumption of
ommon time trends between groups, identifying the eet of the reform, seems to
be reasonable. In addition, it is possible to ontrol for possible trend dierenes in
the eonometri speiation by introduing separate time trends for the groups. This
further strengthens the identiation strategy.
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As mentioned above, the atual reform was announed already in 2004 and this
enabled individuals to antiipate the reform in 2004. Also, the mixed system in 2005
auses problems for the identiation. Figure 5 reveals that there might have been
some antiipation before the reform, at least in 2004 in the high-inome treatment
group. Thus, to gure out the eet of the reform, the results are presented using the
years from 2000 to 2003 as a before period and the years 2006 and 2007 as an after
period.
2.4. Eonometri results
The dependent variables are the dummy variable with a value of one if the individual
has saved in VPPs and zero otherwise, and the logarithm of the annual amount of VPP
savings for an individual. The main ontrol variables are age, labor inome, apital
inome, debts and tax payments. The ontrol vetor inluding gender, residene area,
eduation and marital status is also added to the speiation as a dummy when a
method other than xed eets is used. In addition, all the speiations inlude exible
time trends. The most interesting oeient is the interation term of the after-dummy
and treatment variables. Changes in behavior in the treatment groups due to the reform
are deteted if these interation terms produe a statistially signiant oeient.
As mentioned in the desriptive analysis setion, only a relatively small fration of
individuals save in VPPs in Finland, thus there are many observations with a value of
zero VPP savings in the data set. Therefore, when the analysis onerns the savings
amount, the dependent variable is a ombination of disrete and ontinuous distri-
butions. In this ase, it would be diult to nd a very redible estimator if only
ross-setion data were available. However, the ability to use panel data methods eases
this diulty. In line with Angrist (2001), the starting point is simply to use a xed-
eet OLS model to estimate hanges in both overage and the savings amount of
treated individuals. There are at least two major benets in using this method: rst,
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the alulation of the average treatment eets or standard errors is not omputation-
ally demanding and seond, the interpretation of the results is easy. However, I also
estimate the overage hanges using a probit model to ompare them to the base ase
result of the xed-eet model.
19
Table 2 presents the xed-eet OLS and probit
20
results of the partiipation eets
in both the high and low labor inome treatment groups.
21
The results imply that the
overage of VPP savers dereased in the high inome treatment group and inreased
in the low inome treatment group. The results indiate that high-inome earners de-
reased their partiipation by approximately 4 perentage points. Among low-inome
earners, overage inreased from 1 to 2 perentage points beause of the reform. How-
ever, the hange in partiipation is not statistially very lear beause the hanges are
signiant only at the 10 per ent level.
High inome = Treat Low inome = Treat
Variable Fixed eet Probit Fixed eet Probit
After*Treat -.034*** -.046*** .012* .022**
(.012) (.015) (.007) (.008)
Treat .062*** -.032***
(.009) (.002)
N 31 790 31 790 197 357 197 357
R2 0.047 0.062 0.046 0.144
Log likelihood -14458.4 -49135.3
Note: The table reports the eets of the reform on the probability of saving in voluntary pension saving
plans. All the estimates are marginal eets of the reform. All the models are estimated with a full
set of ontrol variables and ontrolling for separate linear time trends for treatment individuals. The
personal-level ontrols are apital inome, age, age square, debts, and in the probit models residene
area, gender, eduation, marital status and residene type were added as dummy variables. The robust
standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2. Results for the partiipation estimation
19
This part of the analysis is similar to the analysis of Disney et al. (2010).
20
The marginal eets of the interation terms are alulated as Blundell et al. (2004) proposed.
21
The results of the xed-eet models with all the ontrol variable oeients are presented in the
Appendix, Table A2.
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Table 3
22
reports the estimates of the hanges in the log of savings amounts among
the treated groups due to the reform. In the high-inome treatment the savings amount
delined on average by 24 per ent. This an be seen as a relatively signiant hange.
However, the estimate of the low-inome treatment group is not statistially signiant
and the estimate value is nanially minor - a hange of only approximately 3 per ent
on average.
23
High inome = Treat Low inome = Treat
Variable Random eet Fixed eet Random eet Fixed eet
After*Treat -.255*** -.242*** .132* .035
(.088) (.092) (.070) (.076)
Treat .533*** -.365***
(.093) (.044)
N 6 273 6 273 16 205 16 205
R2 0.120 0.046 0.112 0.043
Note: The table reports the eets of the reform on the log of the savings amount in voluntary pension
saving plans. The estimation is made using panel methods, random and xed-eet models. Both
models are estimated with a full set of ontrol variables and ontrolling for separate linear time trends
for treatment individuals. The personal-level ontrols are apital inome, age, age square, debts, labor
inome and tax payments, and in the random eet model residene area, gender, eduation, marital
status and residene type were added as dummy variables. The robust standard errors are presented
in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3. Results for the log of savings
As a robustness hek, the division into ontrol and treatment groups is also per-
formed by using taxable labor inome and MTR shedules for 2002. Otherwise the
22
The Hausman test suggests that the xed-eet model should be used instead of random eets
beause, for instane, in the high-inome treatment ase the null hypothesis of rm-spei eets
unorrelated with the regressors is rejeted at the level of 494.89 (hi 2(5)). However, the oeient
of interest is not very sensitive to the model. Also, inluding muniipality-level ontrols in the model
does not aet the main results. These results are available upon request.
23
The estimation is also performed using regression disontinuity design (RDD) for the high-inome
treatment group. The RDD result is approximately a 17 per ent derease in the savings of high-
inome treated individuals, whih is not statistially dierent from the base ase result of a 24 per ent
derease. These results are available upon request.
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groups are formed similarly, as presented in Setion 2.3.1. The results are not statisti-
ally dierent from the base ase results, see Appendix, Table A6. This gives support to
the base ase estimates and further strengthens the onlusion that the reform aeted
individuals' saving deisions.
24
Another way to test the robustness of the results is to hek the existene of trends
before the reform with a plaebo intervention. I assume now that the reform was
implemented in 2002 and use the years 2000 and 2001 as a pre-reform period and
2002 and 2003 as post-years. When low inome treatment overage is ompared to
the ontrol group, the trend seems to be slightly dierent between groups, but after
introduing a linear time trend for low inome treatment the dierene vanishes. The
results are not statistially signiantly dierent from zero between the groups in any
other omparisons with overage or the amount of savings. This test oers further
support to my identiation strategy.
The transitional provisions and the antiipation of the reform an have an eet
on the results for the years 2004 and 2005; the results may be biased beause of these
reasons. If there was antiipation the base ase results would be downward-biased.
Both antiipation and transitional provisions need to be onsidered. One possible way
to overome the problem is to delete the years 2004 and 2005 from the data set. Then,
2000-2003 are used as a pre-reform period and 2006-2007 are used as a post-reform
period. The results of the estimations are presented in the Appendix, Table A4 and
A5. Aording to these results the estimates are larger than in the base ase. However,
the estimates are not statistially dierent from the base ase results, and thus the
antiipation eet is not very lear.
24
Mean labor inome for 2000-2003 was also used for formulating the treatment and ontrol groups.
The estimates are not statistially dierent from the base ase results. These and the results arrived
at using 2002 labor inome are available upon request.
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More omprehensive analysis of antiipation suggests no hanges before the reform:
neither of the treatment groups hanged behavior in 2004 or 2005 in a statistially
signiant way. The results imply that there was no statistially or eonomially sig-
niant dierene in the behavior of individuals in these years. Thus, the base ase
results seem to oer robust estimates of the reform on the behavior of low and high-
inome earners.
25
Aording to the METRs, the hypothesis is that older individuals had a greater
inentive to hange their behavior even more than other individuals in the treatment
group. The triple dierene model with a xed-eet strategy estimated aording to
equation 2.3.2 does not oer statistially signiant estimates of interest where people
over 50 years old in 2003 were multiplied with the high-inome treatment group. Thus,
we an onlude that savings overage did not hange dierently among older treated
individuals due to the reform
26
. One possible explanation is that older people are not
well informed (or are not interested) in their pensions and inentives to save. This has
been observed previously in the empirial literature
27
. The results from the estimations
are parallel with this onlusion. Another explanation for the results ould be that older
people's ontributions to VPPs have a larger disounted value than those of younger
people and they do not hange their behavior even though the tax inentive to save in
VPPs dereased after the reform.
A further examination of responses by gender reveals that only males reated to the
reform. The two rst olumns in Table 4 represent the results for the divided sample by
gender. The results indiate that the total response omes solely from the male treated
25
As told before, the reform redued the upper limit of tax dedutions from 8,500 euros to 5,000 euros.
This ould, for example, solely explain the redution in high-inome earners voluntary pension savings.
However, I have done a robustness hek by substituting all observations higher than 5,000 euros VPP
savings before the reform by 5,000 euros, and the estimates are not statistially dierent from the base
ase results.
26
These results are presented in the Appendix, Table A6.
27
See for example Lusardi (2008).
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group. Thus high-inome males are less likely to be VPP savers after the reform than
before, and also the savings of high-inome males are muh lower beause of the reform.
Moreover, the result implies that savings behavior did not hange among high-inome
females at all. All the responses ome from men's hanged behavior in the high-inome
treatment group. It is also notieable that the estimates for females' partiipation and
savings amount are positive, whih would imply inreased savings. Nevertheless, these
estimates are not statistially dierent from zero.
The third and fourth olumn in Table 4 ontains the estimates for the low-inome
treatment group by gender. The eets of the reform for the low-inome treatment
group oer similar results: overage hanged statistially signiantly only among
males. The estimates imply that only males responded to the reform in the low-inome
treatment group by being more ative in saving in VPPs. As an be expeted from the
base ase results, the amount of savings did not hange, either for males or females.
The results suggest that high-inome savers seemed to hange their behavior atively
beause of the reform by both lowering their saving ativity and lowering the amount
of savings. On the other hand, the results imply that low-inome individuals inreased
their ativity to save in VPPs but did not hange the amount of savings. It also seems
lear that gender is important role for the responses; all of the hanged behavior is
made by males. These results support the view that males respond more atively than
females to hanges in saving inentives.
However, there are additional aveats whih should be emphasized. The eets
of added marketing of voluntary pension plans and the eet of the reform of earning-
related pensions annot be fully ontrolled in the estimations. It is also possible that the
reform of earnings-related pensions has indeed hanged younger VPP savers' behavior
but it has hardly hanged savings in dierent inome groups. These eets annot be
ignored and might ause bias in the observed results.
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High-inome treatment Low-inome treatment
Partiipation Savings Partiipation Savings
Variable Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
After*Treat -.033** .019 -.265** .076 .010* .003 -.074 .043
(.017) (.042) (.106) (.169) (.006) (.014) (.093) (.121)
N 25,718 7,726 4,564 1,709 88,569 99,845 7,349 8,856
R2 0.047 0.059 0.067 0.143 0.041 0.053 0.224 -0.161
Note: The table reports the eets of the reform on the probability of saving and the amount of savings
in voluntary pension saving plans. The estimation is made using xed-eets OLS. All the estimates
are marginal eets of the reform. All the models are estimated with a full set of ontrol variables
and ontrolling for separate linear time trends for treatment individuals. The personal-level ontrols
are apital inome, age, age square, debts, labor inome and tax payments. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4. The dierenes in responses between male and female treated
individuals: hanges in partiipation and savings amount
2.5. Conlusion
The Nordi-type dual inome taxation oers two alternatives for taxing VPPs. The
rst option is the progressive labor inome taxation and the seond is to apply the
proportional apital inome taxation. In 2005 the taxation of VPP instruments hanged
from labor inome to apital inome taxation in Finland. The reform hanged the tax
inentives to save in VPPs dierently in dierent subgroups.
The empirial analysis of this reform was onduted by using miro data and eono-
metri methods in a before-after framework. Before the reform, high inome individuals
had a lear tax inentive to save in VPPs, but the reform abolished these inentives. In
addition, the reform inreased the inentives of low-inome individuals to save in VPPs.
Therefore, subpopulations faed the tax hange dierently, and it is reasonable to ex-
amine the eets of this reform on savers' behavior by using a dierene-in-dierene
strategy.
The results imply both eonomially and statistially signiant estimates. Firstly,
the results imply that high labor inome savers lowered their savings amounts and the
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overage in VPPs. The probability to save in voluntary pensions delined by approx-
imately 4 perentage points and savings dereased by 24 per ent on average, among
high earners. Low inome earners' probability to save inreased from 1 to 2 perentage
points but their savings amounts did not hange. Gender seems to have a remarkable
role in explaining the responses sine the results indiate that only males hanged their
behavior.
With the proportion of working-age populations delining, governments are faing
huge budgetary pressure, espeially in ountries suh as Finland, where pensions are
mostly government-funded. The results of this analysis show that tax inentives have
an inuene on private pension savings although the responses are heterogeneous.
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Appendix
Variable Mean SD N Min Max
VPP savings overage 0.067 0.249 424304 0 1
VPP savings 97.3 576.1 424304 0 14780.3
Labor inome 14827.2 15539.0 424304 0 1014499
Debts 10664.9 30860.7 424304 0 4412886
Capital inome 1034.2 13455.9 424304 0 4652870
Home ownership 0.333 0.471 424304 0 1
Taxes 4245.3 7770.3 424304 0 1334057
Male 0.417 0.493 424304 0 1
Age 38.9 22.3 424304 0 103
Table A1. Desriptive statistis, data from 2000 to 2007
2.. Appendix 53
High-inome treatment Low-inome treatment
VARIABLES Savings Coverage Savings Coverage
Labor inome -0.005 0.002 0.007** 0.015***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Debts -0.002* -0.001* -0.008 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
Capital inome 0.001** 0.001 -0.003*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Tax payments 0.051 0.014** -0.019 -0.006***
(0.045) (0.007) (0.026) (0.002)
Age 0.331*** 0.075*** 0.302*** 0.037***
(0.051) (0.005) (0.029) (0.001)
Age square -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.000***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year 2001 0.042 -0.002 0.035 -0.000
(0.040) (0.003) (0.040) (0.003)
Year 2002 -0.052 0.021*** -0.066 0.024***
(0.044) (0.004) (0.044) (0.004)
Year 2003 0.038 0.037*** 0.021 0.040***
(0.038) (0.004) (0.037) (0.004)
Year 2004 0.138*** 0.030*** 0.113*** 0.032***
(0.043) (0.004) (0.043) (0.004)
Year 2005 0.139*** 0.027*** 0.062* 0.023***
(0.035) (0.004) (0.033) (0.004)
Year 2006 -0.015 -0.000 -0.049*** -0.002
(0.024) (0.003) (0.017) (0.001)
Year 2007 -0.017 0.000 -0.055* -0.001
(0.024) (0.002) (0.038) (0.004)
Treat*After -0.242*** -0.034*** 0.035 0.012*
(0.092) (0.012) (0.076) (0.007)
Observations 6,273 33,444 16,205 188,414
R-squared 0.046 0.047 0.043 0.047
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 In thousands of euros
Table A2. Fixed-eet results with full set of ontrol variables
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High inome = Treat Low inome = Treat
Variable Partiipation Savings Partiipation Savings
After*Treat -0.045*** -0.242** 0.018** 0.143*
(0.019) (0.116) (0.007) (0.080)
N 31,790 6,009 197,357 16,784
R2 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.043
Note: The table reports the eets of the reform on the probability of saving in voluntary pension
saving plans. The estimation is made using a xed-eet method. All the estimates are marginal
eets of the reform. All the models are estimated with a full set of ontrol variables and ontrolling
for separate linear time trends for treatment individuals. The personal-level ontrols are apital inome,
age, age square, debts, labor inome and tax payments.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A3. Results for partiipation and savings as groups dened by
2002 data
High inome = Treat Low inome = Treat
Variable Fixed eet Fixed eet
After*Treat -0.056*** 0.025***
(.014) (.005)
N 25 605 144 256
R2 0.050 0.056
Note: The table reports the eets of the reform on the probability of saving in voluntary pension
saving plans. All the estimates are marginal eets of the reform. All the models are estimated with
a full set of ontrol variables and ontrolling for separate linear time trends for treatment individuals.
The personal-level ontrols are apital inome, age, age square, debts, labor inome and tax payments,
and in the probit models residene area, gender, eduation, marital status and residene type were
added as dummy variables. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A4. Results for the partiipation estimation: pre-reform period
2000-2003 and after period 2006-2007
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High inome = Treat Low inome = Treat
Variable Random eet Fixed eet Random eet Fixed eet
After*Treat -.393*** -.355*** .158*** .096*
(.088) (.093) (.035) (.049)
N 4 561 4 561 11 829 11 829
R2 0.234 0.121 0.268 0.211
Note: The table reports the eets of the reform on the log of the amount of savings in voluntary
pension savings plans. The estimation is made using panel methods using random and xed-eets
models. All the models are estimated with a full set of ontrol variables and ontrolling for separate
linear time trends for treatment individuals. The personal-level ontrols are apital inome, age, age
square, debts, labor inome and tax payments, and in the random eet model residene area, gender,
eduation, marital status and residene type were added as dummy variables.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A5. Results for the log of savings: pre-reform period 2000-2003
and after period 2006-2007
Partiipation Savings
Variable FE OLS FE OLS
DDD -.005 -.068
(.024) (.203)
DD -.031** -.202***
(.014) (.051)
Age*After -.042*** -.181*
(.010) (.110)
N 34,088 34,088
R2 0.049 0.137
Note: The table reports the eets of the reform on the probability of saving in voluntary pension
saving plans. The estimation is made using a xed-eet method. All the estimates are marginal
eets of the reform. All the models are estimated with a full set of ontrol variables and ontrolling
for separate linear time trends for treatment individuals. The personal-level ontrols are apital inome,
age, age square, debts, labor inome and tax payments.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A6. Triple-dierene model for high-inome and treated individ-
uals over 50 year old: hange in partiipation and amount

CHAPTER 3
Business Owners and Tax Avoidane: Empirial Evidene from
a Finnish Tax Reform
1
Abstrat. This study examines the extent of tax avoidane through inome-shifting
between tax bases among the owners of privately held businesses. The dual inome
tax system in Finland oers notieable inentives for inome-shifting between wages
and dividends for business owners. The dividend tax reform of 2005 enables us to
study how this partiular form of tax avoidane reats to an exogenous hange in
tax rates. Our results support highly ative inome-shifting, and the apparent tax
avoidane behavior has noteworthy welfare eets. We also nd evidene that osts
related to tax avoidane signiantly aet the inome-shifting behavior.
Keywords: Inome taxation, Tax avoidane, Inome-shifting
JEL Classiation Codes: H21, H25, H32
3.1. Introdution
It is well known in publi nane literature that behavioral responses to inome tax-
ation derease the eieny of a tax system. One soure of ineieny is tax avoidane
behavior. Inome-shifting between dierently taxed tax bases is a ommon example of a
tax avoidane hannel. This behavior diretly dereases tax revenue and might inrease
the deadweight loss of inome taxation. Inome-shifting is generally reognized in the
literature, but only a few studies oer redible empirial estimates of its size. Our aim
is to provide new evidene on the extent and signiane of inome-shifting behavior.
Inome-shifting is espeially relevant for the owners of privately held businesses.
Compared to wage earners, business owners have a wider sope of legal possibilities
to engage in inome-shifting, as they an more easily apply dierent types of inome
1
This essay is joint work with Tuomas Matikka. A version of this paper is published in the VATT
Working Papers series, 43, Deember 2012.
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as a soure of personal ompensation
2
. Inome-shifting possibilities and tax inentives
are pronouned within a so-alled dual inome tax system (DIT). In a typial DIT,
the marginal tax rate shedules for labor inome and apital inome dier signiantly
from one another.
Our study ontributes to the literature in several ways. First, we arefully quantify
the extent and signiane of inome-shifting between dierent tax bases among the
owners of privately held orporations in Finland
3
. We then use these results to ap-
proximate the marginal deadweight loss due to this form of tax avoidane behavior. In
addition, we analyze the heterogeneity of tax avoidane among dierent types of rms
and owners. We also study how the osts and benets of tax avoidane aet the extent
of the inome-shifting response. These issues are rarely studied in the literature. The
potential eets of these fators oer evidene for both researhers and poliy makers
that the ineieny aused by inome-shifting an be mitigated by re-designing the tax
system.
We exploit the extensive orporate and dividend tax reform of 2005 in Finland as
an exogenous soure of tax rate variation. In general, the reform inreased the marginal
tax rates on dividends by abolishing the single taxation of dividends. Thus the reform
inreased inentives to pay wages instead of dividends as a form of personal ompen-
sation for many owners. Importantly, inome-shifting inentives hanged dierently
among the owners based on the net assets position (assets=liabilities) of the rm. For
some owners there were only small hanges in tax rates, whereas some owners faed
large hanges in inome-shifting inentives.
2
In addition to many tax bases, inome-shifting an also our in other forms. A well-known example is
intertemporal inome-shifting, for example in the form of antiipating the forthoming tax rate hange
(see for example Goolsbee (2000)). This paper fouses on the longer run eet of inome-shifting
between tax bases.
3
Privately held orporations are dened as orporations that are not listed on a publi stok exhange.
In the Finnish tax system, dividends from listed and privately owned orporations are taxed at dierent
tax rates and tax regulations.
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This variation ombined with the total tax reord data and the opportunity to
link tax reord information from the owner level to the rm level reate an interesting
starting point to analyze inome-shifting responses. The extensive data allow us to
preisely dene the tax-optimal omposition of total gross inome for eah owner before
and after the reform. Analyzing how hanges in the tax-optimal inome omposition
aets the hanges in the realized inome omposition provides us redible empirial
evidene on the extent and signiane of inome-shifting behavior.
We nd lear support for the view that the owners of privately held orporations are
ative in inome-shifting. Tax-optimal inome omposition has a lear and robust eet
on the realized inome omposition of business owners. Using standard approahes in
the exess burden literature (see Chetty (2009b)), we assess the welfare loss stemming
from the inome-shifting response to be notable. In addition, we do not observe muh
heterogeneity in the inome-shifting response between dierent owners or rms. How-
ever, the size of the tax inentive hange and the monetary gains from tax optimization
aet the inome-shifting behavior.
Earlier empirial studies onerning tax avoidane among orporate owners and
entrepreneurs have been rather rare. Gordon and Slemrod (2000) oer an overview
of the inome-shifting literature and show evidene of tax-motivated inome-shifting
between personal and orporate tax bases among orporate owners in the US. Gordon
and Slemrod onlude that distintive inome-shifting eets need to be taken into
aount in the eieny analysis of the tax system. Also, Sivadasan and Slemrod (2008)
nd that a derease in the eetive tax rate on wages led to a signiant inrease in
managerial wage ompensation for partners of partnership rms in India.
Inome-shifting responses are losely related to the analysis of the elastiity of tax-
able inome (ETI). The ETI aptures tax avoidane behavior, along with all other
forms of behavioral responses to inome taxation (see Feldstein (1999)). The ETI is
usually estimated to be muh larger among top-inome earners and business owners
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than regular wage earners (see a survey by Saez et al. (2012)). This suggests that
business owners might be ative in tax avoidane.
Also, Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011) and Bastani and Selin (2012) show that the
self-employed bunh at the kink points of the tax shedule muh more than laborers.
This suggests that the self-employed have more opportunities to reat to the pieewise
struture of the inome tax ode and are more aware of the details of the tax shedule.
In addition, onentrated ownership struture is shown to inrease tax planning among
business owners in the US (Chetty and Saez (2010)).
Earlier Finnish studies provide some evidene of tax avoidane. Pirttilä and Selin
(2011) show that the relative share of apital inome inreased among entrepreneurs
after the implementation of the Finnish DIT system in 1993. Kari et al. (2008 and 2009)
use the Finnish tax reform of 2005 as an exogenous shok for privately held orporations.
They report lear-ut results of how higher dividend taxation after the reform inreased
dividend payments before the reform (antiipation eet), and dereased it afterward.
Within other Nordi Countries, Alstadsæter and Jaob (2012) disuss dierent tax
avoidane hannels within the Swedish DIT system, and nd evidene for inome-
shifting between tax bases. Fjaerli and Lund (2001) nd support for the hypothesis
of ative inome-shifting among entrepreneurs in Norway. In Denmark, le Maire and
Shjerning (2012) provide evidene of inome smoothing and intertemporal inome-
shifting among the self-employed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Setion 3.2 presents the institutional
bakground of the Finnish DIT shedule and desribes the main attributes of the 2005
tax reform. Setion 3.3 depits the theoretial bakground for our empirial analysis.
Setion 3.4 presents the empirial model and desriptive statistis. Setion 3.5 presents
the results. Setion 3.6 presents extensions to our baseline model, inluding the instru-
mental variable estimation and the analysis of the osts and benets in inome-shifting
behavior. Setion 5.6 onludes.
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3.2. Finnish inome tax system and the tax reform of 2005
Sine 1993 Finland has applied the priniple of Nordi-type dual inome taxation
(DIT). In DIT, earned inome (wages, pensions, fringe benets et.) is taxed at a
progressive tax rate shedule, whereas personal apital inome (interest inome, apital
gains, dividends from listed orporations et.) is taxed at a at tax rate. A distintive
feature of the DIT system is that the at tax rate on apital inome is set muh lower
than the highest marginal tax rates on earned inome. The lower at tax rate for
apital inome was motivated for various reasons, for example broadening the tax base,
dereasing the sope for tax arbitrage, and inreased global apital mobility whih all
argue in favor of taxing apital inome more leniently.
4
Within the DIT system, the wide gap between the marginal tax rates on apital
inome and earned inome reates a triky task for the legislator: How to formalize
the taxation of business owners in suh a manner that it prevents inome-shifting from
heavily taxed earned inome to more leniently taxed personal apital inome? At the
same time, the lawmaker needs to assure that the return on invested apital is not
overtaxed.
In the Finnish system, this issue is arranged by limiting the amount of at-taxed div-
idends. Dividends are split into two parts aording to the net assets (assets-liabilities)
of the rm. The amount of dividends taxed at the apital inome tax rate is based on
omputational normal rate of return on net assets of the rm. This imputed rate of re-
turn (9%) is set to be the same for all owners of privately held orporations. Dividends
less than the omputational normal return are at-taxed, and any dividends exeeding
this amount are taxed with the progressive tax rate shedule.
5
4
A more detailed disussion on the Nordi type DIT an be found for example in Nielsen and Sørensen
(1997) and Sørensen (2005).
5
For example, with assets of 500,000 ¿ and liabilities of 100,000 ¿, the maximum amount of dividends
taxed at the at tax rate is 36,000 ¿ when the imputed return is set to 9%. In other words, any
dividends reeived from the rm below 36,000 ¿ are eetively taxed at the at tax rate, and any
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The Finnish dual inome tax system until 2005
Until 2005, Finnish DIT applied a full imputation system of orporate taxes to remove
the double taxation of dividends, in whih dividend inome is taxed both as orporate
prots and personal inome. In the full imputation system, dividends were exempt from
orporate taxes. Thus all dividends were eetively single taxed before 2005. To sum
up, taxation of wages and dividends from privately held orporations was organized
aording to the following rules and priniples:
• Dividends:
 Dividends up to the imputed normal return on the net assets of the rm
(assets=liabilities) were subjet to the at apital inome tax rate of 29%.
 Dividends exeeding the imputed normal rate of return were taxed with
the progressive tax rate shedule.
 Corporate taxes were fully redited against the dividend tax liability of
a shareholder, resulting in single taxation of both at taxed and progres-
sively taxed dividends.
• Wages were subjet to the progressive tax rate shedule (0-56% in 2002). Wages
were single-taxed as they were dedutible from rm prots.
• Wages and progressively taxed dividends were not taxed with similar tax rules.
Some tax dedutions and tax redits were only allowed on wage inome. In
ontrast, progressively taxed dividends were not subjet to rm-level soial
seurity ontributions.
6
dividends above this amount are subjet to progressive taxation with top marginal tax rates above
the at rate. The value of net assets is alulated based the asset and debt values of the rm in the
previous year. The individual net asset share of the owner is alulated based on the ownership share
of the rm. Also, there are some individual adjustments to the net assets. For example, if the owner
or her family members live in a dwelling whih is owned by the rm, the value of this dwelling is not
inluded in net assets when alulating the imputed return.
6
Firm-level soial seurity ontribution rate is 26% of wages, depending on the level of total wages
paid and the depreiations made by the rm.
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The dividend tax reform of 2005
From 2005 onward, the full imputation system was abolished, and Finland swithed to
a system with double taxation of dividends. After the reform, dividends and wages are
taxed aording to the following priniples:
• Dividends:
 All dividends beame subjet to a orporate tax of 26%.
 The splitting rule of dividends aording to the imputed rate of return on
rm net assets was maintained
7
.
 The at-tax dividends below the imputed return and under 90,000 ¿ re-
mained single-taxed, and are only subjet to the at orporate tax rate of
26%.
 70% of all other dividend inome is taxable in individual taxation, whih
results in partial double taxation of dividends.
• There were no large hanges in wage taxation at the time of the reform.
• Wages and progressively taxed dividends are still taxed dierently.
The taxation of dividend inome below the amount orresponding to the imputed return
on net assets (9%) did not hange signiantly in the reform. Eetively, the at div-
idend tax rate for dividends below the imputed return and under 90,000 ¿ dereased
from 29% to 26%. In general, this means that for owners with large net assets and
small dividends the 2005 tax reform did not indue a notable hange in inome-shifting
inentives. In ontrast, the double taxation rule inreased the dividend tax rate for
dividends above the imputed return. In general, the abolition of single taxation sig-
niantly inreased dividend taxes for owners with low rm net assets. In addition to
individual-level progressive taxation, progressively taxed dividends beame subjet to
the at orporate tax rate of 26%. Thus after the reform of 2005, the minimum eetive
7
However, the imputed rate of return dereased slightly from 9.6% to 9%.
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tax rate for progressively taxed dividends is 26%, ompared to 0% before the reform.
Furthermore, the at tax rate inreased from 29% to 40.5% for at-tax dividends over
90,000 ¿. However, this onerns only a relatively small number of owners.
For example, onsider an owner who withdraws 50,000 ¿ of dividend inome both
before (2002) and after (2007) the reform. For simpliity, assume the owner has no
wage inome in either of the periods. With rm net assets of 600,000 ¿, the owner
faes a 3 perentage point derease in the marginal tax rate of dividends. This is due to
the fat that the withdrawn dividends are below the imputed return in both years, and
dividends below the imputed return on net assets of the rm are single taxed at the
at tax rate both before and after the reform. In ontrast, with lower rm net assets
of 400,000 ¿, the owner faes a 8.3 perentage point inrease in the eetive marginal
dividend tax rate, as the marginal tax rate for dividends exeeding the imputed return
beame partly double taxed after 2005. We disuss the hanges in inome-shifting
inentives reated by the reform in more detail in the next subhapter.
In addition, one important aspet of the reform was its primary motive. Aording
to the European Union Court of Justie, the pre-reform Finnish system of full orporate
tax imputation was not in aordane with European Union legislation. Full imputation
was given only to domesti shareholders. Also, the imputed tax redit was not granted
to Finnish shareholders whose rms operate abroad. These violated EU regulations on
equal tax treatment of all EU itizens. Therefore Finnish legislators were more or less
fored to hange the tax system towards a more unied tax treatment. This proedure
has important impliations for our study. As the reform was not driven by the eonomi
and sal onditions in Finland, the tax reform of 2005 an be onsidered exogenous
from the point of view of the owners of privately held orporations.
Finally, the ontent of the 2005 tax reform was made publi already in late 2003.
This enabled the owners to antiipate the hanges indued by the reform
8
. Also, speial
8
For evidene of antiipation eets, see Kari et al. (2008).
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transition rules were applied in 2005 to temporarily alleviate the double taxation of
dividends. For these reasons, we fous on analyzing the inome-shifting eet by using
a longer time period of 20022008.
Tax inentives for inome-shifting
There are many possibilities for tax avoidane within the Finnish DIT system. For
example, the owners of privately held orporations may seek to minimize taxes by
dynamially optimizing the level of net assets, and in a stati year-to-year ontext, by
hoosing an optimal ombination of wages and dividends as their personal ompensation
from the rm. In this paper we fous on the latter ase. In general, the Finnish DIT
system indues notable inentives to minimize taxes eah year by hoosing wages and
dividends optimally with respet to the tax shedule. We fous on the deision to divide
total inome into dividends and wages, as these are the atual deision variables for
the owners
9
. This denition is important. The dividend tax rate shedule omprises
of both at-tax and progressive regions, whih depend on the net assets of the rm.
In addition, progressively taxed dividends and wages are not taxed by the same rules
neither before nor after the reform, whih makes the ombination of dividends and
wages the relevant hoie variable for the owners.
The tax-optimal division of total inome between wages and dividends is relatively
omplex within the Finnish system. The amount of at-tax dividends an be simply
alulated based on the net assets position of the rm. However, wage taxes depend
on the level of progressively taxed dividends, and vie versa. Wages and progressively
9
There are only a few minor legal limitations on whether inome is withdrawn as wages or dividends
from a privately held orporation in Finland. A orporation annot distribute dividends more than it
holds distributable assets. These inlude, for example, aumulated prots and non-tied equity. With
some rms this might limit the sope for inome-shifting. Wages annot be paid when there is no
work ontribution to the rm. Otherwise wages may be regarded as a veiled distribution of prots.
However, this is a minor issue in our analysis sine our sample of orporate owners hold an exeutive
position in the rm, and are thus by default assumed by the tax authorities to work for the rm.
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taxed dividends are part of the same tax base even though they are eetively taxed
with dierent tax rates. This ompliates the optimization proess. When optimizing
the inome omposition, the owner needs to simultaneously onsider both the eet of
net assets and wage inome on the tax rate of dividends. We disuss this issue in the
light of our empirial analysis in Setion 3.4.2.
The dividend tax reform of 2005 hanged the inome-shifting inentives dierently
among the owners of privately held orporations. Owners with high level of net as-
sets faed only modest hanges in their dividend tax rates. In ontrast, owners with
relatively low net assets faed large dividend tax inreases.
Figure 1 illustrates the hanges in inome-shifting inentives due to the tax reform of
2005. The Figure presents the marginal tax rates (MTR) on wages and dividends before
(2002) and after (2007) the reform with both zero rm-level net assets and with net
assets of 170,000 ¿ (median net assets in the data set). Wage tax rates and progressive
dividend tax rates inlude entral government taxes, average muniipal taxes, appliable
individual soial seurity ontributions and all automati dedutions and tax redits on
either dividend inome or wage inome or both. In addition, MTR on wages inludes
rm-level soial seurity ontributions. MTR on dividends inludes the orporate taxes
paid on dividends after the reform.
From Figure 1 we an see that wages and dividends were almost equally taxed before
the reform for owners with no rm net assets (upper left graph). Dierenes in tax rates
ome from the dierenes in soial seurity payments and tax dedutions between wage
and dividend inome. Dividend taxes inreased signiantly for this group after 2005
(upper right graph). The double taxation of dividend inome inreased the MTR of
dividends, making the MTR on dividends higher than the MTR on wages. Thus for the
owners with low net assets, the reform indued inentives to shift inome from dividends
to wages. However, as only 70% of dividends are taxable in individual taxation after
the reform, the dierene between marginal tax rates derease at large inome levels.
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There were no signiant hanges in the taxation of at-tax dividends below 90,000¿.
Before the reform, dividends were in general taxed more leniently than wages for owners
with median-level net assets (lower left graph). The reform of 2005 inreased dividend
taxes for dividends above the at-taxed region, whih brings the MTR on wages and
dividends loser to eah other (lower right graph).
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Figure 1. Marginal tax rates (MTR) on wages and dividends: Years
2002 (left) and 2007 (right). Above no net assets, below net assets of
170,000 ¿ (in nominal euros eah year)
In general, the reform did not indue signiant hanges in inome-shifting inen-
tives for owners with very large net assets. However, high-inome owners with at-tax
dividends above 90,000 ¿ faed a large hange in the MTR on dividends (from 29%
to 40.5%). Table A1 in the Appendix presents the marginal tax rates on wages and
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dividends in numbers for the years 2002 and 2007 and for rm net assets of 0 ¿, 170,000
¿ and 1,000,000 ¿.
We do not inlude mandatory pension and health insurane ontributions as a tax
on wages in this study. Our empirial analysis is limited to owners who own at least 50%
of the rm alone or together with immediate family members, and hold an exeutive
position in the rm. These owners are termed YEL owners in the Finnish tax legislation.
YEL owners are subjet to speial pension insurane rules. YEL owners report a
so alled YEL inome to the insurane ompany from whih insurane payments are
aumulated from. Importantly, YEL inome does not need to oinide with atual
wages paid for the owner. In other words, YEL inome an be above or below atual
wages paid without impliations or santions. Thus mandatory insurane ontributions
have no diret eet on the deision to divide total inome into wages and dividends,
and are therefore exluded from the inome-shifting analysis.
10
However, annual wages might be orrelated with the reported YEL inome. Some
owners might report the atual wage inome withdrawn from the rm as the YEL
inome. For these owners, pension and health insurane ontributions inrease or de-
rease one-to-one with hanges in atual wage inome. If insurane ontributions are
regarded as taxes, this redues the inentives to pay out more wages. Therefore, in-
surane ontributions might mitigate inentives to pay more wages as a response to
inreased dividend taxation, whih would derease our inome-shifting estimate. We
further disuss this in Setions 3.4.4 and 3.5. Finally, there were no relevant hanges
in ontribution rates or other regulation on insurane payments for YEL owners in the
10
There are regulations for both the lower and upper limits of YEL inome, whih are, however, also
independent of atual taxable wage inome. Insurane payments determine pensions when retired,
as well as the amount of many inome-bound soial benets before retirement (e.g. publi health
insurane). Thus owners have inentives to report a realisti YEL inome whih reets the atual
inome earning potential.
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time period we study. The overall average rate of insurane payments on YEL inome
was 21.1% in 2002 and 20.8% in 2007.
3.3. Theoretial framework
3.3.1. Tax optimization model . The following theoretial model is intended to
larify our empirial strategy to measure the level and signiane of tax avoidane via
inome-shifting. In the model, the owner of a privately held orporation both owns a
signiant part of the orporation and works for the rm. We assume that the owner
makes all the relevant deisions about the distribution of prots. Prots are paid out to
the owner as a ombination of wages and dividends. Importantly, wages and dividends
are taxed at dierent tax rate shedules.
The aim of stati tax optimization is to hoose a ombination of wages and dividends
suh that the total taxes paid are as low as possible with a given total inome. The owner
reeives positive utility from her net-of-tax inome (i.e. net wages and net dividends).
The utility funtion is of the form U(W + D), where W is net wages and D is net
dividends. The payout budget onstraint is Π − R = W g + Dg, where Π is the total
distributable prots from the rm before taxes, R is retained earnings and W g and Dg
are gross wage inome and gross dividend inome from the rm.
As in Fjaerli and Lund (2001), we fous on the hoie of the optimal ombination
of wages and dividends onditional on given total prots Π and retained earnings R.
In other words, we do not model the inome-generating proess of the rm nor the
optimal level of retained and/or distributed prots, and thus simply assume Π and R
to be exogenous
11
. We follow this assumption throughout the paper.
11
The hoie of retained earnings (R) is relevant in dynami tax optimization. R inrease net assets,
whih are the base for determining the at-taxed dividends in the Finnish DIT system. Other than
purely tax-motivated issues also dene the amount of R (for example, essential investments and im-
perfet apital markets). In the analysis, we assume that R is already optimized, or simply taken as
given. However, the endogenous nature of R does not hange the relevane of the stati year-to-year
tax minimization problem of hoosing the tax-optimal ombination of wages and dividends. Also,
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More formally, the owner's optimization problem is to
(3.3.1) maxU(W +D) = [1− tW (W
g, Dg, I)]W g + [1− tD(W
g, Dg, I)]Dg
subjet to
(3.3.2) Π−R = W g +Dg
where tW (W
g, Dg, I) and tD(W
g, Dg, I) are the average tax rates on wages and divi-
dends, respetively. The tax rate on wage inome tW (W
g, Dg, I) onsists of personal
inome taxes plus rm-level soial seurity ontributions. The tax rate on dividends
tD(W
g, Dg, I) inludes dividend taxes plus orporate taxes assoiated with withdrawn
dividends. Wages are assumed to be dedutible from rm prots whereas dividends
are not. Also, both tax rates depend on inome earned outside the rm, denoted by
I. This inome inludes, for example, wages from a seondary job and dividends from
other non-listed rms. I is assumed to be exogenous in the model.
Both tax rates are always between zero and one. In this general framework, the wage
tax rate tW (W
g, Dg, I) is also a funtion of dividends, and dividend taxes tD(W
g, Dg, I)
are a funtion of wages. This implies that the amount of wages withdrawn from the
rm is allowed to have an eet on the tax rate on dividends, and vie versa. Also, we
assume that the tax rate shedules on wages and dividends are well-behaved, smooth
and monotonially inreasing funtions of W g and Dg. For now, we assume there are
no optimization fritions or optimization errors.
After taking the rst order onditions with respet to W g and Dg and rearranging
the terms, we get the owner's optimality ondition
without year-to-year tax optimization, the benets from dynami tax avoidane diminish or vanish
altogether.
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(3.3.3)
tW (W
g, Dg, I) +
(
∂tW (W
g,Dg,I)
∂W g
−
∂tW (W
g,Dg,I)
∂Dg
)
W g
tD(W g, Dg, I) +
(
∂tD(W g,Dg,I)
∂Dg
−
∂tD(W g,Dg,I)
∂W g
)
Dg
=
MTRW
MTRD
= 1
whih says that the ombination of gross wages and gross dividends is optimal when
the marginal tax rates (MTR) are equal. The intuition is that if MTRW > MTRD,
the optimal behavior would be to replae W g with Dg up to the point at whih the tax
rate dierential is zero.
The optimality ondition (3.3.3) determines the tax-optimal ombination of gross
wages and gross dividends, denoted by (W ∗, D∗). This gross inome ombination min-
imizes taxes, and therefore maximizes the total net inome withdrawn from the rm.
However, assumptions behind the theoretial optimality ondition do not generally
hold in pratie. For example, real-life tax rate shedules are not smooth and ontinu-
ous. If anything, the shedules are more or less disontinuous pieewise linear funtions
of inome. In addition, optimization fritions might matter, and optimization errors
might our for at least some owners. All of these issues imply a deviation from the
optimality ondition 3.3.3
12
. Nevertheless, equation 3.3.3 illustrates the main deter-
minant of inome-shifting behavior: the ratio of the assoiated tax rates of dierently
12
As shown in Chetty (2012) and Chetty et al. (2011), searh osts and other optimization fritions
might matter in tax-optimization behavior. Optimization osts will be analyzed later in Setion 3.6.
There are also some other matters that might impliate a deviation from the non-fritional solution
equation 3.3.3. Fjaerli and Lund (2001) suggest that benets reeived from paying soial seurity
ontributions inrease wages as a form of ompensation, although no ompelling evidene has been
found to support this view. Also, wages an be seen as a soially more aeptable form of personal
ompensation. These matters imply that we would observe higher realized wages than what equation
3.3.3 suggests.
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taxed tax bases, MTRW/MTRD. In other words, the tax optimal gross inome ombi-
nation (W ∗, D∗) remains the key parameter to onsider even if some of the theoretial
assumptions are relaxed.
13
3.3.2. The deadweight loss of inome-shifting . After haraterizing the in-
dividual owner's tax optimization pattern, we next derive a formula for the marginal
deadweight loss of inome-shifting behavior. Our setup is similar to the model of mar-
ginal exess burden with resoure osts from tax avoidane by Chetty (2009a), and the
standard taxable inome model by Feldstein (1999).
In our version of the model, the owner's problem is to
(3.3.4) maxU(W +D, γ) = (1− tW )(W˜
g − γ) + (1− tD)(D˜
g + γ)− φ(γ)
subjet to
(3.3.5) Π− R = (W˜ g − γ) + (D˜g + γ)
where (W˜ g − γ) = W g, (D˜g + γ) = Dg. W˜ g and D˜g represent wage inome and
dividend inome in the absene of inome-shifting opportunities. γ is the amount of
inome shifted from wages to dividends at the margin, and φ(γ) denotes the real private
ost of inome-shifting, i.e. the ost of hanging the tax base. For simpliity, we assume
the ost funtion to be onvex and inreasing in γ.
In this framework, we assume that the marginal tax rates tW and tD are onstant, i.e.
we are on the linear segments of the tax rate shedules. For onveniene, we assume for
13
Sivadasan and Slemrod (2008) derive similar theoretial preditions in their model for partners of
partnership rms in India. Also, Fjaerli and Lund (2001) get the same result when pension onsidera-
tions related to wage payments are not inluded in their model. Christiansen and Tuomala (2008) and
Piketty, Saez and Stantheva (2013) disuss the impliations of inome-shifting between tax bases in
the optimal inome taxation framework.
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now that tW > tD. Also, there are no optimization errors and no other private transfer
osts involved in inome-shifting behavior
14
.
We use the standard approah in the deadweight loss literature. We assume that
the tax revenue olleted with wage and dividend taxes is returned to the owner as a
lump sum transfer (see for example Chetty (2009a, 2009b)). The soial welfare funtion
̟(tW , tD) is expressed as the sum of the owner's utility (in the urly brakets) and the
tax revenue olleted by the government
̟(tW , tD) =
{
(1− tW )(W˜
g − γ)− (1− tD)(D˜
g + γ)− φ(γ)
}
+tW (W˜
g − γ) + tD(D˜
g + γ)(3.3.6)
Next, onsider a marginal hange in the wage tax rate, dtW . The envelope ondition
states that dtW has only a rst-order eet on the owner's utility, and thus we may
ignore the behavioral responses in the urly brakets. The rst-order eets on the
owner's utility and the tax revenue of the government anel eah other out by denition.
In partiular, we assume that there are no hanges in W˜ g and D˜g. In other words, we
onentrate only on the marginal exess burden aused by the inome-shifting eet
with given total gross inome.
After arranging the terms, the marginal exess burden an be written as
(3.3.7)
d̟(tW , tD)
dtW
=
dγ
dtW
(tD − tW )
The right-hand side of equation equation (3.3.7) implies that the marginal deadweight
loss of inome-shifting omprises of two omponents: The rst is the response of the
14
Chetty (2009a) analyzes the deadweight loss and tax avoidane under optimization errors and transfer
osts. In short, these issues add further dimensions to the analysis if the marginal soial ost of
avoidane behavior does not equal the net-of-tax rate. In this simplied ase we abstrat from this
possibility. However, we briey disuss this issue and its relevane for the interpretation of the exess
burden estimate in the end of Setion 3.5.
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amount of inome shifted, and the seond is the dierene in dividend and wage inome
tax rates
15
. Intuitively, the result suggests that the marginal exess burden of inome-
shifting is larger the bigger the dierene is between the tax rates, and the average
inome-shifting response denes the sope of the deadweight loss. Thus to be able to
approximate the sope of the ineieny, we need a redible estimate of the average
inome-shifting response.
As shown before in Setion 3.3.1, with xed total inome, the amount of inome
shifted depends on the relative share of the tax rates. Therefore, the goal of our
empirial analysis is to derive an estimate for dγ/d(tW/tD) in order to assess the marginal
exess burden.
3.3.3. Testable hypotheses. Based on the theory presented above, we take up
the following questions in our empirial analysis:
• Does the tax ode determine the hoie of inome type, and if so, to what
extent?
• Are inome-shifting responses heterogeneous among dierent rms and owners?
• How large is the marginal exess burden of inome-shifting?
3.4. Empirial analysis
3.4.1. Data. Our data set omes from the Finnish Tax Administration and it
inludes information on the nanial statements and tax reords of Finnish businesses
and business owners for the years 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008
16
. We use it both in a
15
Saez (2004) derives a similar formula for the marginal exess burden when agents an shift inome
between the personal tax base and the orporate tax base. However, Saez's model also inludes hanges
in real behavior (total inome, labor supply et.).
16
As mentioned before, the ontent of the 2005 tax reform was made publi already in late 2003.
Kari et. al (2008) show evidene that privately held orporations antiipated the reform by inreasing
dividend payments right before the reform, and dereasing them right afterward. Therefore, we do not
use the years losest to the reform in our baseline analysis in order to alleviate the eets aused by
antiipation on the longer-run inome-shifting response between tax bases.
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ross-setional and balaned panel form. The unique harateristi of the data is that
they ontain basially all Finnish businesses (all publi and privately held orporations,
partnerships, sole proprietors et.).
In this study we fous exlusively on the owners of privately held orporations. The
data ontain all important tax information for the inome-shifting analysis, for example
taxable wages and dividends paid to the owner by the rm, and inome earned from
other soures by the owner. By linking the rm-level and the owner-level data together
we an analyze the eets of tax hanges on owners' inome-shifting behavior while
onsistently ontrolling for various rm and individual-level eets. The owner-level
data inlude only those individuals who reeived positive dividends from the rm during
a tax year. Furthermore, we onentrate only on those owners who work in their own
rm in an exeutive position and own at least 50% of the rm alone or together with
immediate family members.
17
3.4.2. Empirial model . This setion desribes the empirial model we use in
our analysis. Our aim is to study how the tax-optimal inome omposition aets the
deision to withdraw dierent types of inome from the rm. This relationship an be
desribed with the following ross setional equation
(3.4.1) W gi,t = β ∗W
∗
i,t +Xi,t + Ci + αt + εi,t,
where W gi,t is realized gross wages from the rm for eah owner i in year t. Xi,t is a
matrix of rm and owner-level variables that aet the amount of gross wage inome
and the inome omposition. Ci desribes time-invariant variables that aet gross
17
We disuss the impliations of data and sample restritions in the end of Setion 3.5.
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wages, suh as the innate ability of the owner.
18 αt is the time trend, and εi,t is
the error term. Finally, W ∗i,t is the tax-optimal gross wage with given total inome
Πi,t − Ri,t = W
g
i,t + D
g
i,t. This is the variable of main interest in our analysis
19
. The
parameter β denotes the average inome-shifting eet on the atual gross wage inome
withdrawn from the rm.
The tax-optimal gross wage W ∗i,t summarizes the eets that both the tax rate
shedules of wages and dividends have on the atual realized gross wage, given the
exogenous total inome. As we have the data atually used to tax the owners, we have
all the information needed to dene the tax-minimizing values W ∗i,t and D
∗
i,t for every
owner eah year.
The tax-optimal gross wage is alulated using tax register information on the
owner's total gross inome from the rm (W gi,t + D
g
i,t), net assets of the rm, gross
earned inome from other soures and the tax ode and regulations for the year in
question. As disussed in Setion 3.2, we do not take into aount soial insurane
payments when dening the tax-optimal inome omposition.
In order to dene (W ∗i,t, D
∗
i,t) for eah owner, we formulate a funtion that gives
the tax-minimizing amount of wages and dividends for eah possible total gross inome
level with respet to every ombination of net assets and other earned inome. In the
optimization funtion, the number of feasible outomes for the optimal gross inome
ombination for eah total gross inome level is limited due to the stepwise nature of
the tax ode (given all possible ombinations of net assets and other earned inome). In
order to limit the number of dierent ombinations of total gross inome, net assets and
other earned inome, we use an inome interval of 100 ¿. Table A2 in the Appendix
18
In the data, the available ontrols for Xi,t and Ci at the owner level are gender, age, other apital
inome and the ownership share of the rm. On the rm level, the ontrols are turnover, number of
employees, prots, total assets, and loation and industry dummies.
19
Fjaerli and Lund (2001) use a similar explanatory variable in their study.
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presents an illustrative example of the hanges in tax optimal gross wages due to the
tax reform of 2005.
The empirial approah of using the tax-optimal inome omponent as a measure for
inome-shifting is not solely linked to the Finnish tax institutions or the dual inome tax
shedule. This approah generalizes to any ase where there are two or more dierently
taxed tax bases available to the taxpayer. This also applies to dierent types of inome
whih dier only with respet to tax dedutions or allowanes. In the Finnish ontext,
an example of these is wages and progressively taxed dividends, whih are nominally
part of the same tax base, but are eetively taxed dierently both before and after
the tax reform of 2005.
As is well known in the miroeonometri literature, estimating the ausal eet of
the tax ode on the omposition of realized inome using equation (3.4.1) is diult in
pratie. Many of the time-invariant variables that might aet inome-shifting behav-
ior are generally unobserved, whih violates the exogeneity ondition cov(W ∗i,t, εi,t) = 0.
Therefore, we use panel data and the tax reform of 2005 to estimate the model. Taking
rst dierenes of equation (3.4.1) between t and t + j gives us our estimable model
W gi,t+j −W
g
i,t = (αt+j − αt) + η(W
∗
i,t+j −W
∗
i,t) +(3.4.2)
µ(Xi,t+j −Xi,t) + (εi,t+j − εi,t).
In this rst-dierenes (FD) model, the time-invariant omponent Ci gets aneled
out by denition. In ontrast to the ross setional one-year analysis in Fjaerli and
Lund (2001), we fous on identifying the eet of the tax-optimal inome omponent
on the omposition of inome using exogenous individual variation in W ∗i,t in time.
Our main interest is in the oeient η, whih expresses the average eet of a
hange in tax-optimal gross wages on the hange in realized gross wages onditional
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on given total gross inome in t and t + j. The hange in the tax-optimal gross wage
W ∗i,t+j−W
∗
i,t = △W
∗
i,t aptures all the hanges in the individual tax ode. In addition to
hanges in wage taxes, △W ∗i,t also aptures hanges in dividend and orporate taxation.
The testable hypotheses in the FD model are the following: If hanges in the tax ode
explain the hanges in the omposition of inome, η should be statistially signiant
and greater than zero. A one-to-one inome-shifting response implies that η = 1.
Also, adding ontrol variables to the model should not aet the value of η, and the
oeients for the ontrols should not be statistially signiant if the hange in the
tax ode is the dominant fator behind the hange in the division of inome.
3.4.3. Identiation. With regard to identifying the behavioral parameter η, an
important feature is that the tax reform of 2005 hanged the inome-shifting inentives
dierently among similar business owners. In other words, △W ∗i,t = W
∗
i,t+j −W
∗
i,t varies
aross otherwise similar individuals in the data. Owners with similar total gross inome
(W gi,t+D
g
i,t), other inome, ownership share, rm total assets, prots and turnover but
with dierent levels of rm net assets faed dierent hanges in the marginal tax rates
on dividends, and thus get dierent values of△W ∗i,t. Owners with high level of net assets
faed only modest hanges in their marginal tax rates, whereas owners with low net
assets faed larger tax inentives to rearrange their total gross inome. Also, dierent
levels of other earned inome reate variation in tax optimal gross wages, as inome
earned outside the rm aets the MTR on wages and progressively taxed dividends
withdrawn from the rm. We assume that other earned inome is exogenous.
Using △W ∗i,t as a regressor instead of △(MTRWi,t/MTRDi,t) helps to overome the
issue of endogenous orrelation between the inome-shifting inentives and realized gross
wages W gi,t. The optimal wage W
∗
i,t is not mehanially orrelated with W
g
i,t or D
g
i,t at a
given level of total gross inome, whereas marginal or average tax rates themselves are.
In most inome tax systems, larger wages are assoiated with high marginal tax rates
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and vie versa, ausing these variables to be mehanially orrelated in a FD model.
However, realized gross wages do not aet the value of the tax-optimal gross wage, as
W ∗i,t is the same for any ombination of W
g
i,t and D
g
i,t at a given level of (W
g
i,t +D
g
i,t).
Therefore, in the presene of exogenous tax rate variation, △W ∗i,t is exogenous in the
FD model and does not neessarily require an instrumental variable.
We need to assume that in the absene of the reform, owners with a large positive
△W ∗i,t do not hange their W
g
i,t dierently than owners with smaller hanges in △W
∗
i,t
(and vie versa). In general, we have no expliit reason to assume that with given
total inome in t and t + j, the hange in the realized gross wage △W gi,t depends on
other fators than inome-shifting inentives, onditional on individual and rm-level
ovariates. However, we annot rule out the possibility that hanges in some observed
harateristis suh as net assets and other earned inome might mehanially aet
both △W gi,t and △W
∗
i,t in some ases. For example, an inrease in rm net assets,
whih on average lowers the dividend tax rate andW ∗i,t, might indue a mehanial eet
through a derease inW gi,t as well. Assuming other things unhanged, an inrease in net
assets might lead to less total gross inome to be withdrawn altogether, for example
due to an inrease in retained earnings Ri,t. Therefore, we also use an instrumental
variable (IV) estimator to estimate the inome-shifting model. The IV estimation is
presented and disussed in Setion 3.6.
Finally, it is worth noting that W ∗i,t itself is not based on individual preferenes.
Owners with the exat same tax reord information get the exat same values for
tax-optimal gross wages. Furthermore, we ontrol for other individual and rm-level
variation in a rih way. In equation (3.4.2), the matrix (Xi,t+j−Xi,t) ontrols for hanges
in the ownership share and other apital inome on the owner's side, and hanges in
turnover, number of employees, prots and total assets on the rm side.
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3.4.4. Desriptive statistis. Figure 2 presents the kernel density estimate dis-
tributions of wages and dividends reeived by the owners of privately held orporations
both before (2002) and after (2007) the tax reform of 2005. From the Figure we an
see that wage ompensation inreased signiantly after the tax reform. This was the
main expeted outome in the light of inome-shifting inentives. Figure 2 does not
indiate very notable hanges in the overall shape or loation of the dividend distribu-
tion. However, there is a visible dip in the density of small dividends, and an inrease
in the density of large dividends at the 90,000 ¿ tax shedule kink point. This was also
expeted, sine after the reform it beame espeially undesirable to distribute small
amounts of dividends and dividends above 90,000 ¿.
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Figure 2. The distributions of wage and dividend inome of the owners
of privately held orporations in 2002 and 2007 (in urrent euros)
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After dening the tax-optimal ombination of gross wages and gross dividends, we
an ompare the optimal gross wages to realized gross wages in order to desribe the
extent of inome-shifting behavior. Figure 3 presents the distribution of the dierene
between the tax-optimal gross wages and realized gross wages for the years 2002 and
2007. Tax-optimal behavior indiates that this dierene would be equal to zero. In
other words, W gi,t−W
∗
i,t = 0 if the owner has optimized her wage `perfetly' with respet
to the tax ode.
Figure 3 presents the distribution of W gi,t−W
∗
i,t around the tax-optimal pointW
g
i,t−
W ∗i,t = 0 in the range of +/- 10,000 ¿. The Figure shows that inome-shifting behavior
is evident. There are lear spikes in the distribution at the level of 0 in both 2002 and
2007. Thus both before and after the reform a notable number of owners withdrew
exatly the tax-optimal amount of wage inome from the rm. This implies that the
tax ode of both wages and dividends aet the total inome omposition of the owners,
as there are no other expliit reasons for the owners to pay out exatly the tax-optimal
amount of wages. In relative terms, over 40% of the owners in our sample optimized their
wages perfetly in 2007. However, in 2002, we observe less omplete wage optimization,
as slightly under 15% of owners optimized their wages.
The monetary gains from inome-shifting were smaller before 2005 (see Setion 3.2
for more details). This means that gains from optimizing the inome omposition are
on average larger after the abolition of the single dividend tax system. This might
explain the larger spike at zero after the reform in 2007. The signiane of monetary
gains from inome-shifting is analyzed in more detail later in Setion 3.6. In addition,
Figure 3 inludes the optimal orner solutions as optimal hoies. Dropping the optimal
orner solutions signiantly dereases the peak at the level of 0 before the tax reform
in 2002. However, after the reform the overall piture of ative inome-shifting remains
lear even when the optimal orner solutions are not inluded.
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Figure 3. The distribution of the dierene between realized gross
wages and tax-optimal gross wages in 2002 (left) and 2007 (right)
Figure 4 desribes the relationship of the key variables in our study, the hange in
realized gross wages △W gi,t = W
g
i,t+j −W
g
i,t and the hange in tax-optimal gross wages
△W ∗i,t = W
∗
i,t+j − W
∗
i,t between the years 2002 and 2007. There is a lear positive
relationship between the variables. On average, large △W ∗i,t are followed by similar
△W gi,t. In other words, hanges in the realized division of gross inome are losely
related to the hanges in the tax ode, measured by the hanges in tax-optimal gross
wages. Thus the owners who faed large hanges in the tax-optimal inome omposition
also hanged their realized wages more than the owners who faed no or only small
hanges in tax inentives.
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We t a non-parametri Kernel estimate with a 95% ondene interval into Figure
4 to further illustrate this eet and its statistial signiane. Furthermore, the Figure
illustrates that there is a onsiderable amount of variation in both realized and tax-
optimal gross wages in the data.
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Figure 4. The eet of hanges in tax-optimal gross wages △W ∗i,t on the
hange in realized gross wages △W gi,t between 2002 and 2007 (in urrent
euros)
Finally, Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix present desriptive statistis for the
key variables in our analysis. Table A3 presents the variables at the owner level. For
example, the wages variable represents total gross wages paid to the owner from his/her
rm. Optimal gross wages and optimal gross dividends are optimized aording to the
prevailing tax system in eah year for eah observation.
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There are signiant dierenes in the pre and post-reform optimal ombinations
of gross wages and gross dividends. Before the 2005 tax reform, the average level of
tax-optimal gross wages was relatively low. After the inrease in dividend taxation, the
average level of optimal wages relative to optimal dividends inreased markedly.
Table A4 desribes the harateristis at the rm level. These statistis are alu-
lated only for those rms for whih we also have information at the owner level. The
mean of total assets, net assets and turnover all inreased onsiderably over the time
period of 20022008.
3.5. Results
Tax optimization model
We estimate the rst-dierenes equation (3.4.2) using a balaned panel data onsisting
of the years 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008, and adding year dummies to the model
20
. We
estimate the equation in levels, as many observed and optimal wages and optimal divi-
dends are zeros both before and after the reform. Therefore, for example, a logarithmi
model would lose too muh information.
The results are presented in Table 1. The rst olumn shows the eet of a hange
in tax-optimal gross wages on a hange in the realized gross inome omposition with-
out ontrol variables. The seond olumn estimates are derived using the full set of
individual and rm-level ontrols.
21
The owners of privately held orporations reat to tax hanges very atively. The
tax shedule has a remarkable and statistially signiant eet on the deision to
20
There were only trivial hanges in the tax ode of dividends and wages outside the 2005 reform.
21
We also estimate the ross setional model in equation (3.4.1) with a full set of ontrol variables. The
ross setion OLS estimates for the years 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008 are presented in Table A5 in the
Appendix. The results show that the point estimates for the oeients of tax-optimal gross wages
(W ∗) are between 0.90-1.05 and highly signiant in every year. These results imply that inome-
shifting inentives and realized behavior seem to be highly orrelated. Fjaerli and Lund (2001) get
qualitatively similar results in their ross setional analysis for Norway.
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divide inome into wages and dividends with a given level of total gross inome. The
oeient for the optimal gross wage implies that a one euro hange in the tax-optimal
gross wage aets realized gross wages by 66 ents on average. The estimate diers
from one, so the inome-shifting response is not perfet. However, the magnitude of
the optimal wage oeient implies that the welfare osts of inome-shifting might be
onsiderable.
Adding ontrol variables does not hange the results. The oeient for optimal
gross wages with ontrols is very lose to the oeient without them, whih supports
the view that the tax shedule is the main fator aeting the inome omposition. Fur-
thermore, adding ontrols does not aet the t of the model. The R-squared statisti
inreases only by 0.01 ompared to the model with △W ∗i,t as the only explanatory
variable.
We also use a two-year dierene model for the years 2002 and 2008 to estimate
the longer-run average eet. These results are presented in Table A6 in the Appendix.
When using the data for 2002 and 2008, the point estimate for inome-shifting is ap-
proximately 0.68. This estimate is not statistially dierent from that using the panel
data for all four years. This indiates that our results are robust and independent of
the length of the dierene
22
.
Also, the oeients for the ontrol variables are mostly insigniant or very small,
whih again indiates that the hanges in the tax system are the driving fore behind
the deision on inome omposition. However, the ownership share seems to have a
negative eet on realized gross wages. When ownership is onentrated, the owner
has more power to make tax optimal deisions on inome omposition. In this ase,
inreased ownership seems to open up a way to pay out more low-taxed dividends at
22
The results are robust using all pairs of pre and post-reform years. The results for the years 2002
and 2007 are presented in Table 3 in Setion 3.6 (olumns 3 and 4). Other results are available from
the authors upon request.
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the expense of wages (given the hanges in the tax ode). This result is also expeted
in the light of previous literature. Chetty and Saez (2010) nd that tax-optimization
is more ative among orporate owners who own larger shares of the rm.
In addition, a hange in the turnover of the rm has a positive and statistially
signiant eet on the dierene in realized gross wages, although the size of the eet
is very small. This an be interpreted as indiating that the growth of the rm (in
the sense of turnover) has a small inreasing eet on wage ompensations given the
hange in the tax ode. All the other oeients for rm-level ontrols are statistially
insigniant, inluding the number of employees, prots and total assets. Therefore,
hanges in most of the rm-side variables have no signiant eet on the division of
inome on average.
3.5. Results 87
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ΔWage ΔWage
ΔW ∗ 0.662*** 0.661***
(0.007) (0.013)
ΔOwnership -71.580**
(33.259)
ΔTurnover 0.000***
(0.000)
ΔTotal assets 0.000
(0.000)
ΔProts -0.000
(0.000)
ΔEmployees 9.927
(9.469)
ΔOther apital
inome
-0.001
(0.000)
Observations 17,238 17,238
R-squared 0.347 0.348
Notes: Owner-level lustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. First-dierenes
model estimated by OLS using balaned panel data for 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008: the dependent variable is
the dierene in realized gross wages.
Table 1. OLS estimation results
One important aspet is the heterogeneity of the inome-shifting response. First, we
use quantile regression methods to study the heterogeneity around the average estimate.
In Figure 5, we plot the estimates at separate perentile points with the 95% ondene
intervals using equation (3.4.2) with the full set of ontrols.
As an be seen from the Figure, the point estimates are larger at higher perentiles.
The largest estimate is lose to one at the 95th perentile point, whih suggests that
the inome-shifting response is nearly perfet among those owners who faed the largest
absolute hanges in their tax-optimal wages. In ontrast, the estimates are smaller for
those whose tax inentives were not aeted as muh by the tax reform. Thus inome-
shifting responses vary in dierent perentiles ompared to the average OLS estimate
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(dash line in Figure 5), whih is important to take into aount when interpreting the
results. However, all estimates in the Figure are learly statistially dierent from zero,
implying that the responses are evident regardless of the size of tax inentive. Also, this
Figure implies that monetary benets from the hange in taxes aets the response,
beause with large hanges in tax-optimal wages the benets are also largest. The osts
and benets from tax optimization are disussed more thoroughly in Setion 3.6.
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Figure 5. Quantile regression results
We also ategorize owners into four equally sized groups and estimate equation
(3.4.2) separately for these groups. We use base-year turnover, total assets and the
number of employees as ontinuous variables to study if there are dierenes in inome-
shifting responses with respet to the size of the rm. We also estimate the model by
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age and gender of the owner. In addition, we examine if there are dierenes in inome-
shifting ativity between industries. The results for the heterogeneity estimations are
presented in Table A7 in the Appendix.
In general, the inome-shifting responses are homogeneous between dierent groups.
There are no signiant dierenes in tax avoidane ativity between women and men,
age groups or the size of the rm. Thus these results suggest that the average inome-
shifting response is not driven by ertain types of owners or rms. However, some
dierenes an be deteted at the industry level. For example, the owners of rms in
naning and agriultural industries shift inome more atively than others.
There are some issues regarding the empirial setup that might aet the results.
First, our data are limited to owners who reeive dividends from their rms in eah year.
This might bias the estimated average inome-shifting eet among Finnish business
owners. However, the diretion of the bias is unlear. The owners who do not pay any
dividends might be more or less ative in tax-motivated inome-shifting ompared to
the owners who pay dividends. However, it is plausible that the owners not inluded
in the data might be less ative in inome-shifting, espeially before the reform of 2005
when there was in general larger inentives to pay dividends.
Seondly, our FD analysis uses balaned panel data for a relatively long time period
(20022008). This means that our estimating sample inludes only owners who were
suessful enough to ontinue their business ativity throughout this period. It might
be that these owners are also more ative in inome-shifting. This might ause an
upward bias in our average estimate. In addition, our sample is limited to owners who
own at least 50% of the rm alone or together with family members. It is presumable
that these owners are more responsive to tax inentives than those who own less than
50%. The owners with more than 50% of the rm have more power to make tax-optimal
deisions on prot distribution.
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Finally, as mentioned in Setion 3.2, pension and health insurane ontributions
might aet the inome-shifting behavior. Insurane ontributions are based on self-
reported YEL inome, whih need not to oinide with the atual gross wage inome
of the owners in our estimating sample. However, wages and YEL inome might be
orrelated among some owners. If insurane ontributions are onsidered as taxes, this
might derease the inentives to inrease wage payments as a response to dividend tax
inrease. This might reate a downwards bias to our estimate, as we do not inlude
insurane ontributions based on YEL inome as taxes when dening the tax-optimal
wages.
The marginal deadweight loss of inome-shifting
In order to link the marginal deadweight loss theory to our empirial inome-shifting
estimate, we assume that
dγ
d(
tW
tD
)
=
dW
g
i,t
dW ∗i,t
. In other words, we replae the tax rate ratio
parameter d( tW
tD
) with its empirial ounterpart dW ∗i,t. The inome-shifting omponent
dγ equals the hange in gross wages dW gi,t. This follows from the denition that total
gross inome is given, and thus any inome shifted from or to gross wages equals the
hange in the gross wage level.
Formally, the approximation for the marginal exess burden of tax avoidane via
inome-shifting takes the following form
DWL ≈
dW gi,t
dW ∗i,t
(tD − tW )
where dW gi,t/dW
∗
i,t is the average inome-shifting response, and tD and tW are the mar-
ginal tax rates on dividends and wages, respetively.
We approximate the DWL at the average point using the average values for realized
and optimal gross wages. Ideally, (tD − tW ) should reet the dierene between the
marginal tax rates when there are no possibilities for inome-shifting. However, this
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inome omposition is unobserved, as we only observe the realized inome omposition
for eah owner after the inome-shifting deision has been already made.
In order to evaluate the DWL, we need ounterfatual values for the marginal tax
rates for the ase where inome-shifting does not exist. As the owners in the data set
all hold an exeutive position in their rm, the ounterfatual wage inome and wage
tax rate should orrespond to the exeutive wage level of an employee with a similar
position in the rm. Counterfatual dividend tax rate should orrespond to the tax
rate on the return on assets for a passive main owner not working for the rm.
The rms in the data are relatively large and protable on average. Thus we as-
sume that a non-owner exeutive position at these rms would require a relatively high
wage ompensation. Also, the rms are wealthy in terms of net assets. Therefore
we approximate the marginal tax rate dierene by using the post-reform (2007) top
braket employee wage tax rate (56%) and the eetive dividend tax rate for at-taxed
dividends (26%).
We estimate the average inome-shifting response
dW
g
i,t
dWi,t∗
to be 0.66. Using this and
the above mentioned assumptions on the tax rate dierene, we approximate the mar-
ginal DWL to be 0.21
23
. In addition, the marginal exess burden is similar aross
dierent owners and rms, as the inome-shifting response itself does not vary signi-
antly between dierent groups.
The approximated marginal DWL an be onsidered signiant as it does not inlude
any real eonomy eets. A omparison to DWL estimates in the elastiity of taxable
inome literature, alulated mostly in the US, reveals that this estimate is similar in
size (see Saez et al. (2012)). However, beause of the absene of real eonomy responses,
our alulation does not neessarily apture all welfare losses. Tax rate hanges might
also have a signiant eet on the amount of total gross inome (W g +Dg) or other
real eonomy variables suh as investments. In addition, ombining real eets and
23
By using the seond highest marginal tax rate for wages (48%), the DWL dereases to 0.15.
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inome-shifting responses ould either derease or inrease the DWL ompared to the
sole inome-shifting ineieny.
Furthermore, as emphasized by Chetty (2009a), the theoretial assumptions behind
the standard DWL model might not hold in pratie when analyzing tax avoidane
behavior. The marginal ost of inome-shifting might not equal the dierene of the
marginal wage and dividend tax rates, whih hanges the interpretation of our exess
burden model. In the extreme ase that inome-shifting has no ost, the marginal
exess burden equals zero, and inome-shifting only aets the alloation of resoures
between the publi setor and the owner. If the overall marginal soial ost is positive
but smaller than the tax rate dierene, only a part of the inome-shifting response
auses a deadweight loss. Therefore, our estimate of the exess burden of inome-
shifting serves mainly as an approximation of the sale of the inome-shifting response,
and need to be interpreted with aution.
24
3.6. Extensions
IV estimation
As disussed in Setion 3.4.3, it is possible that △W ∗i,t is not ompletely exogenous
in the FD model. Therefore we also use an instrumental variable (IV) estimator to
estimate the model. In the IV estimator, we dene △W ∗i,t with xed harateristis
and use it as an instrumental variable. This instrument, △W
∗
i,t, only aounts for the
hanges in tax-optimal gross wages aused diretly by the tax reform of 2005.
We use only the years 2002 and 2008 in the IV estimation. We alulate △W
∗
i,t
using total gross inome, rm net assets and other earned inome in the year in the
middle of the dierene. We dene the tax-optimal gross wages for total gross inome,
net assets and other earned inome in 2005 using both the 2002 and 2008 tax odes.
24
We further disuss this issue in Setion 3.6 when we analyze the signiane of monetary benets in
inome-shifting behavior.
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The dierene of these tax-optimal gross wages is then used as an instrument in the IV
estimator. These types of predited tax instruments are widely used in the elastiity of
taxable inome literature (see Saez et al. (2012)). The basi idea of using inome and
other harateristis in the middle year of the dierene as a base for the instrument
has been proposed by Blomquist and Selin (2010). The use of inome in the middle year
redues the ovariane between the instrument △W
∗
i,t and the error term (εi,t+j−εi,t) if
there are reasons to suspet that the instrument is a funtion of the dependent variable
(W gi,t+j −W
g
i,t). Therefore, for example, using harateristis at time t as a base for the
instrument might provide inonsistent estimates.
The two-stage least squares results are presented in Table 2. The instrumented oef-
ient for the hange in tax-optimal wages with the full set of ontrols is approximately
0.32 (olumn (4)), whih is smaller than our baseline estimate. This shows that the
possibly endogenous part of the response auses an upward bias in the average inome-
shifting estimate. Nevertheless, the IV estimate is still signiant both statistially
and eonomially, whih indiates that inome-shifting is notable even when possible
mehanial eets on gross wages are taken into aount.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 1st stage ∆W 1st stage ∆W
1st stage 0.523*** 0.528***
(0.014) (0.014)
∆W ∗ (instrumented) 0.344*** 0.319***
(0.034) (0.034)
Full set of ontrols No No Yes Yes
F-test 134.07 24.01
Observations 4,334 4,334 4,334 4,334
R-squared 0.252 0.259
Notes: Owner-level lustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01. Estimates from the instru-
mental variable model estimated with 2SLS for the years 2002 and 2008. Columns (1) and (3) present the
rst-stage results, and olumns (2) and (4) report the oeients for the instrumented optimal wage. The
dependent variables in (2) and (4) are hanges in realized gross wages.
Table 2. IV estimation results (2SLS)
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As realized hanges in net assets and other harateristis are not allowed to diretly
aet realized hanges in the division of inome, the IV estimates only denote the lower
bound for the total inome-shifting response. For example, there is no general expliit
reason to assume that the hange in net assets would be in itself (i.e. without the
eet on the tax rate on dividends) endogenous to the hoie of inome omposition
and the type of inome withdrawn from the rm. Therefore the IV approah probably
exludes part of the exogenous variation in inome-shifting inentives as well. Thus
the IV estimate an also be interpreted as the lower bound inome-shifting response.
When using the lower bound 2SLS estimate, the approximate for the average marginal
DWL of inome-shifting dereases to 0.12. Thus even with the lower bound estimate,
the welfare osts of inome-shifting are still non-negligible.
Costs and benets of inome-shifting
It has been shown both theoretially and empirially that optimization fritions, e.g.
adjustment and searh osts, have an eet on individual tax-optimization behavior (see
Chetty (2012) and Chetty et al. (2011)). In short, the intuition behind the optimization
frition framework is that individuals are not responsive to hanges in inome taxation if
the potential benet does not exeed the osts related to re-optimization (e.g. adjusting
the amount of labor supply). Also, our earlier results support this view as the quantile
regression estimates in Figure 5 show that larger hanges in tax inentives inrease the
behavioral response of the owners.
We dene the utility gain from optimizing orretly with respet to the tax ode as
(3.6.1) △U = U(W ∗, D∗)− U(W 0, D0)
where (W ∗, D∗) is the tax optimal ombination of gross wages and gross dividends,
and (W 0, D0) is the gross inome ombination initially seleted by the owner. In other
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words, U(W ∗, D∗) = (1− tW )W
∗ + (1− tD)D
∗
denotes the utility from behaving opti-
mally with respet to taxes, and U(W 0, D0) = (1 − tW )W
0 + (1 − tD)D
0
denotes the
utility stemming from an initial inome ombination. As (W ∗, D∗) is a unique optimum
that minimizes taxes and maximizes net payouts, and assuming the utility funtion is
linear in terms of total after-tax inome, △U is by denition always non-negative.
The owner optimizes the ombination of gross wages and gross dividends if the utility
gain from optimization exeeds a xed individual optimization ost ψ. By applying this
threshold rule, the hoie rule beomes
(3.6.2) (W g, Dg) =


(W ∗, D∗) if△U > ψ
(W 0, D0) otherwise
For example, the ost of inome-shifting an stem from the opportunity ost of time,
or simply from monetary osts to tax onsultants. To sum up, it is also rational for the
owner not to withdraw the tax-optimal ombination of gross inome (W ∗, D∗) from the
rm if the osts are high and/or the monetary benets from tax optimization are low.
We alulate △U as the dierene between taxes paid per total inome at (W 0, D0)
and taxes paid per total inome at the optimal point (W ∗, D∗). In our empirial analy-
sis, (W 0, D0) is taxes paid after the reform of 2005 when there are no behavioral hanges
in the pre-reform inome ombination and the amount of total inome. (W ∗, D∗) is
taxes paid when the owner has optimized her gross inome ombination perfetly using
the post-reform tax legislation and pre-reform total inome level. Thus △U desribes
the monetary amount eah owner would have gained by re-optimizing her gross inome
ombination after the reform.
The benet analysis is arried out using the years 2002 and 2007. First, we alulate
(W 0, D0) using realized gross inome ombination of wages and dividends in 2002 for
eah owner and tax it aording to the post-reform legislation of 2007. Seond, we
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dene (W ∗, D∗) using the tax-optimal inome ombination under 2007 tax rules using
the level of 2002 total gross inome. Taxes paid are divided by total gross inome in
2002 in order to get a more realisti piture of the relative signiane of the monetary
benet.
The △U variable is orrelated with the realized wages paid in 2002, ausing △U
to be endogenous in the model. Therefore, we need a valid instrumental variable that
is orrelated with △U but unorrelated with the rst-period realized wages (i.e. 2002
wages). A natural andidate for suh an instrument is to derive a similar △U variable
by using the total gross inome and realized inome omposition in any of the pre-
reform years. Thus we use a △U variable alulated with the realized gross inome in
the year 2003 and the tax ode of 2007 as an instrumental variable for the potential
benets.
More formally, the 1st stage of the two-stage least squares estimator is
(3.6.3) △U2007i,2002 = χi + κ△U
2007
i,2003 + ρ(W
∗
i,2007 −W
∗
i,2002) + ϕ(Xi,2007 −Xi,2002) + νi
and the 2nd stage is
(3.6.4)
(W gi,2007-W
g
i,2002) = △αi,t + η(W
∗
i,2007 −W
∗
i,2002)+
µ(Xi,2007 −Xi,2002) + θ∆Uˆ
2007
i,2002 +△ǫi,t
where θ measures the average eet of relative monetary benets on hanging the gross
inome ombination. △U2007i,2002 and △U
2007
i,2003 denote the potential benets alulated
with 2002 and 2003 gross inome and the 2007 tax rules, respetively.
We expet those who benet less from re-optimization not to hange their behavior
after the reform, i.e. small relative benets lead to small (or zero) hanges in realized
gross wages, and vie versa. In this ase θ is positive and signiant. If the osts and
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benets are irrelevant in the inome-shifting pattern, the oeient would be insigni-
ant or lose to zero.
The results for the FD model inluding the potential benets from inome-shifting
are presented in Table 3. The rst olumn shows the results without ontrols, and the
seond olumn presents the estimates with the full set of ontrols using equation (13).
Columns 3 and 4 present the estimates without inluding the benets.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ΔWage ΔWage ΔWage ΔWage
ΔW
∗
0.662*** 0.663*** 0.620*** 0.620***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
△Uˆ 2,796.05*** 2,799.77***
(184.450) (184.449)
ΔOwnership -29.315 -32.053***
(20.786) (4.221)
ΔTurnover 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ΔTotal assets 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ΔProts -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ΔEmployees -9.875 -3.855
(8.424) (12.044)
ΔOther ap.
inome
-0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 6,115 6,115 6,115 6,115
F-test (1st stage) 1,627.28 407.96
R-squared 0.356 0.357 0.319 0.319
Notes: Owner-level lustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01. Estimated by OLS/2SLS using
the years 2002 and 2007. The dependent variable is the dierene in realized gross wages.
Table 3. Results with benets from optimization (2SLS/OLS)
Monetary benets have a signiant eet on inome-shifting behavior. The sign
of the oeient is positive as expeted. The estimate implies that a 1% inrease in
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benets from inome-shifting inreases the dierene in realized gross wages by ap-
proximately 2,800 ¿. This eet is also related to the heterogeneity of the average
estimate disussed before. We estimate larger responses for those who faed large in-
entive hanges due to the tax reform. Those owners who faed lear hanges in tax
inentives usually also benet more from shifting inome than those who faed only
minor hanges.
The baseline inome-shifting estimate inreases slightly after adding the potential
benets into the model, but the magnitude of the tax ode eet is statistially the
same as without the benets. After inluding the benets to the model, none of the
ontrol variables are signiant. This indiates that tax inentives and the osts of
inome-shifting are the main fators behind owners' deisions to withdraw dierent
types of inome from the rm.
The signiane of monetary benets also suggests that the osts related to inome-
shifting are relevant. As mentioned before, if inome-shifting would not indue any
real osts, there would be no deadweight losses either (see Chetty 2009a). Our results
indiate that the osts aet the behavior of the owners. Nevertheless, it is likely
that at least part of the osts are payments to tax onsultants, whih an be regarded
as transfers within the eonomy. This would imply that the standard DWL model
overestimates the true exess burden of inome-shifting. Thus our approximation for the
deadweight loss needs to be interpreted as the upper bound for welfare losses stemming
from inome-shifting.
Finally, Chetty and Saez (2010) onlude that onentrated ownership inreases tax
optimization among orporate owners. Our results in Table 3 do not support this view.
When we expliitly inlude the potential benets from inome-shifting into the model,
we nd the ownership share to be irrelevant in tax avoidane behavior. Therefore, the
ownership struture is not as important an aspet as the atual osts. However, our
data set inludes only shareholders of private orporations who own at least 50% of the
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rm alone or together with family members, and thus we annot oer a general result
for the relationship between the ownership share and inome-shifting.
3.7. Conlusions
In this paper we quantify the extent of inome-shifting behavior by the main owners
of privately held orporations in Finland. In addition, we explore the heterogeneity of
the inome-shifting response among dierent owners and rms, and study how the osts
and benets assoiated with inome-shifting aet tax avoidane behavior.
In many tax systems, business owners an minimize taxes by hoosing an optimal
ombination of dierent inome types as their personal ompensation from the rm.
In Finland, the orporate and dividend tax reform of 2005 signiantly hanged the
inome-shifting inentives for many business owners. In the reform, the taxation of
dividends tightened, whih inreased the inentives to pay wages as a form of personal
ompensation. In the light of behavioral tax researh, the reform had an appealing
feature: the inentives to replae dividends with wages varied among approximately
similar orporate owners. This variation in inentives together with extensive miro
data, inluding information on both the owner and rm-level, enable us to redibly
analyze the extent of inome-shifting behavior.
We nd strong evidene that owners are ative in inome-shifting. Our main result
shows that a one euro hange in the tax-optimal gross wage results in a 66 ent hange
in realized gross wages on average. Our lower bound inome-shifting estimate implies a
32 ent hange in realized gross wages. These estimates indiate that the eet of the
tax ode on the omposition of inome is signiant both statistially and eonomially.
In addition, the inome-shifting response seems to be relatively homogeneous between
dierent rms and owners, as only the relative size of the tax inentive hange aets
inome-shifting ativity. Also, the results suggest that the dividend payments of Finnish
business owners are driven by tax onsiderations, and not, for example, by the atual
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rate of return on invested apital or the ownership share of the main owner. Similarly,
exeutive wage ompensation among the owners does not seem to reet the atual
work ontribution to the rm, as the amount of wages paid is largely determined by
inome-shifting inentives.
We show that tax avoidane via inome-shifting has welfare onsequenes even in
the absene of real eonomy eets (labor supply, work eort, real investments et.).
Using standard approahes in the exess burden literature, we approximate the average
marginal deadweight loss of inome-shifting to be in the range of 0.120.21, depending
on the empirial strategy used. This suggests that limiting the sope of inome-shifting
through administrative and legal measures has positive eets on general welfare. The
government an alleviate the disadvantageous eets of inome-shifting by reduing the
dierene between wage and dividend tax rates, and limiting the legal possibilities to
shift inome between tax bases.
Furthermore, our results show that the osts and benets from inome-shifting are
important parts of tax avoidane behavior. Larger monetary benets from hanging the
inome omposition drive business owners to inrease inome-shifting. Therefore, the
ineieny aused by inome-shifting an also be inuened by aeting the osts of
tax optimization. At least to some extent, the osts an be aeted by simply adjusting
the tax regulations.
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Appendix
MTR on wages MTR on
dividends (no
net assets)
MTR on
dividends
(net assets
170k)
MTR on
dividends
(net assets
1,000k)
Inome 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007
5,000 18.1 11.6 23.1 32.3 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
10,000 23.9 17.0 19.3 35.1 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
15,000 37.4 32.6 36.3 36.6 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
20,000 43.4 32.6 42.3 41.3 23.1 32.3 29.0 26.0
25,000 43.4 43.1 42.3 46.7 23.1 35.1 29.0 26.0
30,000 43.4 43.1 42.3 46.7 32.3 36.6 29.0 26.0
35,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 36.3 41.3 29.0 26.0
40,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 42.3 46.7 29.0 26.0
45,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 42.3 46.7 29.0 26.0
50,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0
55,000 56.4 48.5 55.3 49.5 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0
60,000 56.4 48.5 55.3 49.5 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0
65,000 56.4 56.5 55.3 53.7 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0
70,000 56.4 56.5 55.3 53.7 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0
75,000 56.4 56.5 55.3 53.7 55.3 49.5 29.0 26.0
80,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.7 29.0 26.0
85,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.7 29.0 26.0
90,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.7 29.0 26.0
95,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.2 29.0 32.3
100,000 56.4 54.8 55.3 52.8 55.3 53.2 23.1 35.1
Notes:
MTR on wages is alulated with dividend inome equal to zero, and vie versa. MTR on wages inludes
average muniipal taxes, entral government inome taxes, automati tax dedutions and tax redits and
average rm-level soial seurity ontributions (3%). MTR on wages does not inlude pension and health
insurane ontributions, as these are based on self-reported YEL inome whih is not determined by wage
inome (see Setion 2). MTR on wages does not inlude dedutions based on insurane ontributions. MTR
on dividends inludes orporate taxes on withdrawn dividends (after 2005). MTR on dividends inludes all
automati tax dedutions and tax redits. MTR on progressively taxed dividends inludes average muniipal
taxes and entral government inome taxes. Marginal tax rates are alulated using Stata and the Finnish
JUTTA mirosimulation model.
Table A1. Marginal tax rates (MTR) on wages and dividends with dif-
ferent levels of rm net assets, years 2002 and 2007 (in nominal euros)
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e
Total
gross
inome
Net
assets
Tax optimal
gross wage
2002
Tax optimal
gross wage
2003
Tax optimal
gross wage
2007
Tax optimal
gross wage
2008
15,000 10,000 7,700 7,300 14,500 14,100
50,000 10,000 7,700 7,300 49,100 49,100
100,000 10,000 7,700 7,300 67,500 66,000
15,000 100,000 12,000 12,200 14,500 14,000
50,000 100,000 7,700 7,300 41,000 41,000
100,000 100,000 7,700 7,300 67,500 66,000
15,000 500,000 12,000 12,200 14,500 14,000
50,000 500,000 12,000 12,200 14,500 14,000
100,000 500,000 7,700 7,300 55,000 55,000
Notes:
The optimal gross wage levels are dened assuming that the owner owns 100% of the shares and that the owner
has no earned inome from other soures.
In general, earned inome from other soures lowers the tax optimal gross wage, espeially before the reform.
For example, assume the owner has 2,500 ¿ of other earned inome with total gross inome from the rm being
50,000 ¿ and net assets 100,000 ¿. The tax optimal gross wage in 2003 is in this ase 4,800 ¿ (ompared to
7,300 ¿ without other earned inome). However, with the same ombination of total gross inome, net assets
and other earned inome, the optimal gross wage does not hange after the reform (41,000 ¿ in both 2007 and
2008). This is due to the fat that after 2005 the tax rates for progressively taxed dividends inreased sharply.
After the reform, it is not in general optimal for the owner to replae wages with dividends after reeiving a
modest amount of other earned inome.
Table A2. Tax-optimal gross wages before (2002, 2003) and after (2007,
2008) the 2005 tax reform with dierent levels of total gross inome and
net assets of the rm (in nominal euros)
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Year Stat Wages
Optimal
wages Dividends
Optimal
dividends
Total
inome
Ownership
share
2002 Mean 19,806 5,317 27,105 41,594 46,911 0.82
Median 18,485 7,463 12,222 28,797 34,567 .93
SD 16,986 3,499 82,510 84,965 85,066 0.23
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2003 Mean 19,244 4,794 32,744 47,194 51,988 0.84
Median 17,223 7,011 15,000 31,783 36,996 .95
SD 17,318 3,401 142,723 144,477 144,533 0.23
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2007 Mean 23,083 26,033 32,767 29,817 55,850 0.82
Median 20,440 23,888 14,910 11,267 40,170 .99
SD 22,443 19,416 99,552 100,123 102,931 0.22
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2008 Mean 23,980 26,233 35,487 33,234 59,468 0.82
Median 20,880 23,739 15,400 12,680 42,300 .99
SD 24,064 20,041 103,706 105,115 107,824 0.22
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
Table A3. Desriptive statistis (2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008): Main
owners (in urrent euros)
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e
Year Stat Turnover Employees Total
assets
Net
assets
2002 Mean 782,450 10.35 400,805 285,155
Median 227,617 4 141,598 100,222
SD 4,092,140 32.98 2,174,166 1,669,665
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2003 Mean 946,741 10.27 529,807 381,950
Median 289,713 4 192,240 114,693
SD 3,982,281 30.64 2,375,763 5,233,616
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2007 Mean 1,082,630 10.60 723,319 448,007
Median 321,193 4 253,792 152,155
SD 3,155,168 36.14 2,985,295 2,378,661
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2008 Mean 1,152,018 10.63 811,968 516,807
Median 329,951 4 272,411 168,326
SD 3,329,805 36.25 3,452,935 2,791,899
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
Table A4. Desriptive statistis (2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008): Firms (in
urrent euros)
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(2002) (2003) (2007) (2008)
VARIABLES Wage Wage Wage Wage
W
∗
1.050*** 1.054*** 0.904*** 0.919***
(0.075) (0.071) (0.014) (0.015)
age 731.402*** 796.057*** 152.225 13.974
(178.766) (177.301) (166.080) (180.098)
age sq. -8.102*** -9.032*** -1.295 0.104
(1.912) (1.852) (1.650) (1.771)
male 2,054.167*** 1,887.503*** 222.468 103.157
(632.076) (610.805) (471.941) (500.517)
ownership -5,615.921*** -6,330.395*** -3,311.677*** -1,888.356**
(1,003.374) (975.413) (773.002) (881.820)
turnover 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
total assets -0.000 0.001** 0.000* 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
prots 0.009*** -0.000 -0.001* -0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
employees 18.056 28.357 5.856 3.568
(23.840) (25.448) (5.471) (7.255)
apital inome -0.001*** -0.011 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant -5,060.437 8,823.021** 2,042.214 806.022
(4,528.741) (4,394.755) (4,210.924) (4,548.095)
Observations 5,160 5,611 6,244 6,237
R-squared 0.115 0.114 0.637 0.613
Notes: Owner-level lustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A5. Cross-setion results for the years 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008 (OLS)
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES ΔW ΔW
ΔW ∗ 0.681*** 0.680***
(0.012) (0.016)
ΔOwnership -9.120
(52.054)
ΔTurnover 0.000
(0.000)
ΔTotal assets 0.000
(0.000)
ΔProts -0.001
(0.002)
ΔEmployees -7.535
(12.391)
ΔOther apital inome -0.000
(0.000)
Observations 5,613 5,613
R-squared 0.348 0.349
Notes: Owner-level lustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01.
Table A6. Results the years 2002 and 2008 (OLS)
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Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Employees Employees
0-25th p 26-50th p 51-75th p 76-100th
p
0-25th p 26-50th p
VARIABLES ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW
△W ∗ 0.676*** 0.597*** 0.646*** 0.613*** 0.604*** 0.626***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.025) (0.034)
Observations 1,528 1,529 1,529 1,529 2,009 1,387
R-squared 0.383 0.345 0.365 0.253 0.317 0.332
Employees Employees Total
assets
Total
assets
Total
assets
Total
assets
51-75th p 76-100th
p
0-25th p 26-50th p 51-75th p 76-100th
p
VARIABLES ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW
△W ∗ 0.606*** 0.655*** 0.738*** 0.711*** 0.640*** 0.647***
(0.027) (0.033) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033)
Observations 1,301 1,418 1,529 1,529 1,529 1,528
R-squared 0.377 0.302 0.359 0.417 0.380 0.262
Age Age Age Age Male Female
0-25th p 26-50th p 51-75th p 76-100th
p
VARIABLES ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW
△W ∗ 0.601*** 0.628*** 0.606*** 0.583*** 0.623*** 0.590***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.037) (0.017) (0.033)
Observations 1,597 1,587 1,623 1,308 5,247 868
R-squared 0.330 0.348 0.283 0.274 0.318 0.355
Agriulture Mining Industry ConstrutionCommere Hotels
VARIABLES ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW
△W ∗ 0.836*** 0.561*** 0.692*** 0.570*** 0.600*** 0.638***
(0.108) (0.081) (0.048) (0.035) (0.030) (0.092)
Observations 70 156 842 1,070 1,500 137
R-squared 0.537 0.394 0.335 0.308 0.322 0.430
Logistis Finane Estate Eduation Health
are
Other
servies
VARIABLES ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW ΔW
△W ∗ 0.563*** 0.964*** 0.636*** 0.693*** 0.658*** 0.579***
(0.078) (0.107) (0.028) (0.124) (0.068) (0.108)
Observations 462 63 1,433 48 208 125
R-squared 0.254 0.660 0.342 0.590 0.423 0.346
Note: Owner-level lustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01.
Table A7. Results for dierent subgroups, 2002-2008 (OLS)

CHAPTER 4
Dividend Taxes and Deisions of MNEs: Evidene from a
Finnish Tax Reform
1
Abstrat. In this study we explore how a rm-level tax on redistributed foreign
prots aets the hoies of a multinational enterprise (MNE). We examine this by
using evidene from a reent tax reform in Finland. The so-alled equalization tax
(EQT) used to be a regular element of European imputation systems, designed to
ensure that dividends were not paid out of untaxed prots. Theoretial analyses have
suggested that EQT may distort several hoies of MNEs. We nd a 23 per ent
inrease in dividend payments and a similar inrease in repatriated foreign prots
after the repeal of EQT. We also nd suggestive evidene that the reported prots
of foreign subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs inreased, whih indiates an eet on prot
shifting. No hange in investment was deteted.
Keywords: Dividend taxation, Finanial deisions, Multinational enterprise, Tax
reform
JEL lassiation: H25, F23, H32
4.1. Introdution
In reent deades multinational enterprises (MNEs) have notably inreased their
role in the world eonomy. There is also widening evidene of the remarkable ability
of MNEs to exploit ross-ountry dierenes in tax systems. These developments have
led to a growing interest in international tax design issues among poliymakers and
aademis.
Against this bakground, it is no surprise that several OECD ountries have re-
formed their orporate tax systems in reent years. Tax rate uts, speial regimes
for inome from intelletual property and limitations to interest dedetions are some
1
This essay is joint work with Seppo Kari. A version of this paper is published in the VATT Working
Papers series, 27, September 2011.
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examples. A further trend in Europe has been to swith from an imputation system
to lassial orporate tax with redued tax rates.
2
This inludes the four largest EU
Member States as well as Ireland, Norway and Finland. The European trend an be
explained at least partly by a series of rulings by the European Court of Justie (ECJ),
where imputation systems were found to be inonsistent with the EU Treaties.
3
The
ase against them turned on disrimination against either foreign shareholders or foreign
orporations.
4
One of the hallenged features of European imputation systems was the so alled
equalization tax (EQT) and its ounterparts
5
. The aim of these measures was to protet
domesti tax revenues by ensuring that no dividends an be distributed from prots
whih are not subjet to domesti orporate tax. EQT served this goal by levying
an extra orporate-level tax if dividends were naned from tax-exempt (or leniently
taxed) prots. An EQT liability was espeially ommon in ases where a ompany
had foreign soure inome whih was tax-exempt to relieve international double tax-
ation. The onsequent extra tax burden on foreign prots and its potential harmful
eets on eonomi ativity were reognized in the European tax oordination debate
2
The imputation system is a method to relieve double taxation of distributed orporate prots. It
gives the shareholders a redit for taxes paid by the ompany,whih an be oset against inome
tax on dividends. Imputation systems are still applied in several OECD ountries suh as Australia,
Canada and New Zealand.
3
See European Commission (2003). See also the ruling by the ECJ on the so-alled Manninen ase
(Case C-319/02), issued on 7 September 2004. The ruling held that the Finnish imputation system,
whih limited imputation redits to domesti soure dividends, violated the free movement of apital
priniple in the EC Treaty. This ruling was an important fator behind the Finnish government's
deision to abolish the imputation system as from 2005.
4
A further reason for the repeal of imputation systems might have been the non-optimality of personal-
level double tax reliefs in open eonomy laimed by Boadway and Brue (1992).
5
The main alternative to EQT was the system of dierentiated redit. Under this method, redis-
tribution of tax exempt foreign prots did not trigger EQT. However, suh dividends did not give
entitlement to imputation redit either. In mid1990s both Germany and the UK swithed from EQT
to dierentiated redit.
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(Ruding Committee (1992)), but also by national governments who soon implemented
amendments to their tax rules.
6
Given the growing role of MNEs and the diulties in designing their taxation, there
has been little researh establishing evidene from quasi-experimental setting between
taxes and the behavior of MNEs. In this study we use the Finnish tax reform of 2005,
whih abolished EQT, as a natural experiment to examine the behavioral responses of
MNEs to taxes. Beause of the opportunity to use valid poliy evaluation methods, we
believe that our study oers a novel ontribution to this eld of publi eonomis.
Our main interest lies in the eets of EQT on dividends, investments and the use
of alternative hannels to repatriate foreign prots from abroad. The unique rm-level
data based on tax returns allow us to examine losely various deisions by ompanies.
In onsidering prot shifting responses we apply data for Swedish and Finnish based
orporate groups inluded in the Amadeus database.
7
How should we expet taxes on dividend payments to aet hoies? Publi eo-
nomis literature inludes two well known opposite hypotheses on the eets of dividend
taxes. The new view laims that these taxes will apitalize into share pries, but have
no eets on investment or dividend payments. The old view predits that dividends
and investment are dependent on dividend taxes. The so-alled Hartman-Sinn hypoth-
esis is an appliation of the new view to the international environment. It suggests
that a subsidiary's long-run apital stok and dividend repatriations are independent
of a potential tax liability due on repatriation of the prots (see Sinn (1987))
8
.
6
See for example Weihenrieder (1994), for Germany and Freeman and Grith (1993), for the UK.
7
We also aim to ontribute to the empirial analyses of the Finnish 2005 tax reform. Kari et al. (2008
and 2009) have examined the reform eets in their studies but both of these analyses onentrated
only to personal-level hanges in dividend taxation and ignored the hanges in ompany-level tax
strutures suh as EQT.
8
Subsequent researh has tried to hallenge and test this view. Desai et al. (2001, 2007) and Bellak et
al. (2010) analyze the eets of repatriation taxes empirially and argue that they have an inuene on
dividends, but nevertheless repatriations are fairly persistent and seem to follow a target pay-out ratio.
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Besides traditional dividend tax issues, previous literature has also addressed several
aspets of imputation systems. Freeman and Grith (1993) provide a poliy disussion
on the eets of `surplus ACT', the British variant of EQT. Devereux and Freeman
(1995) analyze how imputation systems aet international investment ows. Weihen-
rieder (1994, 1998) onstruts a dynami MNE model in the new view tradition to
investigate inentive aspets of the German system of dierentiated redit and shows
that it aets dividends and lowers the parent ompany's ost of apital for investments.
Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2005) analyze EQT in a similar MNE model and argue that
it has idential impliations for dividend and investment poliies as dierentiated redit.
They further show that EQT tends to inrease inentives to shift foreign prots to the
home ountry using transfer priing.
Empirial literature on the eets of imputation systems on the behavior of MNEs
is sant and fouses solely on the UK appliation. Bond et al. (1996) examine the
eets of the tax ost of paying dividends resulting from surplus ACT in the UK. They
report a negative eet on dividend payments. Bond et al. (2007) examine the eets
of the abolition of repayable imputation redits for UK pension funds in July 1997 and
report an inrease in dividend payments among rms beneting most from the reform.
Neither study nds evidene of hanges in investment. The impliations of imputation
systems for the international alloation of prots have not been studied empirially.
9
Our estimation method is a standard linear dierene-in-dierenes approah. It
allows us to evaluate the ausal eet of the abolition of EQT on rms whih faed a
high risk of being liable to pay EQT on distributed dividends (MNEs). Our ontrol
group is formulated from other large rms whih were not at risk of EQT liability before
Desai et al. (2007) refer to information asymmetries and monitoring motives as major determinants
of repatriation poliies.
9
There is, of ourse, a large empirial literature that studies the eets of taxes on international prot
shifting more generally, see for example Hines and Rie (1994), Clausing (2003), Bartelsman and
Beetsma (2003) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008).
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the reform. Consistent with theory, the empirial results suggest that aeted rms in-
reased their dividend payments onsiderably, by approximately 23 per ent. We also
nd that repatriation of foreign prots in the form of intra-ompany dividends inreased
after the repeal of EQT. Furthermore, we observe an inrease in the reported prots
of foreign subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs, suggesting a derease in prot-shifting. How-
ever, we annot observe statistially signiant hanges in the level of real or nanial
investments. Our results emphasize the sensitivity of dividend deisions to taxes both
outside and inside an MNE and hene they provide similar evidene as the previous
empirial literature, inluding the study by Bond et al. (1996). The natural experiment
approah onerning the eets on prot-shifting is generally novel and espeially so in
the literature dealing with imputation systems.
The paper proeeds as follows. Setion 4.2 introdues an overview of the elements
of the tax system in question. Setion 4.3 presents the theoretial bakground and the
hypotheses to be tested in our empirial analysis. Setion 4.4 is devoted to empirial
analysis and setion 4.5 presents the onlusions.
4.2. The taxation of dividends in Finland
We briey summarize the main elements of dividend taxation before and after the
2005 tax reform in Finland. A full imputation system was adopted as a part of a
larger base-broadening and tax rate-utting reform, as from 1990. After the reform,
orporation tax was fully redited against the tax liability of a shareholder paid by
the ompany on distributed prots. Following its European predeessors in Frane,
Germany and the UK, equalization tax (EQT) was an elementary part of the system.
This regime operated for 15 years until 2004. As from the beginning of 2005 the
imputation system (inluding EQT) was repealed and a partial double tax of dividends
introdued. The main rule was that 70 per ent of dividends were reognized as tax-
able apital inome. Substantial reliefs for dividends from non-listed ompanies were
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maintained. Corporate tax (τ) was ut from 29 to 26 per ent and the at tax rate
on personal-level apital inome from 29 to 28 per ent.
10
An exemption method was
introdued for the taxation of apital gains from the sale of shares and for taxation of
dividends reeived by orporations.
The operational priniple of EQT is to make sure that no dividends whih are
entitled to imputation redit are distributed out of prots not subjet to the full do-
mesti orporate tax. The ways of implementing this idea varied somewhat in dier-
ent ountries but the goals were very similar. In Finland EQT liability was due if
the so alled minimum orporate tax (MT ) exeeded preliminary orporate tax (CT ).
MT was equal to the imputation redit granted to the shareholder and it was alu-
lated MT = sG/(1 − s), where G is dividends, s is the rate of imputation redit and
τe = s/(1−s) is the rate of EQT. In Finland s = τ implying τe = τ/(1−τ). Preliminary
orporate tax was dened CT = τ ∗ Πˆ, where Πˆ is taxable prot. The amount levied
as EQT was alulated EQT = max (MT − CT, 0).
An additional ompliating aspet must be mentioned. It is an inter-temporal
smoothing mehanism. Due to the volatility of prots some onsidered it not rea-
sonable to levy EQT if dividend distribution exeeds annual taxable prots in a year
when prots are exeptionally low. Thus the tax system allowed taxed domesti prots
from previous years to be taken into aount. To implement this idea a onept of tax
surpluses was introdued. It was dened as taxes paid on retained prots from a time
interval whih was initially ve years and later ten years. Hene tax surpluses (TS)
were alulated as follows:
(4.2.1) TSt =
t−1∑
t−10
max(CTs −MTs, 0),
10
Sine 1993 Finland had operated a dual inome tax where tax rate on apital inome is proportional.
Earlier analyses on the 2005 tax reform inlude Kari et al. (2008) and Korkeamäki et al. (2010).
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where t refers to the urrent sal year. Where old tax surpluses were required to
redue the equalization tax liability, the oldest unused tax surpluses were used rst
(rst-in-rst-out rule).
We get:
EQT = max(MT(CT + TS), 0).
Next we illustrate how EQT works by means of an example. Assume an MNE on-
sisting of a parent ompany resident in Finland and a subsidiary resident in Germany.
The parent's pre-tax prot is 100 of whih 50 is a result of foreign-soure dividends.
These dividends are tax-exempt beause of the exemption method applied to relieve
international double taxation. The rest of the pre-tax prot, 50, is earned from business
operations in Finland and is subjet to orporate tax at rate 29 per ent. Hene, the
MNE's orporate tax liability is 14.5.
To onsider the potential tax impliations of dividend distributions, assume that
the parent has no tax surpluses. If the MNE distributes no more than 35.5, i.e. it
distributes its taxable domesti prot after taxes, no EQT liability is due. However,
if its dividend exeeds 35.5, it pays 29 ents in EQT for every euro exeeding the
threshold. If the MNE distributes its entire after-tax prot, its EQT liability is 14.5.
The MNE an avoid this extra tax ost on dividend distributions simply by utting its
dividends so that only domesti after tax prot is distributed and by investing the rest
in the parent's home ountry. The next setion examines the inentive eets of EQT
using a formal model.
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4.3. Theoretial preditions
We will draw the hypotheses for our empirial analysis by onsidering EQT in an
innite-horizon dynami MNE model.
11
We show that EQT reates an extra tax ost for
dividend payments naned from foreign soure prots, whih leads to hanges in the
MNEs dividend, investment and repatriation poliies. The onlusions on the eets
of the repeal of EQT are judged by omparing the optimal hoies of the rm with
and without EQT. We begin by laying out the model framework and then move to the
analysis and disussion. The presentation draws muh on Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja
(2005).
12
4.3.1. The dynami MNE model with EQT. Consider a value maximizing
MNE that onsists of a parent ompany, resident in the home ountry (h-ountry), and
a subsidiary, operating in a foreign ountry (f-ountry). The parent produes at home
using apital K as the only prodution fator. Let Π(K) be operating prots with
standard properties Π' > 0 and Π < 0. The parent's budget onstraint is13
(4.3.1) Π(K) +Q+D∗ + C = G+ I + T,
where the soures of funds are domesti prots Π(K), proeeds from new share issues
Q, foreign soure intra-ompany dividends D∗, and prots of foreign origin C, shifted
from the subsidiary for the parent. We leave out debt nane to simplify the analysis.
11
The model builds on the new view theory developed by King (1974) and others, extended to
the international ontext by Hartman (1985), Sinn (1984, 1993), Alworth (1988) and Keen (1991).
Weihenrieder (1994, 1998) and Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2005) have used the set-up to analyze
elements of imputation systems. Altshuler and Grubert (2002) disuss the limitations of the standard
model, partiularly it fous on a narrow set of nanial ows between the parent and its single aliate.
12
More thorough theoretial analysis is presented in a version of this paper that is published previously,
Harju and Kari (2011).
13
The starred variables refer to the f-ountry.
4.3. Theoretial preditions 119
Funds are spent on dividend distributions G to shareholders, h-ountry investment I
and h-ountry taxes T .
The subsidiary's budget onstraint is
(4.3.2) Π(K∗) = D∗ + I∗ + C + c(C) + T ∗.
The soure of funds is operating prot Π(K∗) earned on investments loated in
the f-ountry. The funds are used for dividend repatriations D∗ for the parent, loal
physial investment I∗, prot-shifting via transfer priing C and f-ountry taxes T ∗.
Prot-shifting is assumed to ause administrative and eieny osts c(C) with the
properties c' > 0, c > 0, borne by the subsidiary.
The MNE hooses dividends, investments at home and abroad, equity issues, intra-
ompany dividends and shifted prots to maximize the present value of the after-tax
ash ow from the ompany to its owners:
(4.3.3) max
{G,Q,C,D∗}
V =
ˆ ∞
t0
(γG−Q)e−ρ(t−t0)dt,
where γG with γ = (1 − τp)/(1 − s) denotes after-tax dividends reeived by the
shareholder. τp is the tax rate on apital inome and s is the rate of imputation redit.
For full imputation s = τ and for partial imputation 0 < s < τ , where τ is the rate of
orporate tax. We assume τp ≥ τ , whih implies γ ≤ 1. ρ = (1 − τp)r is the after-tax
disount rate. To simplify, we assume no owner-level apital gains taxation.
The rst step to model EQT in this framework is to split dividends G into two parts
(4.3.4) G = D +De,
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where D denotes dividends naned from after-tax domesti prots (normal divi-
dend) and De refers to that part of dividends whih exeeds the amount of domesti
prots and thus triggers an equalization tax payment (exess dividend).
We onstrain normal dividend D to the h-ountry taxable prot after taxes:
(4.3.5) D ≤ (1− τ)Πˆ with Πˆ = [Π(K) + C].
Observe that Πˆ inludes C, i.e. prots earned in the f-ountry but shifted to the
h-ountry using transfer priing. If the rm distributes more than the after tax prot,
it must set De > 0 and is then liable to pay EQT.
The parent's and the subsidiary's taxes T and T ∗ are dened as
(4.3.6) T = τ [Π(K) + C] + τeDe, T
∗ = τ ∗[Π(K∗)Cc(C)],
where T onsists of the domesti orporation tax at rate τ and EQT at rate τe.
The h-ountry is assumed to grant international double-tax relief using the exemption
method. Hene, repatriated dividend D∗ is tax-exempt and does not show up in T .
The subsidiary's taxes T ∗ onsist of the f-ountry orporation tax, the base of whih is
prots from loal prodution less inome shifted to the parent, inluding osts.
4.3.2. The MNE's optimal poliy. Consider now the MNEs optimal poliy in
the presene of EQT. It makes sense to start with the naning hoies of the parent
and then move to investment and repatriation poliies. We use a heuristi approah
here to demonstrate the eets of EQT. A formal derivation is given in the Appendix
of Harju and Kari (2011).
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In our model with no debt there are three soures from whih the parent may nane
additional h-ountry investments: domesti prots (normal dividends), repatriated for-
eign prots (exess dividends), and new share issues. A useful way to onsider the
eets of tax rules on naning hoies is to ompare the osts of small inreases in
naning while keeping the eet on investment onstant.
14
If the parent deides to
retain one euro of its domesti prots after orporate taxes, the shareholder foregoes
(1− τp)/(1− s) after taxes. The owner's inome is only redued by owner-level inome
tax (τp) net of imputation redit (s).
The orresponding ost for retaining one euro of foreign prots is (1 − τp)/[(1 −
s)(1 + τe)]. Now the owner's inome is again redued by owner-level taxes but also by
EQT.
15
Finally, the ost for new equity is 1 sine equity apital an be invested in and
withdrawn from a orporation without tax impliations.
Using the assumption (1 − τp)/(1 − s) ≤ 1, we may draw the following peking
order for the alternative naning forms:
foreign profits ≻ domestic profits % new equity
Foreign prots are unambiguously the most preferred form of naning while do-
mesti prots are preferred or equal to new equity depending on the sizes of s and
τp.
16
The position of foreign prots as the most favoured soure is solely determined by
EQT.
17
14
More formally, ompare the partial dierentials of the Lagrangean in respet of dividend variables
and new equity, see Appendix in Harju and Kari (2011).
15
If the one euro is spent on dividends, the rm pays τe/(1 + τe) in EQT and distributes the rest
1/(1 + τe). The owner's net inome after personal taxes is then (1− τp)/[(1− s)(1 + τe)].
16
In a partial imputation system (s < τ) domesti prots are stritly preferred to new equity. In full
imputation (s = τ) with τp = τ indierene ours.
17
Observe that without the imputation system (s = τe = 0), but retaining other aspets of the model,
the peking order beomes foreign profits ≈ domestic profits ≻ new equity.
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Consider next the eets of EQT on the parent's investment. This an be a-
omplished by deriving the ost of apital of real investment naned from foreign
repatriated prots (marginal soure of nane). As demonstrated above, the ost of
retaining one euro of foreign prots is (1 − τp)/[(1 − s)(1 + τe)]. On the other hand,
investing the retained one euro internally gives the parent an inome ow of (1− τ)Π'
after orporate tax. Assuming the net return is distributed as dividends, the owner
reeives a net inome ow of (1 − τ)Π'(1 − τp)/(1 − s). Using the owner's after-tax
interest rate, ρ = (1−τp)r, as the disount rate, we may alulate its present value to be
(1− τ)Π'/[r(1− s)]. This gives the ontribution of the investment to the market value
of the MNE. In equilibrium the osts and benets (the present value of the returns) of
the investment equal. By solving on the marginal return on apital, we may draw the
MNEs long-run ost of apital in the presene of EQT:
(4.3.7) Π'(K) =
1− τp
(1− τ)(1 + τe)
r.
Without EQT but retaining other features of the tax system, the ost of apital is
Π' = (1 − τp)r/(1− τ). By omparing to equation (4.3.7) we may onlude that EQT
lowers the h-ountry ost of apital below the benhmark level and hene inreases
investments. In the ase of a full imputation system (τe = τ/(1− τ)) ondition (4.3.7)
beomes Π' = (1 − τp)r. Now the ost of apital orresponds to the owner's after-tax
interest rate whih reets strong investment inentives.
The intuition of these results is straightforward: EQT aets the osts and returns
of investment dierently. It redues the osts, but leaves, unlike a standard dividend
tax, the returns on investment intat. Therefore its eets do not anel out but rather
lead to a rise in inentives to invest.
4.3. Theoretial preditions 123
Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2005) extend the model to inlude the parent's invest-
ments in nanial assets, F , yielding a return at a xed rate i = r. In this ase the
rm does not aept a return on real investments lower than the market interest rate.
The optimal stok of real apital is determined by the ondition Π'(K) = r. After
this size of K is reahed, all repatriated foreign prots are invested in nanial assets
dF/dt = D∗. Only h-ountry prots are distributed, and these now inlude the returns
on nanial investments, G = D = Π(K) + iF .18
Observe that dividends D distributed by the parent grow in this regime. This is
beause the growth in nanial assets leads to an inrease in domesti prots and this
relieves the upper limit of D. Hene, by investing the repatriated foreign prots in the
h-ountry, the parent, in a way, transforms these prots into domesti prots whih
an be paid out without EQT liability (Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja 2005, Altshuler
and Grubert 2002). Only domesti prots are distributed. The onstraint in equation
(4.3.5) binds permanently. Hene, EQT eetively establishes an upper limit on the
parent's dividends whih is gradually relieved when nanial assets aumulate.
The MNE has two alternative ways to repatriate foreign prots, intra-ompany
dividends, D∗ and prot shifting using transfer priing, C. We disregarded the latter
alternative but we now perform an analysis of it. The inentives to use transfer priing
rather than dividends an again be examined by onsidering the osts and benets of a
poliy hange where intra-ompany dividends before foreign orporate tax are redued
by one euro and the transfer-pried prot inreased orrespondingly.
If the MNE redues foreign-soure pre-tax dividends by one euro, the shareholder
foregoes a dividend net of tax of (1 − τ ∗)(1 − τp)/[(1 − s)(1 + τe)]. In this expression
the owner's inome is redued rst by foreign orporate tax (τ ∗), then by EQT after
18
Adding debt into the model would produe a similar steady-state regime where EQT generates
inentives to pay bak debt aumulated earlier to nane the stok of real apital. Weihenrieder
(1998) elaborates this solution in the ase of the German system of dierentiated redit.
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the foreign-soure dividend is redistributed (τe), and, nally by personal-level dividend
taxes (τp) net of imputation redit (s). The redution in foreign dividends enables
the MNE to inrease the prot shifted to the h-ountry by one euro. This raises the
shareholder's net inome by (1− τ)(1− τp)/(1− s). The dividend only is subjet to h-
ountry orporate tax (τ) and owner-level dividend tax (τp) net of imputation redit (s).
No f-ountry orporate tax or EQT is paid beause the prot, even if earned abroad,
is reported in the h-ountry. There is a further soure of osts aused by the poliy
hange, namely administrative and eieny osts from prot-shifting c(C), assumed
to grow at an inreasing rate. It is useful to assume that this ost is lose to zero for
the very small hange in shifted prots. Hene we fous on the rst two omponents of
osts and benets.
19
We obtain the following ondition:
(4.3.8)
1− τ ∗
1 + τ e


<
=
>


(1− τ) ⇐⇒ D∗


≺
≈
≻


C.
The left-hand side of the tax rate ondition gives the relative value of distributed
prot when the prot is reported abroad and repatriated as intra-ompany dividends
D∗ and the right-hand side is the value when prot is transferred to the h-ountry using
prot-shifting and reported there. If the right-hand side is greater than the left-hand
side, then the transfer priing hannel is preferred and vie versa.
Without EQT the MNE hooses transfer priing if the h-ountry tax rate is lower
than the f-ountry rate. Prots will be reported in the ountry with the lowest tax
burden. With EQT the relative sizes of τ and τ ∗ still matter but now EQT inreases
the probability of prot-shifting being used. In the ase of full imputation (s = τ) the
19
A broader analysis is given in the Appendix of Harju and Kari (2011).
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ondition boils down to τ e > 0 implying that transfer priing dominates at all positive
rates.
The results derived above from the standard MNE model
20
provide us with the
following behavioral hypotheses for the empirial analysis. Beause of the repeal of
EQT as from 2005 we expet Finnish MNEs to have:
• inreased their dividends to shareholders,
• dereased h-ountry real or nanial investments,
• inreased intra-ompany dividends and dereased prot-shifting as a way of
repatriating prots from abroad.
4.4. Empirial analysis
4.4.1. Method. We apply a standard dierene-in-dierene (DD) method to es-
timate the hanges in the behavior of rms in response to the abolition of EQT in
2005. The treatment group onsists of all Finnish MNEs operating during 20002002.
In our main estimations the ontrol group onsists of other large Finnish orporations
operating in Finland. When we investigate prot-shifting responses, we use Swedish
multinationals and their subsidiaries as our ontrol group. This is justiable sine
Swedish MNEs were not subjet to any major poliy reforms during our examination
period.
The estimated DD equation is the following
(4.4.1) Log(Yit) = βcontrolsit + δaftert + γtreati ∗ aftert + ηi + εit,
20
Altshuler and Grubert (2002) extend the simple standard model to inlude several subsidiaries,
investments in nanial assets abroad and investments between subsidiaries of the MNE. While suh
extensions are important to understand MNEs' deisions more generally, we believe that our model is
suient to demonstrate the entral inentive eets on the parent's deisions.
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where Y refers to the dependent variable in rm i at time t. We have several
dependent variables in our analysis: dividend payments, real investments, nanial
investments, repatriated prots and reported prots at home and abroad, whih are
all in a logarithmi form to deal with the skewed outomes.
21
The variable treat is a
dummy variable with a value of one if the rm is a Finnish MNE and zero otherwise,
and after is a time dummy with a value of zero before and one after the reform. In
some speiations we also replae after by year dummies to investigate the yearly
responses. Controls inlude the number of employees, sales and equity in natural
logarithmi form. ε is the i.i.d. error term.
The main interest lies in the oeient γ of the interation variable (treat∗after) in
equation (4.4.1). This desribes the impat of the reform on treated rms relative to the
ontrol group (average treatment eet for the treated, ATT), if the DD assumptions
hold. The main assumption of the DD method is the parallel time trends assumption
meaning that the variable of interest should behave similarly in the treatment and
ontrol groups over time if the poliy hange had not been introdued. The method
also requires no self-seletion to the groups and no dierenes in transitory shoks
during the examination period. If these assumptions hold, we are able to write the DD
estimator as follows:
γˆ = (Y¯1a − Y¯1b)− (Y¯0a − Y¯0b),
where Y¯gt is the log of average outome value over group g at time t.
22
The poliy
impat γ in equation (4.4.1) is the expeted value of parameter γˆ.23
21
Naturally, the logarithmi model anels out the zero values. However, for example, the share of
rms distributing zero dividends is rather small in our sample, only 15%, inluding both treatment
and ontrol rms.
22
Here a and b refer to the post- and pre-reform periods and 1 and 0 to the treatment and ontrol
groups respetively.
23
See e.g. Blundell and Costa Dias (2009).
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We use a rm xed-eet strategy. In our ase, the xed-eet model an be seen
as a better option than, for example, the random eet model or pooled OLS beause it
allows orrelation between the rm omponent (ηi) and the regressors.
24
Additionally,
all models assume that the error term is not orrelated with the regressors and there is
no perfet multiollinearity of regressors (full rank ondition).
An additional hallenge is to produe appropriate standard errors. The problem
is emphasized in two separate papers by Bertrand et al. (2004) and Cameron et al.
(2008). The problem arises when the number of groups used in the estimations is small.
It ould be, for example, in a ase where an unobserved shok aes groups behavior
dierently. These papers propose several options to help solve this problem: Bertrand
et al. propose to use blok bootstrap method and Cameron et al. propose to apply
wild bootstrap method. In this paper we apply industry level lusters with a blok
bootstrap. As a robustness hek we also apply a wild bootstrap method with the
industry lusters. In addition, as a further robustness hek we use muniipality level
lusters with both blok and wild bootstrap methods.
4.4.2. Identiation issues. We reognize four issues whih might hamper our
identiation. The rst is the potential antiipation responses of rms to the announe-
ment of a reform before its atual implementation. In this ase the before-after setting
of our analysis is less lear ut. The seond potential worry is that the rms in the
treatment and ontrol groups responded dierently to the other hanges of tax reform
of 2005 (TR2005). The third worry is that the reform may not have been exogenous
but rather an endogenous response to eonomi onditions. The last issue relates to
the seletion of rms in the ontrol and treatment groups. In the following we argue
that these issues are not too serious for our identiation.
24
We also oer test results supporting the xed-eet strategy later on. Estimates of other methods
are also available upon request.
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Antiipation ould be a problem beause TR2005 was announed already in No-
vember 2003. In Figure 1 we plot the average annual log of dividends in the ontrol
and treatment groups from 2000 to 2007 to desribe how well our main identifying
assumption of parallel time trends holds in pratise. The Figure shows that there was
an inrease in means in both groups in 2003, whih, in line with the study by Kari et
al. (2008) reets the expeted general tightening of personal dividend taxes. Kari et
al. (2008) found lear antiipation in dividend payments among small rms in 2003
and 2004, but in 2003 alone among large (listed) rms.
The dierene in means of dividends appears to be relatively stable until 2002.
However, the means seem to diverge in 2003 and the dierene is even larger in 2004.
This suggests that some antiipation might have happened before implementation of
the reform. Right after the reform in 2005, the dierene between the means of dividend
payments is already statistially signiant.
25
We suggest two options to solve the antiipation question. The rst approah is
to test whether or not the parallel time trend assumption holds by onsidering yearly
responses before the reform implementation. Alternatively we may drop the observa-
tions of 2003 and 2004 from our data and use 20002002 as the pre-reform period, and
thus examine how robust our main results are. We onsider the issue by using both
approahes in our result setion.
As to the seond issue, we believe that the ontrol and treatment groups faed these
other hanges in TR2005 apart from the abolition of EQT in a broadly similar manner.
Support for this view is reeived from the paper by Kari et al. (2009), whih did not nd
any response after 2005 among large listed rms. Thus we believe that the abolition of
EQT was the major element of the reform that aeted large rms.
Thirdly, the DD method assumes that the poliy hange is exogenous to eonomi
agents. Otherwise the method would oer biased impat estimates. Thus, the reform
25
In Appendix, Figures A2, A3 and A4 show the average trends for other main outomes in the paper.
4.4. Empirial analysis 129
13
.
5
14
.
5
15
.
5
Lo
g 
o
f d
iv
id
en
ds
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Confidence intervals Treatment
Control
Average log of dividends for treatment and control groups
Figure 1. Average log of dividends: treatment and ontrol groups
should not have been implemented on the grounds of eonomi onditions (for example
to boost MNEs eonomi ativity). In our ase, the repeal of the imputation system was
a response to an ECJ ruling whih held the full imputation system to be inonsistent
with EU legislation. Therefore, the tax reform was not driven by Finnish eonomi
onditions.
The fourth possible identiation problem is the hoie of the ontrol group. The
DD method assumes that the ontrol group is hosen exogenously. Aording to the
desriptive statistis, the ontrol and treatment groups seem to be relatively equal in
size. Besides, we use pre-reform (years 20002002) information to identify the treatment
and ontrol groups. Thus we believe that the ontrol group, in the form we have dened
it, is a good ounterfatual for the treatment group.
To assess the robustness of our results, we will use Amadeus data to investigate
behavioral hanges by subsidiaries with dierent ontrol group assumptions. However,
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our primary data do not allow us to perform similar robustness heks. In addition,
setion 4.4.8 presents all other relevant robustness hek results we have made.
4.4.3. Data and desriptive statistis. Our primary data ome from the Finnish
Tax Administration and inludes information on the nanial statements and taxation
of Finnish orporations for the period 20002007. We use data in unbalaned panel
form. The data ontain all Finnish orporations and allow us to examine various de-
isions of ompanies. As the abolition of EQT mainly aeted large rms with inter-
national operations, we exlude small rms from our analysis. The data inlude only
Finnish MNEs (treatment) and Finnish orporations that have domesti subsidiaries
(ontrol).
We also make use of the Amadeus database. Amadeus provides unonsolidated
nanial aounting data on European rms and inludes information on ownership
relationships between rms. In this study the Amadeus data are used to identify Finnish
MNEs and the loation of their subsidiaries, and to investigate the hanges in prot-
shifting beause the main data do not inlude information on foreign subsidiaries of
Finnish based MNEs. The Amadeus database provides valuable information on the
ownership struture of rms. This is important for our analysis, sine it helps us to
identify the Finnish MNEs preisely. However, the version of whih we are applying
in the analysis is only partial from the total Amadeus, inluding 1.5 million rms in
Europe. Also, we have only data from 20002006. Thus, beause of these reasons the
information we have is inomplete and we should be areful when interpreting these
results. Nevertheless, we apply the Amadeus data beause we want to give a onlusive
analysis of the responses.
Table 1 presents the desriptive statistis of the most important variables of the
main data set we use in the estimations. All variables are in logarithmi form. Divid
represents the log of distributed dividends alulated for eah individual rm. The
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variable Invest refers to real investments, Profit represents taxable prots, F −Invest
refers to nanial investments, Divid − Inc is for prots repatriated by rms during
the nanial year, Equity is the sum of xed assets held at the end of the tax year,
Employees is the number of employees and Sales represents the turnover during the
sal year. Real investments refer here to investments made by rms in xed assets
during the sal year and nanial investments represent investments in liquid assets,
inluding bonds and stoks. As an be seen, the rms in the ontrol and treatment
groups are broadly of equal size, whih is important for our analysis. In Appendix,
Figure A1 plots the averages of main ontrol variables over time to further emphasize
that the groups are relatively similar to eah other.
26
Treatment
Stats Divid Invest Prot F-Invest Divid-In Equity Employees Sales
Mean 14.519 13.085 14.028 14.229 12.490 16.011 4.682 16.482
Sd 2.281 2.434 2.672 2.845 3.220 2.377 1.820 2.245
N 1731 3076 2598 700 3383 3272 3348 3163
Control
Stats Divid Invest Prot F-Invest Divid-In Equity Employees Sales
Mean 14.089 13.210 14.090 14.366 12.054 15.960 5.442 16.812
Sd 1.890 2.359 1.986 2.509 2.546 1.896 1.587 2.052
N 1455 1806 1620 502 1901 1860 1909 1832
Table 1. Desriptive statistis for the data 20002007: treatment and
ontrol groups
We introdue Figure 2 to illustrate that there was onsiderable bunhing at the tax
threshold of EQT before the reform. The Figure plots the share µ of minimum tax
divided by the sum of orporate tax and tax surpluses in our sample of Finnish MNEs
in 20002003. The variable µ an be interpreted as the ratio of distributed dividends
to undistributed prot from urrent and previous years. The distribution of µ allows
26
Table A1 in Appendix shows similarly the desriptive statistis for the Amadeus data we apply as
a seond data set. Also Table A2 in Appendix shows the mean of turnover for treatment and ontrol
groups by main industry odes to present that the groups are omparable also by that harateristi.
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us to examine the burden of EQT: the rm was obliged to pay EQT if µ > 1 otherwise
not. The Figure shows a notieable spike around the tax kink (µ = 1) in the otherwise
smooth distribution. This may imply that a onsiderable number of rms adjusted their
dividend payments at preisely the level where they an avoid the extra tax burden of
EQT. We interpret this as giving initial evidene that rms responded to the inentives
reated by the EQT.
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Figure 2. The liability of rms to pay EQT (years 20002003)
4.4.4. Results on dividend payments. We use the DD method to analyse the
eets of the abolition of the EQT on MNEs' behavior ompared to other large Finnish
rms. The estimations are made using an unbalaned panel for the years from 2000 to
2007 and the estimation strategy used is a xed-eet model.
The results onerning dividend payments are shown in Table 2. While the rst two
olumns apture the total eet of the reform on log of dividend payments, olumns (3)
and (4) present the possible antiipation responses using year dummies for 2003 and
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2004 multiplied by the treatment dummy. The oeients in olumns (5) and (6) are
estimated similarly as those in olumns (1) and (2), but exluding the years 2003 and
2004 from the data. The odd olumns give the results without any ontrol variables
and the even olumns for the estimates with the full set of ontrols.
In aordane with theoretial preditions, the results suggest that the rms in
the treatment group inreased their dividend payments relative to the ontrol group
after the reform. We nd that the estimate of the interation term `after' (refers here
to years 2005, 2006 and 2007) multiplied by the treatment group dummy variable is
positive and signiant with or without ontrol variables (at the 5 per ent level). As
the dependent variable is in a logarithmi form and we are using a linear model, the
estimate of the interation variable an be interpreted diretly as a perentage hange
among the treated rms. The estimate suggests that the average inrease in dividend
payments by MNEs was approximately 23 per ent.
As stated above, there are reasons to believe that some MNEs may have antiipated
the repeal of EQT in 2004 and even in 2003. In olumns (3) and (4) of Table 2 we inlude
the interation terms of the treatment and year dummies 2003 and 2004 in the model
and apply the data only from 2000 to 2004. The oeients of interation would be
statistially dierent from zero if there were dierenes in dividend payments between
the treatment and ontrol groups already before 2005. This ould be interpreted as
antiipation of the reform and hamper our main identifying assumption. In both years
we nd that the estimates are statistially zero and the quantitative values of the
estimates are rather small.
Another way to test this issue is to perform robustness heks by exluding the years
2003 and 2004 from the data. The estimates in olumns (5) and (6) of Table 2 without
data for the years 2003 and 2004 are slightly smaller than our main results in olumns
(1) and (2). However, the estimates are not statistially dierent from the base ase
estimates. Hene we onlude that we do not observe lear antiipation eets. This
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underpins our main identiation assumption of parallel time trends. More robustness
heks for the estimations are presented in setion 4.4.8.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Log(D) Log(D) Log(D) Log(D) Log(D) Log(D)
After*Treatment 0.233** 0.231** 0.222* 0.209*
(0.106) (0.100) (0.119) (0.113)
Treatment *2003 0.030 0.006
(0.067) (0.070)
Treatment *2004 -0.052 -0.063
(0.073) (0.066)
Firm eets X X X X X X
Year X X X X X X
Full ontrol set X X X
Observations 2,835 2,835 1,923 1,923 2,069 2,069
R-squared 0.022 0.057 0.073 0.116 0.045 0.066
Number of groups 548 548 502 502 534 534
Blok bootstrapped standard errors with industry level lusters in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2. Estimation results: dependent variable the log of dividend payment
We present Figure 3 to show more expliitly the hanges in logarithmi dividend
payments due to the reform in both treatment and ontrol groups. To be able to show
the Figure, we rst pooled the data to before (20002004) and after periods (20052007).
Then, we alulated the hanges in average logarithmi dividend payments for eah rm
between pooled periods. Thus, the Figure presents the whole distribution of hanges
in average dividend payments. It seems evident that there are very large hanges in
dividend payments over time as it is ommon to have even 100% inreases in dividend
payments of rms (number 1 in the horizontal axis refers to 100% inrease in dividends
and so on). However, the Figure suggest that almost the whole distribution of hanges
among treatment rms is shifted more to right in omparison to ontrol group. It is
also lear that many of the rms have inreased their dividend payments very muh as
there are many hanges between 50% and 200% inreases.
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Figure 3. Relative hanges in dividend payments before and after the
reform for treatment and ontrol groups
4.4.5. Results on investments. Our preditions in setion 4.3 suggest that EQT
may inrease investments by MNEs in the parent's home ountry. Thus we expet to
see a derease in investments after the repeal of EQT among Finnish MNEs. This
predition applies for both real and nanial investments.
The estimates for the real investment impats are in Table 3. The dependent vari-
able, log of real investments, desribes here the rm's yearly investments in mahinery,
equipments and buildings. The estimation applies the same method and also the same
set of ontrols as previously, see equation (4.4.1).
27
The estimate in the rst olumn
is performed without ontrols and the one in the seond olumn is with the full set of
ontrol variables.
The estimated oeient of the interation variable is positive without ontrols and
negative after inluding ontrols. Both estimates are learly statistially insigniant.
27
Figure A2 shows the average real investments over time for ontrol and treatment groups.
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The small size of the point estimates further stress the onlusion that the abolition of
EQT did not hange the real investments of Finnish MNEs.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log(Invest) Log(Invest)
After*Treatment 0.053 -0.024
(0.089) (0.086)
Firm eets X X
Year X X
Full ontrol set X
Observations 4,364 4,364
R-squared 0.000 0.068
Number of groups 670 670
Blok bootstrapped standard errors with industry level lusters in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3. Estimation results: dependent variable the log of real investments
Another way to use repatriated foreign prots with a similar eet on EQT liabil-
ity was to invest in nanial assets in the parent's home ountry, implying a derease
in these investments after the repeal of EQT. We estimated these eets with several
dierent denitions for nanial assets and using the same approah as above. The
estimations did not give any responses among the treated rms.
28
Therefore, we on-
lude that in ontrast to theoretial preditions EQT seems not to have aeted Finnish
MNEs' investment deisions.
4.4.6. Results on repatriation deisions - dividends and prot shifting. In
setion 4.3 we disussed the inentive eets of EQT on intra-ompany dividends and
prot-shifting by MNEs. The analysis suggested an inrease in dividend repatriations
and a derease in prot-shifting after the repeal of EQT in 2005.
To investigate the eets on intra-ompany dividends we are fored to use a variable
desribing all dividend inome reeived from domesti and foreign subsidiaries as well
28
The results are available upon request.
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as minority shareholdings. Therefore, this variable measures repatriated dividends from
foreign subsidiaries impreisely. However, the tax reform did not hange the taxation
of domesti dividends or foreign dividends from minority holdings. And even if there
had been some hanges we have no reason to believe that they would have aeted
our treatment and ontrol groups dierently. We use the same estimation strategy as
before. The dependent variable is now the log of dividend inome and we use the same
set of ontrol variables as previously.
The results are in Table 4. In both olumns (1) and (2) the oeients are positive
and statistially signiant without and with ontrol variables. Thus it seems that
dividend inome to parents inreased among the treated ompanies ompared to the
ontrol group after the reform. However, with the full set of ontrols the point estimate
is signiant only at 10% level. The magnitude of this response is high, an inrease of
approximately 23 per ent. This result implies that the inrease in dividend payments of
MNEs to the owners of the rms was mostly a result of an inrease in dividend inome.
We interpret that the inrease in dividend inome is oming from the intra-ompany
transations from the foreign subsidiaries of MNEs to their parents. Thus the abolition
of EQT also aeted the transations inside the MNEs.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log(Divid-In) Log(Divid-In)
After*Treatment 0.261** 0.228*
(0.129) (0.127)
Firm eets X X
Year X X
Full ontrol set X
Observations 4,645 4,645
R-squared 0.045 0.128
Number of groups 681 681
Blok bootstrapped standard errors with industry level lusters in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4. Estimation results: dependent variable the log of dividend inome
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Our nal question is to study the eets on prot-shifting by examining the hanges
both in subsidiary and parent ompany prots. The empirial literature on tax-motivated
prot-shifting inludes several dierent approahes to identify the eets on prot-
shifting. While one group of studies follows an indiret strategy by measuring the
impat of tax rate dierenes on the protability of foreign subsidiaries (e.g. Hines and
Rie, 1994, and Huizinga and Laeven, 2008), various studies examine more diretly the
eets of taxes on transfer pries and nanial strutures (e.g. Bartelsman and Beetsma
(2003) and Clausing (2003)).
In this setion we use the Amadeus database for the years 20002006. The data
inlude nanial information on national enterprises and MNEs, inluding their sub-
sidiaries and parent ompanies. The prot variable used in our analysis is earnings be-
fore interest and taxes (EBIT), whih is ommonly used in related studies (e.g. Huizinga
and Laeven (2008)). Our estimation strategy is as earlier, see equation (4.4.1). Controls
inlude now the ost of employees, xed assets and operating revenue. The variable
after refers to the years 2005 and 2006. As mentioned in the data desription setion,
these results should be interpreted with aution. The data set we are applying inludes
only a share of the total Amadeus database and is ertainly laking some important
information. Still, to give a onlusive analysis, we estimate the eet of the reform on
prot-shifting as well.
First we estimate the eets of the reform on the prots of subsidiaries of Finnish
MNEs. As noted in the theory setion, we expet to detet an inrease in subsidiaries'
prots beause the reform abolished the tax inentive to shift prots from foreign oun-
try to home ountry. To oer redible estimates we use two dierent groups of rms as
ontrols. The rst group omprises the European subsidiaries of Swedish based MNEs.
The seond ontrol group is formed from domesti subsidiaries of Finnish orporate
groups whih do not have overseas operations. The variable treat equals one if the
foreign (European) subsidiary is owned by a Finnish MNE and zero otherwise. Again
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the main identifying assumption is that the ontrol and treatment groups have parallel
trends before intervention, see disussion in setion 4.4.1.
29
The results are in Table 5. The rst two olumns ontain the results for the esti-
mations using the subsidiaries of Swedish MNEs as the ontrol group and the last two
olumns give the results for the estimations with Finnish subsidiaries as the ontrol
group. Again, the rst and third olumns ontain the results for models without on-
trols and the seond and fourth olumns provide estimates for models with a full set of
ontrols.
The estimates imply that the prots of subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs rose slightly
ompared to prots in the ontrol groups. The point estimates suggest inrease in
prots in the range of 10 to 12 per ent being seemingly stable irrespetive of the
ontrol group applied. However, the estimates are only statistially signiant at 10%
level when applying the full set of ontrols. Considering this and the data problems,
we have to be areful in interpretation. Still, these estimates suggests that, in the pre-
reform regime, at least some of the Finnish MNEs may have used intra-rm transations
to lower their overseas prots as a response to the threat of an extra tax burden in the
form of EQT.
29
Figure A4 in Appendix desribes the mean of log EBIT in the treatment and two ontrol groups
over time. The parallel time trend assumption seems to hold relatively well.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control: Swedish subsidiaries Control: Finnish subsidiaries
VARIABLES Log(EBIT) Log(EBIT) Log(EBIT) Log(EBIT)
After*Treatment 0.113 0.121* 0.117 0.119*
(0.077) (0.062) (0.072) (0.067)
Firm X X X X
Year X X X X
Full ontrol set X X
Observations 13414 13414 12537 12537
R-squared 0.035 0.199 0.034 0.085
Number of groups 3196 3196 2706 2706
Blok bootstrapped standard errors with ountry level lusters in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5. Estimation results: dependent variable the log of EBIT (subsidiary)
We are also interested in the impat of the reform on the parent ompanies' prof-
its. However, we annot make a lear predition of the sign of the response as we are
fored to use only EBIT as an outome variable. It inludes both prots from sales
and dividend inome. If MNEs used intra-rm transations to shift prots from for-
eign soures to Finland before the reform, this should derease the EBIT of the parent
ompanies after the reform. On the other hand, if we observe, as we did, an inrease in
parents' dividend inome, this would inrease EBIT. Now if both hanges were some-
what equal in size, the response in terms of the total prots of MNEs' parents would
be zero. Therefore, the predition of the eet of the reform on the parents' EBIT is
that the hange was lose to zero. Unfortunately the Amadeus data do not allow us to
distinguish between these two possible hannels.
To estimate the hange in parent ompanies' prots we apply the same method as
above and use EBIT from the Amadeus database to measure prots. Swedish MNEs
are used as the ontrol group. The results are given in Table 6 where the rst olumn
is without and the seond is with ontrol variables.
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The point estimates are negative even though neither of them is statistially signif-
iant. Hene there is no evidene of a hange in the aounting prots reported by the
parent ompanies of Finnish MNEs after the reform. The most valid point estimate, in
olumn 2, is quantitatively very lose to zero and the lustered standard error is large,
implying that the 95 per ent ondene interval aptures a lot of both negative as well
as positive values. This result suggests the onlusion that the inrease in dividend in-
ome reeived by the parent and the derease in prot-shifting were largely omparable
in size.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log(EBIT) Log(EBIT)
After*Treatment -0.037 -0.030
(0.098) (0.076)
Firm X X
Year X X
Full ontrol set X
Observations 3935 3935
R-squared 0.020 0.229
Number of groups 851 851
Blok bootstrapped standard errors with rm level lusters in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6. Estimation results: dependent variable the log of prots (parents)
4.4.7. Heterogeneity of the results. Our main data oming from the Finnish
Tax Authority enables us to study the heterogeneity of the results. We divide the
responses by the pre-reform variables. First we divide the data by the size of the tax
surpluses into four quartiles. The tax surpluses in the data is a variable similar as is
presented in equation (4.2.1). The rms with the low level of tax surpluses before the
reform were losest to the margin to be fored to pay EQT. We interat the DD variable
with the tax surplus quartiles to investigate the heterogenous responses. Columns from
(1) to (3) in Table 7 oer the results of these estimations. In olumn (1) we estimate
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the eet on dividend payments of rms, in olumn (2) the estimations are for real
investments and the results in olumn (3) are for dividend inome. In all spesiations
the smallest tax surplus quarter is omitted.
The estimate of the main DD variable represents the eet on dividend payments
for the parents with smallest tax surpluses. The interation variables with two highest
quartiles and the main DD variable are with opposite signs and are similar in size.
Thus, the heterogeneity results show that the parent rms whih had the smallest tax
surpluses before the reform inreased their dividend payments the most, olumn (1).
We also nd that parents over median tax surpluses hanged their dividend payments
only little, if at all. Therefore, it seems that the whole response omes from those rms
having the highest inentive to inrease their dividends after the reform. We do not nd
any statistially signiant dierenes in real investments, results presented in olumn
(2). This is also the ase for parents' dividend inome, results presented in olumn (3).
However, the smallest tax surplus quartile seems to have the highest point estimate
for dividend inome and all interation estimates are learly negative. This suggest
that some rms that had the lowest tax surpluses have also inreased the repatriation
of dividends from their subsidiaries. Nevertheless, all these estimates are statistially
insigniant in olumn (3) and this oers only suggestive evidene.
In the seond part of Table 7 in olumns from (4) to (6) we divide the responses
by the size of the pre-reform equity. We examine the responses of rms by the equity
size beause it is an indiator for the amount of distributable prots. The results are
organized similarly as in olumns from (1) to (3). The results imply that the parents
with low equity responded more. Parents in the lowest quartile of equity before the
reform inreased their dividend payments the most after the reform, see olumn (4). At
the same time parents in the highest quartile did not hange their dividend payments
at all. The real investment responses are again statistially insigniant, in olumn
(5). The results are similar for dividend inome as for dividend payments: among the
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highest two quartiles of equity, there is no response in dividend inome of parents, and
among parents in the lowest quartile, there is a statistially signiant inrease. This
result suggests that only those parents with small pre-reform equity levels responded to
the reform. We interpret this to be a result of parents' inreased repatriation of prots
in a form of dividends from their foreign subsidiaries and then, distributing these prots
by inreasing dividend payments to their owners. Thus, the results suggest hanges in
nanial ows within MNEs due to the reform.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Log(Div) Log(Inv) Log(Div-In) Log(Div) Log(Inv) Log(Div-In)
DD 0.517*** -0.070 0.346 0.428*** 0.121 0.383*
(0.142) (0.203) (0.292) (0.137) (0.159) (0.196)
Omitted: smallest quartile of pre-reform tax surplus
2nd quartile* -0.164 0.379 -0.284
DD (0.152) (0.262) (0.307)
3rd quartile* -0.394** 0.237 -0.268
DD (0.159) (0.260) (0.360)
4th quartile* -0.407** 0.085 -0.249
DD (0.171) (0.212) (0.291)
Omitted: smallest quartile of pre-reform equity
2nd quartile* -0.202 -0.022 -0.283
DD (0.141) (0.219) (0.233)
3rd quartile* -0.249 -0.073 -0.495*
DD (0.154) (0.253) (0.270)
4th quartile* -0.409** 0.033 -0.491**
DD (0.206) (0.193) (0.211)
Obs 2,835 4,173 4,435 2,712 4,229 4,498
R-squared 0.050 0.067 0.152 0.048 0.066 0.125
No groups 525 618 626 524 534 648
Blok bootstrapped standard errors with industry level lusters in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7. Heterogeneous results for main outomes by the size of the
pre-reform tax surplus and equity with the full set of ontrols
We have also made other heterogeneity examinations. We have developed indiators
to desribe the extent of international operations for MNEs and use these to examine
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the heterogeneity of the results. We do not detet heterogeneity in responses by these
harateristis. However, these indiators are not perfet as we have no diret variables
to measure the extent of international operations. We have only data on nanial
transations between parents and subsidiaries but we are not able to detet how muh
of these transations are from overseas. Thus these indiators inlude a lot of national
transations (between Finnish subsidiaries and parents) and do not neessarily apture
the extent of multinational operations. We also divided the sample by the main industry
lassiations and estimated the model similarly as presented in Table 7. We did not
nd any statistially signiant hanges in responses by main industries. Similarly we
used the loation of the parent to divide the sample. Also, in this ase we did not nd
any statistially signiant hanges in any outomes.
4.4.8. Robustness heks. Next we fous on oering the robustness heks for
the results. First, we made a plaebo treatment three years before the atual reform
for all outome variables. In this setting we ompare all outome variables between
treatment and ontrol groups and pretend that the reform would have happened from
the beginning of 2002. Partiularly, the time period in these plaebo tests is from 2000
to 2003, years 2000 and 2001 representing the before period and 2002 and 2003 are
for the after period. Table 8 shows the results with exatly the same spesiation and
ontrol set than what was presented previously. None of the plaebo estimates are
statistially signiant whih gives redibility for our identiation strategy.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Log(Div) Log(Inv) Log(Div-In) Log(EBIT) Log(EBIT)
PlaeboDD -0.061 -0.042 0.050 -0.075 -0.000
(0.070) (0.100) (0.085) (0.081) (0.091)
Number of groups 548 670 681 3196 851
Blok bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependents and omparisons are by olumns: 1) Log of dividend payments: omparison between
Finnish MNEs and other large Finnish ompanies, 2) Log of real investments: omparison between
Finnish MNEs and other large Finnish ompanies, 3) Log of dividend inome: omparison between
Finnish MNEs and other large Finnish ompanies, 4) Log of EBIT: omparison between the subsidiaries
of Finnish MNEs and the subsidiaries of Swedish MNEs, and 5) Log of EBIT: omparison between the
Finnish MNEs and the Swedish MNEs.
Table 8. Plaebo results with the full set of ontrols for all dependents
presented before
We also made another plaebo treatment similarly as desribed above but using only
the time period from 2005 to 2007 and pretending that the reform would have taken
plae from the beginning of 2007. This also produed zero results for all outomes
similarly as Table 8.
One onern in our empirial strategy might be the use of logarithmi outomes
and independent variables in the analysis. As we are interested in MNEs this is not a
substantial problem beause all of these rms are very large, having e.g. very few zero
observations. However, we estimated the spesiations in levels as well. The results are
similar in size or even greater relative to our main estimates but less preise beause of
the large variation in variables. Thus, we use logarithmi variables in our main analysis
to redue the variation in the data and to oer results that are not very dependent on
few observations.
Another hallenge is that the estimation sample varies aross the outome variables
we use. We also made estimations for rms that have only positive dividend payments
and in that way kept the onstant amount of rms in every spesiation. This does not
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hange the results muh. We also performed estimations using a balaned panel. The
point estimates are similar to those with an unbalaned panel but the standard errors
are larger as we have fewer observations.
In addition, we also tested the antiipation eets for all other outome variables
than dividend payments as well (Table 2 shows the antiipation results for dividend
payments). The results suggest no lear antiipation eets on other outomes. How-
ever, the log of dividend inome inreased already in 2003 and 2004 ompared to the
previous years among treated. These eets are not signiant even at 10% level but
still, the oeient are similar in size than in the main estimations in Table 4. This
suggests that some MNEs might have antiipated the reform by inreasing the repatri-
ated dividends from their foreign subsidiaries already before the reform. This is also
visible in Figure A3 in Appendix.
We used also a wild bootstrap strategy to alulate the standard errors for the
estimates with industry lusters. This does not aet the interpretation muh. It
seems that the blok bootstrap strategy produes higher standard errors in most ases
and thus, we apply it in the main results. We also used blok bootstrap method with
muniipality level lusters and also with the interation of the industry and muniipality
level lusters. These did not hange the interpretations of the results.
Finally, the Hausman test suggests using the rm-level xed eet model instead
of the random eet model. For example, in the main estimations in Table 2, the null
hypothesis of rm-spei eets unorrelated with the regressors is rejeted at the
level of 899.22 (hi 2(5)). However, it seems that the oeient of interest is not very
sensitive to the method used. In addition, the results with pooled OLS are also very
muh in line with the baseline xed-eet estimates.
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4.5. Conlusions
We use the abolition of equalization tax (EQT) in Finland as a natural experiment
to analyze the eets of taxes on behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs). EQT
was a ommon element of European imputation systems whih were largely repealed
beause the European Court of Justie onsidered them as inonsistent with the EU
Treaties.
Theoretial analyses have pointed out that EQT treats dierently dividends dis-
tributed from domesti and foreign soure prots, and, therefore, distorts various -
nanial hoies of MNEs. We estimate the eets of EQT applying a dierene-in-
dierenes method ommonly used in poliy evaluation studies and utilizing a unique
miro data whih inludes information on tax returns from all Finnish businesses. Con-
sistent with theory we nd substantial evidene of the eet on dividend distributions of
MNEs. We estimate that the reform inreased MNEs dividend payments by 23 per ent
on average. Our results provide similar evidene as the previous empirial literature
(for general dividend taxes, see e.g. Chetty and Saez, 2005, and Poterba, 2004, and for
EQT, see Bond et al., 1996). We also nd that the eet is the largest among those
parents having the highest inentive to inrease dividend payment due to the reform.
We also observe an inrease in foreign intra-ompany dividends as well as a mod-
est inrease in the prots of foreign subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs. Both results are
onsistent with the preditions of the theoretial model and suggest a swith from
prot-shifting to openly distributed intra-ompany dividends.
Contrary to our own theoretial preditions, we do not observe any evidene for a
drop in home-ountry real or nanial investments. Suh behaviour is in fat onsistent
with the theoretial model in the limited ase where the MNE is able to fully avoid
EQT by using prot shifting. The strong dividend response that we observed suggests,
however, that EQT was not fully aommodated by shifting prots. A further way to
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explain the puzzling result on investments is that the theoretial model does not inlude
some important hoie opportunities of MNEs. One example might be the possibility to
defer repatriations of foreign prots by investing in foreign nanial assets (Altshuler
and Grubert (2002)). The question is whether suh a hoie ould rowd out eets on
investments. A further study ould assess this issue.
The results of this study onrm that domesti taxes matter for the behavior of
MNEs. They also suggest that the European agenda to remove distortive elements
from the national dividend tax systems may have improved eieny from the global
perspetive. Similarly, our results, espeially those onerning prot shifting, support
the view that oordinated steps towards more uniform business taxation are welome.
However, we do not observe hanges in real eonomi variables suh as investments and,
moreover, the eieny hanges due to the taxes might be relatively small.
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VARS. EBIT Costs of empl. Fixed assets Operating rev.
Foreign subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs
Mean 13.763 14.568 14.591 16.757
SD 2.268 1.959 2.820 2.050
N 5,379 5,897 5,897 5,897
Foreign subsidiaries of Swedish MNEs
Mean 13.259 14.335 13.627 16.105
SD 1.925 1.689 2.633 1.719
N 8,036 11,906 11,906 11,906
Domesti subsidiaries of Finnish orporations
Mean 12.663 13.685 13.308 15.341
SD 1.731 1.603 2.314 1.557
N 7,069 10,122 10,122 10,122
Finnish MNE parents
Mean 15.094 15.745 16.731 17.396
SD 2.140 1.644 2.602 2.051
N 1,544 1,803 1,803 1,803
Swedish MNE parents
Mean 14.834 15.564 16.071 17.483
SD 1.839 1.640 2.386 1.794
N 2,389 4,018 4,018 4,018
Table A1. Amadeus data 20002006: Desriptive statistis
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Treatment Control
Industry lassiation mean N mean N
Manufaturing 17.22 619 17.32 349
Eletriity, gas and water supply 17.26 39 18.08 82
Constrution 17.50 35 17.88 66
Wholesale and retail sale 16.70 282 18.04 205
Transport, storage and ommuniation 16.48 138 16.32 106
Finanial intermediation 15.04 67 15.56 73
Real estate and business ativies 15.65 279 15.88 251
Other 16.68 120 15.85 132
Table A2. Turnover by the main industrial lassiations for treatment
and ontrol groups
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CHAPTER 5
Restaurant VAT ut: Cheaper meal and more servie?
1
Abstrat. This paper provides ausally redible estimates of the eets of onsump-
tion taxes in a servie setor on pries and demand for restaurant servies. We utilize
a large VAT reform aeting restaurant meals, where the VAT rate was ut from
22% to 13% in 2010 in Finland. By omparing with restaurants in neighboring oun-
tries and other related setors in Finland, the reform oers a natural experimental
approah. The results indiate that restaurants redued their pries on average by
only 2%, whih equals roughly a quarter of the full pass-through. Remarkably, at the
same time a majority of restaurants did not redue their pries at all and a non-trivial
fration of restaurants redued their pries by exatly the full pass-through. Larger
restaurants redued their pries more often than smaller restaurants. We do not ob-
serve any inreases in the quantity of servies sold or in wage sums paid to employees.
Furthermore, there are no hanges in medium-term entry and exit due to the reform.
Keywords: VAT reform, restaurants, tax inidene
JEL odes: H21, H22, H32
5.1. Introdution
Internationally, the share of onsumption taxes of total tax revenue seems to be
inreasing all the time. Governments have also tried to support spei setors through
redued onsumption tax rates aiming to reate jobs in these setors. Despite the vast
theory literature
2
, there is only a narrow empirial literature redibly examining the
eets of onsumption taxes on pries and quantities (Carbonnier (2007), Doyle and
Samphantharak (2008), Kosonen (2010), Marion and Muehlegger (2011)). Many studies
fous solely on prie inidene. However, prie responses are not suient statistis for
more thorough eieny analysis. It is more important to know the demand elastiity
of a good or servie.
1
This essay is joint work with Tuomas Kosonen. This paper is published in the VATT Working Papers
series, 52, Otober 2013.
2
E.g. Ramsey (1927), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Myles (1989).
158 Restaurant VAT ut
This study aims to produe poliy-relevant statistis on the eieny of onsumption
taxation by analyzing a value added tax (VAT) reform aeting restaurants in Finland.
The VAT for restaurant meals was ut from the standard rate of 22% to the redued
rate of 13% in July 2010. We utilize this poliy hange to investigate the eets of
onsumption taxes on pries, demand for restaurant servies and wage sums paid to
employees. The results oer insights into the eetiveness of onsumption taxes in
labor-intensive setors.
We apply a dierene-in-dierenes (DD) approah. Restaurant meals in Finland in
the treatment group are ompared against multiple ontrol groups. This improves the
robustness of the results. The ontrol groups are hotel servies in Finland, and restau-
rant meals in Estonia, Norway and Sweden. In the demand and wage sum estimations
we use only hotels in Finland as a omparison group due to data limitations.
The identifying assumption in the DD approah is that a ontrol group should
behave similarly to a treatment group without faing a treatment. In the urrent setting
this assumption is likely to be fullled, sine we ompare the same setors in neighboring
ountries with a similar limate and ulture. Moreover, hotels and restaurants are
losely related setors and resemble eah other. Empirial support for the assumption
that these groups resemble eah other is provided by the similar long-term development
of restaurant meal pries in the ountries we ompare, and in turnover and wage sum
development in the two setors we ompare. The reform is exogenous to the behavior
of rms, sine it was made possible by European Union-level rules shortly before the
Finnish VAT ut. It also seems that restaurants did not antiipate the VAT ut by
altering their pries prior to the reform.
Our prie data ome from a self-designed survey. The survey is for a random sample
of restaurants and hotels in Finland and restaurants in Estonia. Pries were olleted
from the websites of the rms in the sample, or if this was not possible, by phone. The
data inludes the prie of the same meal in the same restaurant and the prie of the
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same room in the same hotel before and after the reform. Thus the prie information
allows us to follow the development of pries of individual servies. By looking at the
relative hange of all servies, we are able to desribe the whole distribution of prie
hanges, rarely possible in the previous literature. In addition, we estimate the average
prie response with meal-level xed-eets, whih gives us high preision. The survey
ontains information about interesting predetermined harateristis of rms, allowing
us to divide the results by them. For robustness we use restaurant meal prie data from
Norway and Sweden originating from data olleted for the onstrution of onsumer
prie indies.
Additional interest in this paper lies in the impat of the reform on the demand
for restaurant servies and wage sums. For this we have a monthly and annual level
tax register data. On monthly level we have information about turnover, whih is the
onsumer prie value of servies sold, and the wage sums of eah rm. Comparing
the development of pries and turnover of the same rms in the treatment and ontrol
groups over the reform period allows to estimate the impat of the reform on the
quantities of servies sold. The development of wage bills in the two groups over the
reform period gives an indiation of whether there are any hanges in employment
due to the reform. In addition, we examine entry into and exit out of the restaurant
industry.
Our unweighted average result shows that the VAT ut from 22% to 13% redued
restaurant pries by 2.2% in Finland. Full pass-through to onsumer pries would imply
a 7.4% derease. Thus the result implies that the atual prie redution was only a
fourth of the full pass-through. The onsumer-weighted prie response was somewhat
larger, a 4% derease in onsumer pries, or over half of the full pass-through. This
implies that larger restaurants redued their pries more than small restaurants. There
is a substantial heterogeneity in prie responses by restaurant type. However, the
estimation results suggest no inrease in demand for restaurant servies or employment
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in the restaurant industry. Furthermore, we do not nd any eets on entry into or
exit out of the restaurant industry due to the reform.
Our results ontribute to a narrow literature estimating the eets of onsumption
taxes. Many studies in the previous literature onentrate on industries with only few
produers and industries where large ompanies dominate the market. We onentrate
instead on the restaurant industry, whih ontains very heterogeneous rms and is a
labor-intensive industry. Also, the number of studies that have produed results on the
quantity of servies sold or wage sums is fairly limited. By linking our unique prie
and tax register data, we have an opportunity to estimate these margins as well, and
be more onlusive about the eetiveness of onsumption taxes.
Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) estimated the tax inidene on gasoline pries
in ertain states in the USA from a temporary repeal and reinstatement of a gasoline
onsumption tax. They found almost 100% pass-through on pries. Marion and Mueh-
legger (2011) found similar estimates for fuel pries. Carbonnier (2007) found lower
pass-through for a ar retailer industry than for a repair servie industry when he an-
alyzed two separate VAT rate redutions in Frane. He interpreted this to be a result
of dierenes in the degree of ompetition in these industries. Kosonen (2010) found
that the pass-through on pries was half of the full pass-through for the hairdressing
servie industry, after a VAT redution in Finland. Kosonen also studied the demand
for hairdressing servies and employment. He onluded that the demand for these
servies seems to be rather inelasti. Hairdressers and restaurants resemble eah other
sine both are labor-intensive servie setors. Therefore it is not surprising that our
results are very muh in line with that study.
The paper proeeds as follows. Setion 5.2 presents the institutional bakground
and eonomi theory preditions as a result of the VAT redution. Setion 5.3 presents
the methods used in the study, setion 5.4 desribes the data and setion 5.5 presents
the results. Finally, setion 5.6 onludes the study.
5.2. Institutions and preditions 161
5.2. Institutions and preditions
5.2.1. Value-added taxation in the EU. The European Union obligates all
Member States to apply value-added taxation as a onsumption tax system. Sine
1977 the EU has applied uniform VAT overage under the Sixth VAT Diretive. The
new VAT Diretive replaed it in 2007 (CD 2006/112/EC). The Diretive states that
Member States an have one standard VAT rate between 15% and 25% and at most
two redued rates of at least 5%
3
. In Finland the standard VAT rate is levied on most
goods and is urrently 24%. There are two redued VAT rates in Finland. The higher
of these two, 14%, is levied on e.g. restaurant meal sales. The lowest VAT rate, 10%,
is levied on books, aommodation servies, pharmaeutials et.
4
The Counil of the EU introdued the possibility of applying a redued VAT rate
on labor-intensive servies already in 1999 (CD 1999/85/EC). Although redued VAT
rates for ertain labor-intensive industries were possible from 1999 onwards, suh rates
were not available for restaurants until May 2009 (CD 2009/47/EC). Thus, prior to
2009, restaurant servies were subjet to the standard VAT rate in all EU Member
States. Frane was the rst to apply a redued rate for restaurant servies. In July
2009, the VAT rate was ut from 19.6% to 5.5% (OECD (2010)). Despite the substantial
redution in the VAT rate, pries only fell by 1.4% after the reform (MEIE (2010)).
This paper examines the eets of the reform whih took plae in Finland at the
beginning of July 2010 (HE 137/2009) when the VAT rate for restaurant servies was
redued from 22% to 13%. At the same time the Finnish government deided to inrease
all VAT rates by 1 perentage point.
3
There are some exeptions from the lowest tax rates, e.g. zero rates on books in the United Kingdom.
Some setors are also exempted from VAT, e.g. postal servies.
4
Reently there have been two inreases in VAT rates in Finland. Before July 2010 the VAT rates
were: 22%, 12% and 8%. After July 2010 all three VAT rates were inreased by 1 perentage point.
Again from the beginning of 2013 all VAT rates inreased by 1 perentage point. Thus the VAT rates
are urrently: 24%, 14% and 10%.
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5.2.2. Tax shifting and optimal onsumption tax. Let us rst onsider the
tax inidene of the VAT rate on onsumer pries. A hange in the VAT rate an
shift to onsumer pries by varying degrees. Under perfet ompetition, the prie
inidene depends on the elastiities of demand and supply. For instane, if demand
is fairly inelasti and supply very elasti, there would be lose to full pass-through to
onsumer pries. In general, the pass-through to pries inreases with supply elastiity
and dereases with the demand elastiity.
When the number of rms is limited and/or there is strategi interation between
the rms (imperfet ompetition), onsumption taxes ould under- or over-shift to
onsumer pries. The elastiities of demand and supply also aet the pass-through in
an imperfet ompetition model. Additionally, in an imperfet ompetition model, the
shape of the demand urve relative to the perfet ompetition predition aets the
pass-through. With a onave demand urve, the tax under-shifts to pries but with a
onvex demand urve over- shifts to pries (Myles (1989), Weyl and Fabinger (2013)).
We study the prie inidene with a redution in the VAT rate for restaurant servies
from 22% to 13%. The data inlude pries for the same meal oered in the same
restaurants before and after the reform. Thus, as we analyze the prie eets, we an
identify the proportional hange in onsumer pries for eah meal in the following way:
(5.2.1) ∆ =
pa − pb
pb
∗ 100 = x%
φ ∗ 1.22 = pb ◮ φ ∗ 1.13 = pa
where pa is the onsumer prie after the reform and pb is the onsumer prie before
the reform. The onsumer prie is the produer prie φ plus the VAT. When there is
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100% pass-through, the produer prie does not hange. Thus the full pass-through is:
φ(1.13− 1.22)
φ1.22
∗ 100 = −7.38%
A ouple of remarks should be made. First, the quality of the meals ould hange
due to the reform. The quality of meals ould perhaps inrease as the osts of produing
them derease, if there are no hanges in pries. But if the quality of meals inreases
due to the reform, the restaurants are likely also rename the meals as well, and this
would not be problem for us. On the other hand, the quality of meals ould derease
in those restaurants that lower their pries. Even where the prie dereases and the
quality of the produt dereases, prie hanges when applying the above equation would
give us an upper bound for the pass-through. However, it is important to note that the
prie data we have, onerns meals oered by restaurants exatly with the same name
before and after the reform. Thus, we assume that the quality does not hange if the
name of the meal does not hange.
Seond, we are not able to observe ross-prie eets on other goods or servies.
A restaurant meal an be a substitute or a omplement for other goods or servies
aeting the amount of onsumption or pries of these other goods due to the reform
for meals. For example, lunh meals during the working day an be a substitute for
lunh boxes or take-away meals from a restaurant. On the other hand, a restaurant meal
an be omplementary to hotel servies, espeially during holiday seasons. Despite these
problems, restaurant meals represent only a small proportion of the whole onsumption
budget (3.6% in 2006) and thus the eets due to substitutability or omplementarity
should be small.
In order to design an optimal onsumption tax system, a perfetly ompetitive
model result implies that the onsumption tax rates of a good or a servie should vary
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aording to the elastiity of its own demand, the elastiity of supply and the ross-
prie eets on other goods. In the ase of fairly inelasti demand, a good should fae
a higher tax rate than a good with elasti demand, if ross-prie eets between taxed
goods are zero. The reason is that an inrease in the tax rate of an inelasti good would
have only little eet on demand for the good and thus lead to only small distortions in
the demand for that good (Ramsey (1927), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)). However,
ross-prie eets ould be high if there are lose omplements or substitutes for a taxed
good.
The literature presents another argument for eient onsumption taxation. This
onerns the distortions reated by labor taxation on labor supply (Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976)). These distortions ould be diminished by using onsumption taxation. The
result is that these distortions diminish if the onsumption of goods or servies highly
omplementary with work are taxed less, and vie versa. Clearly this suggests setting
lower tax rates for goods and servies that are losely related to work and labor, and
tax more the onsumption of goods that are related to leisure. We do not analyse this
argument in this paper. This is beause the omplementarity of a restaurant meal with
labor supply is not lear. It is omplementary with work if we onsider lunhes during
the working day. On the other hand, a restaurant meal is omplementary with leisure
in terms of enjoying meals one's spare time, e.g. ne dining. Moreover, restaurant
servies represent only a small fration of the total onsumption basket of an average
individual (3.6% in 2006 in Finland
5
). Thus hanges in taxation for this small share of
one's onsumption are not likely to greatly aet the substitutability of labor.
We assess the eieny of the onsumption tax system for restaurant servies by
examining the eet of the VAT ut on the quantity of restaurant meals sold and wage
sums paid to employees. The best ase senario to evaluate the demand for a good
would be to be able to observe the prie of a good and the amount of the good sold by
5
Statistis Finland: Household Budget Survey (2009).
5.3. Methods 165
the rm. The seond best ase is to observe pries and the total sales of the rm. This
is what we have in our data set, inluding pries and the reported value of turnover in
onsumer pries.
Assume for now that the whole turnover onsists of sold restaurant meals. Then
turnover is simply the quantity of restaurant meals sold times the onsumer prie. With
this variable we estimate the hanges in demand (quantity) due to the VAT reform. If
there are no hanges in onsumer prie and quantity, turnover would remain the same
over time, before and after the reform. However, if the onsumer prie dereases due
to the VAT rate redution and quantity remains the same, turnover dereases by the
amount of the prie derease. If the onsumer prie dereases and the quantity sold
inreases relatively more than the prie dereases, turnover would inrease. We observe
the onsumer pries for restaurant meals and the monthly level onsumer prie value of
total sales in the data before and after the VAT redution. Thus we have an opportunity
to investigate the hanges in the quantity of meals sold for eah restaurant and interpret
how demand hanged due to the reform.
We also estimate the eets of the VAT redution on wage sums. The osts of
produing restaurant meals dereased due to the VAT redution. This ould inrease
the wage payments of a restaurant to its employees and/or inrease the number of
employees working in a restaurant. The wage sums of restaurants would then inrease
due to the reform if restaurants hire more workfore and/or pay more wages to their
urrent workers after the reform.
5.3. Methods
This setion desribes the methods. Beause of the exeptional data sets, we make
extensive use of graphial analysis to examine the eets of the reform in this paper. We
also use a natural experimental method to investigate the average eet of the reform
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on pries, turnover and wage sums. We apply a dierene-in-dierene (DD) approah
and thus ompare the outomes between the treatment and ontrol groups over time.
We have a unique possibility to perform graphial analysis with our prie data. We
show the whole distribution of relative prie hanges, applying the equation (5.2.1),
as we follow the pries of the same produt or servie before and after the reform.
Graphial evidene shows expliitly the whole range of prie hanges and thus is more
informative than, for example, a standard mean regression of the hange in pries.
In our graphial analysis the proportional prie hanges in Finnish restaurants are
ompared to prie hanges in Estonian restaurants and hotel room prie hanges in
Finland. We also perform omparisons within the restaurant industry using dierent
ategorial variables.
We also use a standard DD method with meal xed-eets to estimate the average
eet of the reform on meal pries. The simplest set-up of the DD method is when
outomes are observed for two separate groups for two dierent time periods. The
standard way to desribe the DD method is to present the following equation:
(5.3.1) Pit = ηi + β11(Treat)i + β21(After)t + β31(Treati ∗ Aftert) + β4(Xit) + εit
where the dependent variable P represents the logarithmi meal prie of rm i at time
t, the onstant ηi is the estimated xed eet for every meal, 1(Treat) is an indiator
variable with the value one for treated and zero otherwise, 1(After) is also an indiator
variable with the value one after the reform and zero otherwise, and 1(Treatment*After)
represents the interation variable of these two variables. The oeient of this inter-
ation term identies the eet of the reform on outome P. X ontains a vetor of
rm-level ontrol variables and ε is the i.i.d. error term.
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As a result of the xed-eets estimation, β3 represents the average proportional
hange in meal pries as a result of the reform. We are able to perform a meal-level
xed-eets estimate beause we followed the pries of the same meals in the same
restaurants over time, before and after the reform. This gives us a very preise prie
estimate.
The main identifying assumption in the DD approah is the parallel time trends.
Thus the time eets should behave similarly in both groups before the reform. The
dierene between the groups is that one of the groups is exposed to a treatment and
the other is not. The treatment group onsists of Finnish restaurants whih experiened
the VAT redution. We use many separate ontrol groups to show the robustness of the
results. In our main prie analysis we use restaurant meal pries in Estonia to formulate
the ontrol group. We also use Swedish and Norwegian Consumer Prie Index (CPI)
data for restaurants and Finnish hotel room pries to represent ontrol groups.
One onern might be that restaurants in these ountries are not suitable ompari-
son groups for restaurants in Finland. However, there are a number of reasons to believe
that the assumption holds in this ase. All the ountries are neighboring ountries to
Finland and, for example, fae similar weather onditions, vaation periods, global food
pries, business yles, ulture et. We have no reason to believe that e.g. Finnish and
Estonian restaurants would behave dierently from eah other during our short exam-
ination period without an exogenous shok in Finland. Restaurants in Estonia ould
experiene dierent onditions in the long run, e.g. in the ompetitive environment, but
we do not onsider this to be a problem over our relatively short examination period (3
months). In addition, we an test the robustness of the results by omparing the pries
of Finnish restaurants to restaurant meal pries from the statistis oes in Norway
and Sweden, whih are olleted for CPI purposes. We believe that all these ontrol
groups onstitute good ounterfatuals for the treatment group.
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In order to give further redibility to our approah, we use another ontrol group
from Finland, namely hotels, whih operate in an industry similar to restaurants, but
whih did not experiene the VAT ut. The VAT applied to hotel servies was already
at the lowest redued rate of 9% before the reform in Finland. Hotels are used as a
omparison group when we study prie eets, but more importantly, we apply hotels
as a ontrol group when we are interested in the eets on quantity of meals sold and
wage sums. We are fored to do this beause of the lak of tax register data from
the restaurants in neighboring ountries. There might be problems in the analysis
when omparing restaurants to hotels. Hotels an, for example, have more exible
or organized priing strategies and fae more onentrated demand for their servies
within the alendar year than restaurants. More importantly, hotels might have been
aeted by the reform as many hotels also oer restaurant servies. Also, there might
be ross-prie eets between meals and hotel room pries. However, despite of all these
problems and the lak of any other relevant ontrol group, we ompare these industries
and try to onvine that the omparison is plausible. To oer evidene favoring the
omparison, we nd a similar trend in turnover and wage sums over time for hotels
and restaurants (see Figure 9). Thus hotels seem to omprise a relatively good ontrol
group for restaurants. However, the monthly variation in demand for hotel servies is
more pronouned during summer period than for restaurant servies and this ould still
ause hallenges for our analysis.
We apply the same DD method, desribed in equation 5.3.1, when we examine the
demand and employment eets of the reform. The measure applied for demand is
the monthly turnover of the rms valued at onsumer pries and for employment the
measure is the monthly wage sums paid to employees. In these estimations we use
Finnish restaurants in the treatment group and Finnish hotels in the ontrol groups
beause we lak tax register data from neighboring ountries.
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One possible problem in using DD method ould be that the poliy hange is not
exogenous or the rms in the treatment group antiipated the reform by hanging
their behavior before the atual poliy hange. The Finnish government allowed the
restaurant industry, and not other industries, to apply a redued VAT rate sine the
EU Diretive permitted them to do so. Thus, the reform was not solely dependent on
the eonomi onditions in the restaurant industry, rather it was an attempt to revive
the eonomy overall. Also, in Figure 1 we show that we do not nd any empirial
evidene to support antiipation behavior among restaurants. Therefore, we believe
that it is possible to use the standard DD method to examine the ausal eets of the
reform on restaurant meal pries, demand for restaurant servies and wage sums paid to
employees. However, beause of the short examination period available we onentrate
only on the short-run hanges.
One hallenge in our empirial set-up is to present appropriate standard errors for
the estimates. Two previous papers by Bertrand et al. (2004) and Cameron et al.
(2008) emphasise this problem. The problem arises when the number of groups used
in the estimations is small. It ould be, for example, that there is an unobserved
shok aeting the groups' behavior dierently and thus biasing the standard errors.
Fortunately, the two papers mentioned above oer us tools to overome this problem.
Following the guidelines of these papers, we apply a blok bootstrap strategy to alulate
the standard errors. We use two sets of lusters. First, we apply ountry-level lusters in
the prie estimations. Seond, when we ompare Finnish restaurants to Finnish hotels
we use industry-level lusters in the prie, quantity and employment estimations. The
strategy of alulating standard errors does not aet the signiane of results too
muh as, at most, it doubles the standard errors of the main prie estimates with no
lustering. However, for the weighted prie results blok bootstrapping is not possible.
Then we only apply heterosedastiity-onsistent standard errors and the signiane
of these results should be interpreted with aution.
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Figure 1. Longer-term development of restaurant pries in Finland,
Sweden and Norway
5.4. Data
We have prie data from a prie olletion survey whih was onduted on the
basis of a random sample of restaurants and hotels from the Tax Administration data
inluding all rms liable for VAT in Finland. We designed our own survey method
to ollet pries. We were able to ollet pries from approximately 750 restaurants
in Finland before and after the reform. The data inlude many ategorial variables
whih we an use to divide pries, e.g. belonging to a hain, restaurant type, et.
We took a random sample just before the reform in Marh 2010 from both the
restaurant and hotel industries. The sample is representative of all restaurants and
hotels in Finland. The prie olletion was made before and after the reform, i.e. in
May/June 2010 and July/August 2010. The survey was also onduted in Estonia,
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where the VAT rate on restaurant meals did not hange during the olletion period.
The sample of Estonian restaurants was also a random sample from the Estonian tax
register data.
6
In the olletion method, we mainly olleted pries from the internet. If this was
not possible via the internet we olleted the pries by phone. The olletion followed
a questionnaire where the restaurants were divided into four ategories by restaurant
type.
7
Eah ategory had its own questionnaire with a minimum of 7 pries and a
maximum of 11 pries. In eah round of surveys (before and after) we reorded the
prie of the same produt from eah rm. Also, the prie olletors used exatly the
same olletion questionnaires and methods in both ountries, whih is very important
for our analysis. In addition, the prie olletion for hotels followed the same priniples
than the survey for restaurants. Hotel pries refer to hotel room pries. Table 1 presents
desriptive statistis of the prie data in euros. On average, meal pries seem to be lower
in Estonia than in Finland but this is not a substantial problem as we are interested in
the prie hanges over a short period of time.
8
6
We also use CPI data sets for restaurant meal pries in Sweden and Norway as omparison groups in
our prie-response analysis.
7
The restaurant types are a la arte, fast food, afeteria and lunh restaurants.
8
Table A1 in the Appendix shows the desriptive statistis for CPI data from the statistis oes in
Sweden and Norway.
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Finland Estonia
Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N
Main Meal 10.68 7.10 1452 6.51 3.97 746
Other Meal 9.97 5.89 1146 6.35 3.67 748
Vege Meal 8.94 4.64 900 3.72 2.02 674
Pizza 7.71 2.27 704 2.97 1.60 226
Appetizer 4.81 2.90 678 3.34 2.50 542
Lunh 8.30 2.69 464 3.12 1.85 266
Wine 8.70 11.44 204 3.98 6.64 220
Beer 4.44 .97 194 2.36 .71 320
Hotel prie 156.38 246.67 518
Table 1. Prie data: Continuous variables
We also olleted various rm-level ategorial variables. The loation of the rm
(Finland/Estonia), the method of olletion (phone/internet), belonging to a hain and
belonging to a lobbying union representing restaurants and hotels in Finland (MaRa)
9
are the most important ategorial variables in the analysis. In our study, a rm is
onsidered to being a hain if there is more than one restaurant with same name or
rm identier. We also ategorize franhising rms as hains. MaRa, instead, represents
the leading national trade and labor market assoiation in the hospitality industry in
Finland, inluding e.g. both restaurants and hotels. MaRa members produe over 80%
of all turnover in the setor. Table 2 desribes the statistis of these variables (in euros).
Most of the pries are from the internet, almost nine out of ten pries in Estonia were
olleted from the web, whereas in Finland a quarter of the pries were olleted by
phone. It also seems that there are more restaurants belonging to a hain Finland than
in Estonia.
9
Oially, the name of the assoiation is the Finnish Hospitality Assoiation (in Finnish, Matkailu- ja
Ravintolapalvelut MaRa).
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Finland Estonia
Variable Share SD N of rms Share SD N of rms
Internet .72 .45 1345 .89 .32 712
Phone .28 .45 523 .11 .32 88
Chain .32 .47 598 .15 .36 120
MaRa .31 .46 572
Table 2. Prie data: Categorial variables
The histogram in Figure 2 ompares the mean of three meal pries between Finnish
and Estonian restaurants. It seems that the distribution of restaurant meal pries is
relatively similar in Finland and in Estonia. However, the variation in pries seems to
be larger in Finland and there is more weight on the right-hand side of the distribution
in Finland than in Estonia. Nevertheless, the shapes of the distributions are similar,
and thus we are able to ompare Finnish pries with Estonian pries.
The seond data set is from the Finnish Tax Administration and inlude all rms
liable for VAT in Finland. A rm is liable with register to the tax authority if its
turnover for the aounting period (12 months) is over 8,500 euros. The data ontain
important monthly-level information about the rms' ativities inluding turnover and
the wage sums paid by the rms. Table 3 shows the pre-reform desriptive statistis of
turnover and wage sums per month for Finnish restaurants and hotels. It seems obvious
that hotels are larger than restaurants, on average. We also have an extensive set of
yearly-level tax reord data whih we an employ as ontrols in our estimations.
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Figure 2. Histogram of the mean of three meal pries in Estonia and Finland
Restaurants Hotels
Turnover Wage sum Turnover Wage sum
Mean 38,166 12,430 82,090 33,804
Median 14,861 4,876 8,048 11,108
SD 373,656 57,116 360,798 90,372
N 11,343 11,343 1,245 1,245
Table 3. Desriptive statistis for monthly pre-reform turnover and
wage sums of Finnish restaurants and hotels
Figure 3 shows the average monthly turnover of restaurants taxed at dierent VAT
rates over time from the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2011. The standard VAT rate,
23% after July 2010, and two redued VAT rates, 13% and 9% after July 2010, are levied
on dierent goods
10
. The Figure learly shows the VAT reform for restaurants in July
10
Before July 2010 all three VAT rates were 1 perentage point lower. From the beginning of 2013 the
VAT rates have been 24%, 14% and 10%.
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2010, marked with a solid vertial line, as the turnover reported in the seond lowest
VAT rate inreases onsiderably and at the same time turnover in the standard VAT
rate dereases. The reported turnover dereases by approximately 15,000 euros at the
standard VAT rate and inreases by a similar amount at the redued rate. We onsider
this to represent the share of turnover in restaurants from meal sales, on average. Thus
less than half of the turnover of restaurants omes from sales of meals (inluding non-
aloholi beverages)
11
, the remainder oming from selling alohol, drinks, et. whih are
not taxed at the redued VAT rate. Sales at the lowest VAT rate seem to be irrelevant
for restaurants over time.
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Figure 3. Average turnover of restaurants taxed at dierent VAT rates
over time
11
Take-away meals were already at the lower VAT rate of 12% before the reform of July 2010.
176 Restaurant VAT ut
5.5. Results
5.5.1. Prie Eets. In our main prie analysis we formulate a omposite of the
average of three main meal pries for eah restaurant before and after the reform.
12
Therefore, the following graphial analysis of relative hanges in onsumer pries shows
the hanges in this variable. We onstrut this omposite meal in order to avoid being
overly dependent on the hanges in individual meal prie. By onstruting a omposite
meal we an examine the entire hange in a restaurant menu more preisely. However,
we also oer the average prie hange results for eah individual prie.
We use equation (5.2.1) to alulate the relative prie hange for eah rm. The
relative prie hange denotes the perentage hange in the prie after the reform om-
pared to the prie level before the reform. Thus we an show the whole distribution of
prie hanges, whih gives very expliit evidene of how pries have hanged.
Figure 4 presents the relative prie hanges as a omposite in Finland and Estonia.
Similarly, Figure 5 shows the distribution of relative prie hanges in omposite pries of
restaurant meals and hotel rooms in Finland. The vertial line represents the loation of
full pass-through in both graphs, whih is -7.4%. A substantial proportion of restaurants
did not hange their pries at all in Finland, the zero relative hange in the Figure. This
indiates that over half of the whole sample of restaurants did not hange their pries
as a result of the VAT ut. However, there is a distintive peak at the level of full
pass-through. These restaurants shifted the entire tax hange to their pries. We do
not observe muh hange in hotel pries in Finland or restaurant pries in Estonia.
Next we divide the relative prie hange Figures for restaurants by rm-level hara-
teristis. These divisions desribe the relative prie hanges among Finnish restaurants
very preisely. In Figure 6 we divide the data by whether or not a restaurant belongs to
a hain. The Figure shows that restaurants belonging to a hain hanged their pries
12
If we have less than three meal pries for an individual restaurant, we use only one or two pries as
a omposite meal.
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Figure 4. Distribution of relative prie hanges in Finnish and Estonian
restaurants
more often after the VAT ut than those not belonging to a hain. Notie also that
hain status divides the sample very learly into those that hanged their pries and
those that did not. Only 25% of all hain restaurants did not hange their pries and
40% responded with full pass-through. Almost all of the rest also dereased their pries
and we observe only few prie inreases among hains. This suggests that the more or-
ganized restaurants hanged their prie more. They may operate in a more ompetitive
environment, whih may have fored them to redue their pries more due to the VAT
reform. Also, they might have more entralised prie setting strategies than indepen-
dent restaurants that are not part of a hain. It is also remarkable that restaurants not
belonging to a hain have almost an equal amount of both prie dereases and inreases.
Also, for them, there is no lear peak at the level of full pass-through.
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Figure 5. Distribution of relative prie hanges in Finnish restaurants
and hotels
In Figure 7, we divide the data into those restaurants that belong to MaRa and
to those that do not. The Figure evidently shows that these lobbying union members
redued their pries more often than others. Figures 6 and 7 are very similar beause
many of the hains also belong to MaRa. However, Figure 7 also shows a small peak
at the level of full pass-through for restaurants not belonging to MaRa. Furthermore,
this suggests a similar interpretation as we found for hain restaurants: more organized
restaurants had larger prie responses to the reform than independent restaurants.
We employ a natural experimental method to estimate the average prie eets of
the VAT reform. The dependent variable is the log of omposite prie, inluding 3 pries
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Figure 6. Distribution of relative prie hanges aording to restaurants
belonging to a hain and those not belonging to a hain
from the same restaurant before and after the reform. All estimates are dierenes-in-
dierenes (DD) results omparing Finnish restaurant pries in the treatment group
with several ontrol groups over time.
Table 4 presents the average estimates of the eet of the VAT reform on pries. The
Table shows omparisons of Finnish restaurant pries with Estonian restaurant pries in
olumns (1) to (3), Finnish hotel room pries in olumn (4), Swedish restaurant pries in
olumn (5) and Norwegian restaurant pries in olumn (6). Column (1) presents the DD
results ontrolling for ovariates and olumns from (2) to (6) present the xed-eets
results.
Our main result in olumn (2) indiates that unweighted meal pries in Finnish
restaurants fell by 2.2% as a result of the VAT redution when we ompare them to
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Figure 7. Histogram of relative prie hanges aording to whether
restaurants belong to MaRa or not
Estonian meal pries. The response in olumn (3) is a bit larger, a 2.8% derease
in lunh pries. This suggests that lunh pries are a bit more responsive to the tax
redution. However, the response is not statistially dierent from the main estimate.
When omparing with hotel pries, in olumn (4), meal pries seem to deline even
more: 4.4%. This results is somewhat dependent on few prie observations and overall
the variation in hotel room pries is muh larger than in meal pries. A omparison with
Swedish meal pries from the CPI data shows that the average response is only a 1.2%
derease in onsumer pries. However, the CPI data from Sweden inludes only a very
small number of observations for restaurant meals, see Table A1 in the Appendix. The
prie derease is a bit larger than our main estimate as we use Norwegian restaurant
meal pries as a omparison group, in olumn (6).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Composite Composite Lunh Composite Composite Composite
Control Est Est Est Hotels Swe Nor
DD -0.022** -0.022** -0.028** -0.044** -0.012 -0.031**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.022) (0.009) (0.016)
Speiation OLS FE FE FE FE FE
N 2250 2250 1162 2020 1270 2155
R
2
0.200 0.153 0.128 0.081 0.163 0.088
N of rms 1125 581 1010 764 1106
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4. Main estimation results. Dierenes-in-dierenes estimates of pries.
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the omposite prie variable. Column (1) presents the
DD results ontrolled for restaurant ategory, olletion method and restaurant type, olumns (2) to
(4) present the DD results from the xed-eets regression. Columns (1) to (3) ompare Finnish and
Estonian restaurant pries and olumn (4) ompares hanges in Finnish restaurant pries with hotel
pries. Columns (5) and (6) ompare Finnish omposite restaurant meal pries with Swedish and
Norwegian meal pries. The standard errors are alulated by using ountry or industry lusters with
a blok bootstrapping method.
We present the weighted xed eet results in Table 5. The weighted results aim
at measuring the prie hange for a representative onsumer. With this weighting we
also take into aount the heterogeneity in restaurant sizes. We use turnover statistis
for 2010 to onstrut the weights. In pratie we onstrut a ategorial variable of 10
size groups to weight the results. We do this beause the CPI data for Swedish and
Norwegian restaurants ontain only this kind of ategorial variable without information
about the exat numerial value of yearly turnover.
The dependent variable is again the log of omposite prie. Column (1) in Table 5
shows again the main unweighted result, olumn (2) presents the main weighted esti-
mate, olumn (3) shows estimates omparing Finnish restaurants with hotels. Columns
(4) and (5) ompare Finnish restaurant meal pries with Swedish and Norwegian meal
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pries. The tax inidene on pries beause of the VAT redution varies from a 2.4%
to 5.9% derease in pries, depending on the omparison group.
The overall result is that weighting by restaurant size ategories leads to larger prie
hange estimates than without weights. This observation suggests that relatively larger
restaurants redued their pries more than smaller ones. The weighting inreases all
point estimates ompared to the unweighted main result but they are still smaller than
full pass-through (-7.4%). On average, the results suggest that the representative meal
prie dereased by slightly more than half of the full pass-though.
VARS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Norm weight weight weight weight
Hotel Swe Nor
DD -0.022*** -0.033*** -0.059*** -0.024*** -0.042***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
N 2250 2250 2020 1270 3182
R
2
0.153 0.350 0.131 0.380 0.320
N of rms 1125 1144 1010 764 1663
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5. Estimation results weighted by turnover
Note: Fixed eets DD estimates where the dependent variable is the log of omposite prie variable.
Column (1) presents the main result, olumns (2) to (5) present the weighted estimation results,
where the weights are rm turnover in 2010. Columns (1) and (2) ompare hanges in Finnish and
Estonian restaurant pries, whereas olumn (3) ompares hanges in Finnish restaurant and hotel
pries. Columns (5) and (6) ompare Finnish omposite restaurant meal pries with Swedish and
Norwegian pries from CPI data. The heterosedastiity-onsistent standard errors are in parenthesis.
There are number of aveats with these weights, however. The turnover statistis
also inlude other sales than restaurant meals as long as these sales are made within
the same rm. In some ases there are really large orporations that have a range of
ativities from supermarket ativities to gas station operations, as well as restaurant
operations. We takled this problem by reduing the weights espeially for rms that
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were not lassied as primarily belonging to the restaurant setor. Still, the whole
weighting proess is somewhat ad ho in nature, but nevertheless the best available.
The weighted results should be regarded as indiative rather than preise estimates. We
expet that these weighted results oer an upper bound for the atual prie hanges as
the weighting ould still be too high for large restaurants even after the orretions we
make. We also have to be areful when interpreting the signiane of the results as
we present naive heterosedastiity-onsistent standard errors.
To shed more light on what drives the heterogeneity of the results, Tables 6 and
7 show the results where the eet of the reform, represented by the DD-variable, is
interated with the main ategorial variables we olleted in the prie survey proess.
Column (1) in Table 6 presents the result where the DD variable is interated by the
type of restaurant. The omitted type is fast-food restaurants. The results indiate that
there are no dierenes in pass-through whether the restaurant is fast-food, afeteria
or a la arte. But the results suggest that espeially restaurants serving mostly lunhes
redued their pries the most. In olumn (2) the DD variable is interated by whether
the pries where olleted from the internet or by phone. The prie redution is larger
among restaurants for whih we were able to nd a website listing the pries.
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VARS (1) (2)
Classiation Collet rule
DD -0.014* -0.025**
(0.008) (0.012)
A la arte -0.007
*DD (0.005)
Cafe -0.007
*DD (0.009)
Lunh -0.020**
*DD (0.009)
Phone 0.015**
*DD (0.008)
N 2250 2250
R2 0.171 0.163
N of rms 1125 1125
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6. Estimation results divided by restaurant type and olletion method
Note: Fixed eets DD estimates where the dependent variable is the log of the omposite prie
variable. Column (1) presents the results where the DD variable is interated with the 4-step restaurant
lassiation and olumn (2) interated with the prie olletion method (internet or phone). The
standard errors are alulated by using ountry lusters with a blok bootstrapping method.
Table 7 presents further divisions of the results. These are the same divisions we
presented in Figures 6 and 7. It ertainly holds here that if a restaurant belongs to
hain or union, pries are ut more than in the rest of the sample. The results even
suggest that most of the prie responses ome from these more 'organized' or 'unionized'
restaurants, and among restaurants not belonging to these groups, the prie response
was very small if signiantly dierent from zero at all, on average. This is the same
onlusion we already reahed based on the graphial analysis.
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VARS Chain MaRa
DD -0.006 -0.012*
(0.005) (0.007)
Chain -0.040**
*DD (0.017)
MaRa -0.029***
*DD (0.012)
S-Group
*DD
N 2250 2250
R2 0.279 0.215
N of rms 1125 1125
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7. Estimation results divided by whether an establishment be-
longs to a hain or to MaRa
Note: Fixed eets DD estimates where the dependent variable is the log of omposite prie variable.
Column (1) presents results where DD variable is interated with whether restaurant belongs to a
hain or not and olumn (2) whether restaurant belongs to MaRa or not. The standard errors are
alulated by using ountry lusters with blok bootstrapping method.
The results, thus far, show the responses on the log omposite of three pries.
However, this perhaps begs the question as to how dependent the results are on this
ategorization or how heterogeneous the prie responses are aross meal types. Figure
8 shows the average relative redution in pries aross the prie ategories in our prie
data. Pries fell by a similar amount in most prie ategories. The largest point
estimate of prie hanges is for desserts. However, this is still not statistially dierent
from any other meal pries aeted by the VAT redution. Wine and beer are in the
ontrol group, sine their VAT remained at the standard rate. We also observe zero
prie eets for them. This is also a robustness hek for our method.
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xed-eets regression by
eah prie ategory and 95% 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5.5.2. Demand eets. We start the analysis of demand eets by showing graph-
ial evidene. Figure 9 desribes the development of average monthly turnover in thou-
sands of euros for the restaurant and hotel industries over time from January 2008 to
Deember 2011. The solid line on the horizontal axis is the time of the VAT reform,
July 2010, and the dashed lines are for every July in the following years. The Figure
shows that the overall trend over time is similar for these two industries, although on
average it seems to be more pronouned for hotels. There seems to be a lot of variation
in turnover during the alendar year. Consistently, July in eah year has the highest
turnover in both industries. However, the variation reates hallenges for statistial
analysis.
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Figure 9. Average turnover over time for restaurants and hotels
To redue the variation and to identify the hanges in turnover learly, we ompute
a perentage hange variable for eah rm. It ompares the monthly turnover with the
turnover in the same rm 12 months previously. As a formula the variable is:
(5.5.1) SR,m =
1
nR
∑
iǫR
sm,i − sm−12,i
s¯y−1,i
△Sm = SR,m − SH,m
where i denotes the rm, R denotes the restaurant industry, H denotes hotels, m is
the month, y is the year, n is the number of rms, s¯y−1,i denotes the average monthly
turnover of rm i in the previous year and sm−12,i refers to the turnover of rm i
12 months previously. We also ompare the perentage hanges in turnover between
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groups by taking the dierenes of the means of the groups, e.g. between restaurants
and hotels, desribed by △Sm. In addition, we apply this method to investigate the
hanges in wage sums as well in setion 5.5.3.
We apply some neessary data restritions. We examine only those restaurants
where over half of the turnover omes from restaurant meals and those hotels where
at least a third of the turnover omes from hotel room sales. This is neessary as
the industry lassiation is not exat enough to separate rms by the prinipal sales
of the rms. First, the problem is that there are many restaurants and hotels with
oasional operations only. The restaurant industry inludes rms oering oasional
atering servies, bars and kiosks et. Similarly, the hotel industry inludes many
motels whih operate during the summer only and rms renting ottages oasionally.
Seond, there are some large rms with a restaurant or hotel industry lassiation but
the turnover of these rms omes from operations other than selling meals or oering
hotel servies. Third, there are also rms oded in dierent industries than restaurants
or hotels but where a large share of their turnover omes from sales of restaurant meals
or hotel servies. The method of examining hanges in onsumer pries presented in
equation (5.5.1) also requires rms to have positive turnover over time. Thus we use
this method to examine the intensive margin responses. The relevant data set used in
the analysis is approximately half of the total number of the rms desribed in Table
3. This data restrition is valid until setion 5.5.4, where we investigate the extensive
margin responses.
Figure 10 desribes the weighted estimates
13
for SR,m and SH,m in the upper panel
and the mean dierene of these two △Sm in the lower panel over time. The inter-
pretation of Figure 10 is as follows: if the onsumer pries and quantities sold hange
immediately after the reform and remain unhanged in the long run, the turnover
hanges would emerge in the rst 12 months after the reform and there would be no
13
We use average turnover in 2009 for eah rm to weight the estimates.
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hanges after 12 months. This is beause we ompare monthly turnover with turnover
12 months previously for eah rm. The horizontal axis is in months from the reform,
and thus zero refers to July 2010, -12 is July 2009 and so on. The overall trends seem
to be relatively similar between the groups before the reform although there are small
dierenes just before the reform. Nevertheless, the Figure shows that there is a de-
rease in the hange in turnover right after the reform among restaurants relative to
hotels.
We estimated 2% unweighted and 4% weighted pass-through to onsumer pries.
With no hanges in the quantity of servies sold, we should see a 2-4% drop in turnover
for restaurants. If the quantities sold inrease due to the reform, the hange in turnover
would be positive or at least loser to zero than the observed pass-through to pries.
Figure 10 shows that turnover dereases after the reform among restaurants. This gives
us initial evidene suggesting no inrease in demand for restaurant meals due to the
reform.
In addition, Figure 1 suggests that onsumer pries in the Finnish restaurant indus-
try ath up with pries in restaurants in neighboring ountries soon after the reform.
Figure 10 indiates a similar development in turnover. After the reform the hange in
turnover gradually inreases and six months after the reform there is no dierene in the
hanges in turnover between restaurants and hotels. This suggests that the inreases in
onsumer pries aet strongly the turnover valued at onsumer pries, whih further
implies that demand for restaurant meals is inelasti in respet of pries in the short
run. However, the quantities of restaurant meals sold ould also inrease gradually over
longer period of time, whih then would inrease turnover.
Nevertheless, there is a reason whih ould dampen the size of the eet. Turnover
inludes sales of produts and servies other than restaurant meals, as Figure 3 previ-
ously desribed. For example, the VAT rate for alohol and drinks sold in restaurants
is dierent than that for meals, but these goods are inluded in the total turnover.
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Figure 10. Changes in monthly turnover of restaurants and hotels over time
However, the data restritions mentioned above diminish this problem. The hanges
in turnover should, however, be orret if the share of turnover oming from the other
VAT bases is unhanged due to the reform.
An additional margin of response ould be a hange in tax evasion in the industry
due to the reform. This is not diretly observable in the data and we annot investigate
this hannel of response preisely. However, we an disuss the possible eets of tax
evasion with respet to our results. The benets from tax evasion deline after the
reform, whih ould end up reduing tax evasion. A redution in tax evasion would
inrease reported turnover at the lower VAT rate and turnover would also inrease in
response.
14
This eet would go in the same diretion as the demand response and
14
There might be some manipulation in reported VAT by rms due to the reform. Restaurants, for
example, ould report part of their sales at redued VAT rate for whih that rate is not appliable.
We annot observe how orretly rms apply the reporting rules in the data. However, this kind of
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vie versa. Thus our estimate would be a lower bound for the real estimate of reported
turnover and quantity hanges.
Next we show the hange in turnover for rms in our prie sample. We measure
the hange in turnover per quarter to redue the seasonal variation in the data. Again
we apply the method presented in equation (5.5.1). Figure 11 illustrates the hange
in turnover for restaurants by dividing the data aording to their hain status. We
split the data by hain status as hain restaurants redued their pries more often
than others (see Figure 6). Therefore, one would expet to observe growth in turnover
espeially for those restaurants if the quantities respond to prie hanges onsiderably.
The horizontal axis presents quarters from the reform and the solid vertial line is for
the time of the VAT ut. It seems that there is a downward sloping hange in turnover
right after the reform for hain restaurants. The hange in turnover one quarter after
the reform for hain restaurants seems also to be similar in size than the prie pass-
through was. This learly suggests that the quantity of restaurant meals sold did not
inrease in response to the reform. Furthermore, these observations together imply that
the demand for restaurant meals is rather inelasti.
In addition, we estimate the eet of the reform on turnover using a similar DD
strategy as we did for pries. In these estimations we again ollapse the data from
months to quarters and use the data only one year before and one year after the reform
to diminish the variation in the data. Thus these results an be interpreted as short-run
eets on demand.
We ompare the log of turnover between restaurants and hotels before and after the
reform. The logarithmi outome produes proportional hanges and the xed eet
model ontrols for the history of eah rm in a similar fashion as the graphial analysis
report manipulation is illegal (tax evasion), and we think it is not a great problem for the analysis.
Yet the eets on total turnover (turnover taxed at dierent VAT rates in total) that should provide
a orret estimate if tax evasion behavior is not aeted in total.
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Figure 11. Change in quarterly turnover of restaurants: Competitive
and not ompetitive
presented above. The dierene between the graphial analysis and the estimation
strategy is that the omparison is now made with the previous quarter of the year, not
with the year before.
Table 8 shows the results. The rst part of Table 8, olumns (1) and (2), is for
all the restaurants and hotels in the data. Column (1) reports the DD result and
olumn (2) interats the DD variable with the MaRa dummy, MaRa being the union
representing the restaurant and hotel industries. The seond part of the Table, olumns
(3) to (6), is only for rms for whih we have prie data. Otherwise, olumns (3) and
(4) are onstruted as olumns (1) to (2). Column (5) distinguishes the eet on hain
restaurants from other restaurants, olumn (6) separates the eet on restaurants that
did redue their pries by over 5% right after the reform from other restaurants.
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Overall the results imply a derease in turnover for restaurants after the reform.
Column (1) shows that the turnover of restaurants dereased by 4.2% after the reform
relative to hotels. In our prie analysis we found a 4.4% derease in onsumer pries
for restaurants when we ompared them to hotels (see Table 4 olumn (4)). Thus the
hanges in turnover and onsumer pries are very similar. This learly suggests no
inrease in the quantity of restaurant meals sold in the restaurant industry due to the
reform. In olumn (2) we interat the DD variable with a dummy of belonging to MaRa
or not. It seems that the turnover of MaRa restaurants dereases less due to the reform
than the average impat. However, the overall eet is still negative also for MaRa
restaurants.
We also estimate the eets of the reform for the data for whih we have prie
observations. Beause of the small sample and large variation in turnover, we do not
nd any statistially signiant results. Nevertheless the point estimates are what we
should expet based on the graphial analysis above. They are mostly negative and in
olumn (5), where we interat the hain dummy with the DD variable, it shows that
turnover dereased the most among restaurants belonging to a hain. This is also true
for those restaurants that redued their onsumer pries most right after the reform,
in olumn (6). In general, it also seems that the estimates produed by using the
sample for whih we have pries (olumns 3 and 4) are a bit larger than for the whole
sample (olumns 1 and 2), however, the dierene is not statistially signiant for any
omparison.
15
15
The results survived a battery of robustness heks. For example, we performed plaebo treatments
a year before and a year after the atual reform and both of these produed zero results. This also
suggests that the main assumption of the DD method, parallel time trends between groups, is satised.
We also varied the time frame used from the base ase of two years to one, three and four years. These
hanges do not aet the results for turnover muh. In addition, we added yearly level ontrol variables
to the speiations but these did not hange the results.
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All Firms with prie observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARS All MaRa All MaRa Chain Prie hange
DD -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.005 -0.020 0.008 0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.034) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036)
MaRa* 0.025*** 0.056
DD (0.010) (0.035)
Chain* -0.051
DD (0.055)
Prie hange >5%* -0.063
DD (0.054)
N 26,963 26,963 4,146 4,146 4,146 4,146
R
2
0.072 0.072 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.037
N of rms 3,402 3,402 543 543 543 543
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8. DD estimation results: Turnover
Note: Fixed eets DD estimates where the dependent variable is the log of onsumer prie turnover.
Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the whole data set of restaurants and hotels, and olumns
(3) to (6) present the results for those rms for whih we have prie data around the reform. Column
(1) presents the DD results, olumn (2) presents the result where the DD variable is interated with
whether the restaurant belongs to MaRa or not, olumns (3) and (4) ontain the same estimates as
in olumns (1) and (2) but only for rms for whih we have prie data. In olumn (5) we interat
the DD variable by a dummy for belonging to a hain or not, and in olumn (6) for whether or not
a restaurant redued pries by over 5% after the reform. The standard errors are alulated by using
industry-level lusters with a blok bootstrapping method.
5.5.3. Employment eets. We analyse the employment eets by examining
the hanges in rms' monthly wage sums paid to their employees. If there are hanges
in the number of employees or in the salaries of existing employees, we should observe
it with this variable. One of the EU's main reason for allowing redued VAT rates for
labor-intensive industries was to stimulate employment. Thus, from a poliy point of
view, it is highly relevant to study these eets.
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We start again with graphial evidene. Figure 12 desribes the hanges in monthly
wage sums similarly as we desribed in Figure 11 for turnover. Therefore, the analysis
is only on the intensive margin responses. The trends in the hanges in these two
Figures are relatively similar before the reform. However, there is no lear hange in
restaurants' wage sums after the reform. This also seems to hold if we ompare the
hanges in restaurants' wage sums to the orresponding trend in hotels' wage sums
(lower panel of Figure 12). It even seems that the average hange in wage sums for
restaurants dereases slightly right after the reform. Therefore, based on the graphial
evidene, we do not detet any lear hanges, on average, in restaurant wage sums due
to the reform.
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Figure 12. Change in monthly wage sums of restaurants and hotels
We also estimate the eets of the reform on wage sums using the DD approah. We
aggregate the data into quarters and use the log of wage sums as a dependent variable
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similarly as in the turnover estimations. Table 9 reports the results. The olumns
are organized exatly as in Table 8. There are no statistially signiant hanges in
the wage sums of restaurants due to the reform. All the DD estimates are negative,
suggesting that some of the restaurants even dereased their wage payments or the
number of employees after the reform. However, none of these estimates are statistially
signiant. The negative point estimates suggest that restaurants did not inrease their
wage sums due to the reform. We also interated the DD variable with the same set of
ategorial variables as for the turnover estimations. Restaurants belonging to MaRa
or a hain, or restaurants whih hanged their prie most, all have positive interation
oeients. However, again, none are statistially signiant. The zero result for wage
sums seems to be a fair onlusion from these estimations. This gives more evidene
supporting the ineieny of VAT redutions for labor-intensive industries. This also
supports the view that VAT redutions are not an eient way to inrease employment
in the industry, whih was the objetive dened by the EU for VAT uts for labor-
intensive industries.
16
16
Again, we heked the robustness of the results similarly as desribed in footnote 15 for turnover.
The results survived these examinations well.
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All Firms with prie observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARS All MaRa All MaRa Chain Prie hange
DD -0.031 -0.042 -0.016 -0.032 -0.027 -0.051
(0.035) (0.037) (0.048) (0.061) (0.055) (0.058)
MaRa* 0.029 0.037
DD (0.023) (0.066)
Chain* 0.039
DD (0.065)
Prie hange >5%* 0.143
DD (0.094)
N 17,065 17,065 2,831 2,831 2,831 2,831
R
2
0.003 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009
N of rms 2,563 2,563 440 440 440 440
Standard errors in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9. DD estimation results: Wage sums
Note: Fixed eets DD estimates where the dependent variable is the log of wage sums. Columns (1)
and (2) present the results for the whole data set of restaurants and hotels, and olumns (3) to (6)
present the results for those rms for whih we have prie data around the reform. Column (1) presents
the DD results, olumn (2) presents the result where the DD variable is interated with whether a
restaurant belongs to MaRa or not, olumns (3) and (4) ontain the same estimates as olumns (1)
and (2) but only for rms for whih we have prie data. In olumn (5) we interat the DD variable
with a dummy for belonging to a hain or not, and in olumn (6) for whether or not a restaurant
redued pries by over 5% after the reform. The standard errors are alulated by using industry-level
lusters with a blok bootstrapping method.
5.5.4. Entry and exit. An additional hannel of response ould be in extensive
margin. This would be reeted in an inrease in the entry of new restaurants in
the industry and/or a derease in the number of exits. The osts of entering the
market dereased due to the reform, and this might have stimulated new businesses.
In addition, the reform, of ourse, also dereased the osts of operating rms in the
industry, and thus ould have revitalized those businesses struggling in the restaurant
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setor, resulting in a derease in exits. Thus, to provide a onlusive analysis, we study
the number of new entries and exits by omparing hotels and restaurants over time.
This is possible as we have the total data for all restaurants and hotels in the industry
whih are obliged to register with the tax authority. In this setion, we only emphasise
the graphial evidene.
First, in Figure 13 we show how many entries and exits there are per quarter.
It would seem natural for the number of entries and exits to be muh higher in the
restaurant than the hotel industry. The Figure indiates that the number of entries
roughly equals the number of exits in both industries, leaving the total number of rms
unhanged. Both the number of entries and exits seems to be more pronouned in the
rst quarter of the year.
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Figure 13. Number of entries and exits over time: Restaurants and hotels
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To study the possible eets of the reform, we also plot the probabilities of exit and
entry in Figure 14. Both the exit and entry probabilities seem to be relatively stable
over time, although there are some exeptions from the overall trend, e.g. the spike of
exits in the rst quarter of 2011 among hotels (quarter 2 in the Figure). Thus, until
now we may be fairly sure in onluding that we do not observe any hange in exits or
entries due to the reform. However, we still estimate the DD model between restaurants
and hotels, and present the estimates and 95% ondene intervals in Figure 15. The
estimation onrms our previous onlusion: we do not see any hange in DD estimates,
neither for entries nor exits after the reform. However, it is still possible to see some
hanges over a longer period of time, but, at least after 1.5 years, no evidene of hange
is observable.
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Figure 14. Exit and entry probabilities over time: hotels and restaurants
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Figure 15. DD estimates for exit and entry over time: hotels vs. restaurants
5.6. Conlusions
We examine the eets of a VAT ut on restaurant meal pries, demand and wage
sums paid to employees in Finland. The VAT rate was redued from 22% to 13% from
the beginning of July 2010. The EU Member States were allowed to apply redued VAT
rates for restaurant servies just one year before the Finnish reform (CD 2009/47/EC).
Thus restaurants did not have muh time to antiipate the hange. We also think that
poliy endogeneity is not a substantial problem, sine it was beause of the EC Diretive
that the Finnish government hose to apply redued VAT to the restaurant industry
rather than other similar industries. Therefore, we have an interesting opportunity to
redibly estimate the eets of onsumption taxes on dierent important margins of
response.
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We use an extensive amount of graphial evidene in the analysis. This is possible
beause we have unique rm-level prie data and tax reord data for monthly turnover
and wage sums. With our prie data, reated espeially for this study, we are able to
show the whole distribution of prie hanges due to the reform. This is not ommon in
the previous literature. In addition, we have an opportunity to estimate rarely available
margin of response in the previous literature as we approximate the hanges in quantities
of restaurant meals sold after onsumption tax reform. Using these information together
we may draw a onlusion of the eetiveness of onsumption taxes on this setor.
We make use of the standard dierene-in-dierene approah with xed eets to
estimate the average eet of the reform on onsumer pries, demand for restaurant
meals and wage sums. Our main estimate implies that the VAT ut redued restau-
rant meal pries on average by 2.2%. A full pass-through would have implied a 7.4%
onsumer prie redution. Thus, the prie redution is approximately a quarter of full
pass-through to pries. The weighted hange in pries was higher, 4%, over half of the
full pass-through. The interpretation of the dierene between the estimates is that,
on average, larger rms redued pries more than smaller rms. Also, there seem to
be large dierenes in the prie estimates, espeially depending on whether or not the
restaurant belongs to a hain or MaRa (the union representing restaurants and hotels).
If a restaurant belongs to one (or both) of these ategories, the prie hange was muh
larger than in our base-line estimates. Independent rms, not belonging to any union
or hain, seem to have mostly ignored the reform as they did not hange their pries at
all in a result of the reform. We also found that lunh restaurants redued their pries
slightly more than other types of restaurants.
Our results for turnover and wage sums suggest no hanges in demand for restaurant
servies or employment in the setor. We nd that even those restaurants whih did
hange their pries the most did not experiene an inrease in the number of restaurant
meals sold. We also have graphial evidene supporting the view that turnover follows
202 Restaurant VAT ut
the development of onsumer pries. In addition, we do not nd any eets on entry
into or exit out of the restaurant industry due to the reform.
These observations imply that the prie elastiity of demand (quantities) is very
small or even lose to zero. Our estimates are in line with the paper by Kosonen
(2010) studying the eet of a VAT ut on hairdressers in Finland. Thus we onlude
that onsumption tax reforms for labor-intensive industries, even when as large as
in this ase, are not very eient poliy means for inreasing demand. Also, the job
reation objetive of redued VAT rates for labor-intensive industries (CD 1999/85/EC)
is evidently not fullled.
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Appendix
Sweden Norway
Variable Mean N Variable Mean N
Dinner1 42.41 84 Beef 8.95 36
Dinner2 32.28 63 Salmon 21.74 138
Dinner3 24.37 93 Salad 14.58 165
LunhA 9.70 115 Pizza 15.06 144
LunhB 10.34 59 Sandwih 5.97 202
Lunh Fish 14.26 49 Soup 11.15 92
Wine 29.31 117 Wine 8.91 310
Beer 6.32 117 Beer 8.05 220
Table A1. Desiptive statistis for CPI data from the statistis oes
of Sweden and Norway (in euros)
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